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Abstract
Based on the assumption that industrial relations influence 
labour market outcomes, the thesis examines first, the
characteristics and the evolution of bargaining structures and 
procedures in the Greek system of industrial relations, second, 
the governmental policies aimed at wage and employment 
regulation, and third, the extent to which, in the context of 
developments in industrial relations as well as in the context of
incomes policy, there was room for relative wage flexibility in
the Greek manufacturing sector.
The main conclusion of the thesis is that, despite the extensive 
and continuous regulation of wage determination procedures by
successive governments, changes in industrial relations which 
occurred after 1975 and were marked by decentralised, fragmented 
and informal collective bargaining, were accompanied by 
flexibility in relative wages.
The sources of this flexibility, which is largely non­
competitive, are related to industry-specific productivity gains 
as well as to industry-specific rates of strike activity. 
Moreover, the rise of decentralised, fragmented and informal 
collective bargaining influenced the effectiveness of the norm- 
based and the indexation incomes policies as far as variation in 
the inter-industry wage structure in the Greek manufacturing 
sector is concerned.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
The system of industrial relations in Greece is regulated as far 
as procedural (collective bargaining units and levels) and 
substantial (wages and employment adjustment) aspects are 
concerned. The purpose of the thesis is to examine the extent of 
this regulation, its consequences regarding the evolution of 
bargaining structures and procedures, and the extent to which, in 
the context of regulation and changing industrial relations, 
there has been any room for relative wage flexibility. In the 
same context, another purpose is to evaluate governmental incomes 
policies with regard to flexibility in the labour market.
It is a running theme of this thesis that developments in 
industrial relations have played a central role in relative wage 
flexibility in Greek manufacturing. More specifically, by 
developments in industrial relations we mean the changes towards 
decentralised and fragmented bargaining at the company and plant 
level through bargaining procedures evolving out of the formal 
system of industrial relations.
As in every industrialised market economy, in Greece too, wage 
setting is not just an economic process. Institutional 
arrangements and developments in industrial relations do matter 
as far as the workings of the labour market are concerned. 
Recently there has been an increasing interest on bargaining
15
structures, industrial relations systems and their relationship 
with economic performance and structural adjustment.
Considered in a comparative perspective, bargaining structures 
have been brought at the forefront of the research and debate 
regarding macroeconomic performance and its association with 
labour market characteristics. What comes out of this literature 
in various versions, as summarised by Calmfors and Driffil 
(1988), is that the speed of response or adjustment of 
collective bargaining to new economic conditions depends on the 
degree of centralisation at the collective bargaining structures. 
The underlying rationale is that large and centralised unions 
which bargain at the national level can, and do, take into 
account the macroeconomic consequences of their behaviour and in 
a sense become partners in macroeconomic policy- making so as to 
minimise the costs of inflation and unemployment.
However, Calmfors and Driffil (1988) challenged the literature 
which asserts that the more corporatist is an economy the better 
is its economic performance. And they argued that both extremes, 
namely the highly centralised and the highly decentralised 
systems of wage setting work best as far as the macroeconomic 
performance is concerned. The rationale underlying this argument 
is that in highly centralised systems of wage setting trade- 
unions enjoying relatively extensive market power, consider the 
macroeconomic consequences of their bargaining behaviour, while 
in highly decentralised systems of wage setting unions have a 
relatively limited market power and thus they cannot delay the
16
necessary adjustments in the labour market.
A study by OECD (1987) discussed and emphasised the importance of 
bargaining structures for economic performance and labour market 
flexibility. After a period, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
of widespread treating of trade-unions as scapegoats, the study 
by OECD (1987: 140) proposed a more balanced view and recognised 
that "in no OECD country have labour markets functioned outside 
the framework of a socially structured system of industrial 
relations" and that "it may be taken as a premise that collective 
bargaining will remain at the centre of labour market in OECD 
countries". From this point of view the policy implication is 
that "a durable improvement in the wage setting process hinges on 
the evolution of labour market institutions and in particular of 
collective bargaining" (OECD 1987:41).
In the literature on industrial relations and economic 
performance, Greece is a case hardly examined. This is largely 
due to problems regarding data availability. However, this does 
not mean that questions regarding the Greek system of industrial 
relations have not been raised by the parties concerned and 
policy-makers. Currently three questions are debated: compulsory 
arbitration for dispute resolution in collective bargaining, 
incomes policy and the system of automatic indexation, and 
employment regulation and protection and the legislation on 
collective dismissals. The criticism on these labour market 
issues has been growing during the last two decades.
With regard to arbitration since the mid-1970s, the system of
17
compulsory arbitration has been the frequent target of criticism 
mainly by the labour side. Political parties have repeatedly 
promised to reform this system. During the 1980s, throughout the 
course of Socialist governments, successive Ministers of Labour 
announced its reform, which never occurred. Currently new 
legislation regarding the system of arbitration is to be 
discussed in the Greek parliament. Despite the criticism, the 
system of collective bargaining in Greece, and especially 
compulsory arbitration, have not been sufficiently studied. Not 
even the criteria for the evaluation of its performance have been 
spelled out. This is one reason for why the will for reforms is 
not followed by clear ideas concerning the system which should be 
adopted.
Formal incomes policies were first adopted in 1975. During the 
1960s, the Greek economy enjoyed low rates of inflation, with the 
annual average of the 1960-70 period being below 2.0 per 
cent. Inflation became an apparent and severe problem during 
the mid-1970s, and, since then has been fluctuating at double­
digit levels. Those persistently high levels of inflation 
obliged successive governments to undertake formal incomes 
policies for controlling cost-push and demand-led inflationary 
pressures. Since 1975 there has been no period without formal 
incomes policy in force.
Apart from being a matter of political debate, incomes policy has 
been the target of systematic criticism in the literature. It is 
noteworthy that the first major and systematic criticism of 
incomes policy in Greece referred to its distributional aspects
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and effects. Pavlopoulos (1987) criticised incomes policy 
adopted over the decade 1975-85 because they caused an increased 
labour share in national income and led real wages to grow faster 
than productivity. He concluded that the conditions under which 
the dramatic increase of the labour share in the national income 
occurred, indicate that trade-unions, under the proper 
institutional arrangements, can increase the labour share in 
national income. But, he argued, such an increase was not 
consistent with and was detrimental to economic growth. However, 
Pavlopoulos did not discuss the institutional arrangements 
regarding trade-unions, under which the increase occurred.
Kioulafas (1987) addressed another aspect of incomes policies, 
namely their effects upon wage differentials among individuals 
and concluded that the incomes policy adopted during the decade 
1975-85 narrowed the wage differentials between individuals of 
different skills, education, and experience and led, contrary to 
the varying human capital characteristics of the labour force, 
to a very egalitarian wage structure.
Since the early 1980s, but mainly since the 1985-87 stabilisation 
programme, the Greek labour market has been the frequent target 
of criticism for its lack of flexibility. Two main policy 
issues concerning wage determination and employment adjustment 
are central in the debate. Both are related to the key aspects of 
labour market flexibility. First, there is the issue of 
indexation in wage determination. Second, there is the issue of 
controls upon collective dismissals. However, the flexibility
19
debate has not been properly and explicitly set up upon either 
evidence or, at least, coherent normative approaches of the Greek 
labour market. It has been, more or less, for both pro- and anti­
flexibility sides, set in rather ideological terms. Flexibility 
has been proposed as a panacea, without being quite clear how it 
is linked with the workings of the labour market in the Greek 
economy.
The socialist governments of the period 1982-88 always avoided 
being explicit on the flexibility issue and, indeed, during the 
1985-87 economic stabilisation programme, backed off from a 
labour market flexibility drive because it was considered too 
costly in political terms. The opposition parties of the 1982-88 
period, have not been clear enough on their views about 
flexibility in the labour market. In fact, the Conservative party 
has adopted the phraseology of the flexibility drive as proposed 
and implemented in Western industrialised market economies, 
mainly the U.K. version. The Communist party has been opposing 
altogether any policy towards labour market flexibility. Unions 
too have opposed any flexibility measures as an offensive 
against themselves and employees.
With regard to flexibility in the labour market there are two 
main questions. First has there been any flexibility in relative 
wages in the Greek manufacturing sector and, in turn, has this 
flexibility, or the lack of it, been a solution for problems 
arising from wage determination developments, or flexibility has 
been part of the problems. Second, there is the choice concerning 
the policy mix for moderation in wage determination on the one
20
hand, and job security on the other. Both the partial indexation 
and the employment regulation policies seem to provide to the 
typical employee a certain degree of income and job security. 
The policy issue is whether the menu should be modified, for 
instance, either radically towards de-indexation and more 
flexible legislation for collective dismissals, or in a rather 
corporatist way towards the use of job security as a quid pro quo 
for moderate wage determination.
In other words, the question of the relationship between 
industrial relations and economic performance, wage flexibility 
in particular, has been raised on different occasions by 
academics, politicians, trade-unions and employers associations. 
Furthermore, in the late 1980s policies and measures for de­
regulation of the capital, products and labour market have been 
initiated. But, the reform of the Greek labour market and the 
national system of industrial relations has neither been at the 
top of the agenda nor implemented, despite the accumulating and 
intensifying criticism regarding their long-lasting 
characteristics and wage and employment policies persistently 
used by successive governments.
To put the varying views on labour market and industrial 
relations issues, as well as the developments in Greek 
manufacturing over the last two decades, in an international and 
comparative industrial relations perspective, the distinction 
proposed by OECD (1987) between two quite different approaches to 
collective bargaining, namely the highly centralised and the
21
highly decentralised, provides a fruitful starting point.
The OECD (1987:41) study concluded that both highly decentralised 
bargaining, as in the U.S. and in Japan, and highly centralised 
bargaining, as in Austria, Sweden, Norway and Germany, have 
proved reasonably successful in obtaining "sensible wage 
outcomes" while labour market outcomes have been consistently 
poorer in those countries where collective bargaining structures 
fall between these extremes, as in the U.K., France, Italy and 
Belgium. Calmfors and Driffil (1988) arrived at the same 
conclusion.
On the basis of the policy orientation towards more flexibility 
in labour markets, the OECD study suggested that a greater degree 
of decentralisation of collective bargaining to the enterprise 
level would be the preferable policy stance for countries aiming 
at flexibility and structural adjustment. To secure that 
decentralised bargaining would not aggravate inflationary 
pressures and would not be accompanied by widespread industrial 
conflicts, the OECD study spelled out some preconditions 
regarding the legal framework and employers solidarity in the 
bargaining process.
Given these definitions and policy prescriptions, the Greek 
system of industrial relations cannot be easily classified into 
one of the three above mentioned categories. Is the structure of 
collective bargaining in Greece centralised, decentralised or 
does it fall between these two extremes?
Prima facie, it could be classified into the group centralised
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collective bargaining. But developments in manufacturing 
industrial relations after 1975 indicate a trend towards 
decentralisation of collective bargaining to the company and 
plant level. Therefore, the Greek experience provides a basis 
for examining, in the context of governmental regulation of the 
labour market and changing institutions and processes of 
collective bargaining, the question of relative wage 
flexibility in manufacturing. This thesis examines exactly these 
questions.
The thesis consists of five main chapters. Chapters 2 and 3 
examine procedural and institutional issues. Chapter 2 discusses 
the main characteristics of collective bargaining procedures and 
structures in Greece and examines the evolution of the formal 
bargaining structure. Chapter 3 discusses the role of compulsory 
arbitration and strike activity in the Greek system of industrial 
relations, examines the compatibility of compulsory arbitration 
with collective bargaining and analyses institutional 
developments associated with the strike behaviour of salary and 
wage earners.
Chapter 4 discusses the governmental involvement in wage 
determination and employment regulation. It analyses the 
rationales and the mechanics of incomes policies adopted in 
Greece since 1975 and examines the variability in the wage 
structure in Greek manufacturing. It also presents the existing 
legislation and the mechanics for employment regulation and 
examines the evolution of employment in the Greek manufacturing
23
sector.
Chapter 5 examines the extent to which the Greek manufacturing 
wage structure has been responsive either to competitive 
influences or to industry-specific conditions. Moreover, as these 
two different types of flexibility may exert opposite influence 
upon labour allocation and employment growth, this chapter 
discusses the extent to which such responsiveness, if any, has 
been employment enhancing or not. The examination of flexibility 
in relative wages is performed at the disaggregated level of two- 
digit industrial branches in manufacturing.
Chapter 6 examines the level and the direction of influence 
exerted by the norm-based and the indexation-based incomes policy 
upon the inter-industry wage structure in the Greek 
manufacturing sector over the period 1975-88 as well as the 
influence of aggregate inflation, unemployment and variation in 
strike activity. The inter-industry wage structure in Greek 
manufacturing is described by the coefficient of variation of 
average hourly pay of male workers across twenty two-digit 
branches. This analysis can offer an account of the wage- 
inflation process at the disaggregated level and its association 
with the rise of the informal collective bargaining in the Greek 
manufacturing sector.
Chapter 7 summarises the findings of the thesis, draws the 
conclusions and discusses the policy implications. The main 
findings of the thesis are the following.
With regard to bargaining structures and procedures the main
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findings of the thesis suggest that within the formal system of 
collective bargaining, despite the extensive legalistic control 
exerted by successive governments via the Ministry of Labour, 
there were tendencies towards more decentralised bargaining. 
These tendencies were noticeable even in the Greek manufacturing 
sector where collective bargaining at the company and the plant 
level is not permitted.
As far as the role of compulsory arbitration is concerned it is 
argued that arbitration has been incompatible with collective 
bargaining not because of its compulsory character but because of 
its lack of independence from the Ministry of Labour, which used 
the machinery of compulsory arbitration for implementing the 
governmental incomes policy. Moreover, arbitration is found 
unsuccessful in controlling industrial conflicts, the rise of 
which, especially in manufacturing, led to the creation of an 
informal system of collective bargaining at the plant level. 
Therefore, decentralisation and fragmentation of collective 
bargaining has been a dominant feature of manufacturing 
industrial relations after 1975.
The rise in strike activity and the set up of the informal system 
of collective bargaining after 1975, and throughout the period 
1975-88, coincided with the use of formal incomes policies 
largely aimed to compress the wage structure. Especially the 
egalitarian indexation policy of the period 1982-88 was clearly 
designed to narrow wage differentials. However, variability in 
manufacturing wages was observed throughout the period 1966-88.
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In the same period, contrary to what happened in the majority of 
industrialised market economies, employment in Greek 
manufacturing has been expanding, faster in 1967-74 and slower 
since then.
In the context of substantial and procedural regulation of the 
Greek labour market, it is found that this regulation permitted 
only episodes of competitive flexibility in relative wages, while 
the observed variability was mainly associated with non­
competitive flexibility caused by industry-specific factors such 
as changes in productivity and strike activity. The decentralised 
and informal collective bargaining is considered as the main 
institutional precondition favouring non-competitive flexibility 
in relative wages. Furthermore, egalitarian incomes policies, as 
they insulated wage formation in branches with below-average 
changes in productivity from their relative productivity 
performance, caused inter-industry asymmetries between changes in 
wages and changes in productivity which, over the period 1977-88, 
were employment hindering.
The examination of the influence exerted by the norm-based and 
the indexation incomes policies leads to the conclusion that 
since 1975, in the Greek manufacturing sector and in the context 
of collective bargaining, incomes policies dominated the 
variation in the inter-industry wage structure. However, the 
influence of the informal system of collective bargaining is 
noticeable, as it caused the business cycle variables, i.e. 
inflation and unemployment, to affect the wage structure in an 
unconventional way, by making them to work in favour of the high-
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wage and high-bargaining power industrial branches. The influence 
exerted by strike activity was not homogeneous as not every 
strike is successful and strike-proneness does not always 
indicate bargaining power.
Overall, in the context of a regulated system of industrial 
relations and given the continuous use of incomes policy, in the 
Greek manufacturing sector, the move towards decentralised 
and fragmented collective bargaining, observed after 1975, 
caused a certain degree of flexibility in relative wages which 
was associated with industry-specific characteristics. Bargaining 
structures and relative wages have not been as rigid and ossified 
as an overview of the governmental policies for procedural and 
substantial regulation may imply.
However, the prevailing decentralisation and the observed 
flexibility were not part of a solution similar to that proposed 
by the OECD study. They rather were part of a twofold problem 
regarding first, the harmonisation of the formal system of 
collective bargaining with the real bargaining structures and 
procedures and second, the need for moving from permanent incomes 
policies to wage determination based more upon voluntary 
collective bargaining institutions and processes.
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CHAPTER 2: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES.
2.1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.
The post-war system of industrial relations in Greece, as far as 
collective bargaining is concerned, has been based upon Law 3239 
introduced in 1955. Excessive legalistic regulation of 
collective bargaining is one of its main features. Legalistic 
regulation applies to bargaining levels and units, to the 
coverage of collective agreements and to the qualification of 
trade-unions for collective bargaining.
The practical consequences of this legalistic regulation upon 
collective bargaining institutions and processes in Greece have 
not been sufficiently studied. Not even the criteria for such an 
examination have been spelled out. This is one reason for why 
the will for reforms is not followed by clear ideas concerning 
the system which should be adopted. Conflicting interests between 
the parties to the bargaining process are expected but it is 
important for the national system of industrial relations whether 
the bargaining structures, through which conflicting aspirations 
as far as wage and employment regulation are concerned, remain 
stable or not.
This chapter discusses collective bargaining procedures and 
structures and examines institutional developments associated 
with the bargaining behaviour of salary and wage earners. The 
analysis first, deals in general with the dynamics of the formal
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system of collective bargaining set up by Law 3239 and, then, 
focuses upon developments in the manufacturing bargaining 
structure.
Section 2.2 discusses theoretical and methodological questions 
about bargaining structures and behaviour. Section 2.3 analyses 
the Greek formal system of collective bargaining with reference 
to trade-unions developments and to the characteristics and the 
evolution of the formal bargaining structure. Section 2.4 
discusses the bargaining structure and the formal bargaining 
procedures in the manufacturing sector. Section 2.5 summarises 
the findings and presents the conclusions of this chapter.
Our analysis suggests that in the Greek system of industrial 
relations the formal structure of collective bargaining and the 
legalistic regulation of formal bargaining procedures have 
created rather ossified bargaining structures which exclude, 
especially in manufacturing, collective bargaining at the 
company or plant level. Nevertheless, during the 1975-81 period, 
even within the formal system of collective bargaining, pressures 
and tendencies towards decentralised and fragmented bargaining at 
the company and plant level occurred.
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2.2. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND BARGAINING STRUCTURES
2.2.1. Bargaining Structures ; Levels and Units.
Collective bargaining is one mode of wage and job regulation. 
Apart from it, as Flanders (1970:94) pointed out, five other 
modes can be identified: unilateral regulation by either
employers or employees, tripartite regulation, state and social 
regulation. In the industrialised market economies there has been 
a long tradition of collective bargaining. At least during the 
last three decades, collective bargaining has been the dominant 
mode of wage and job regulation.
Historically, wage earners initiated collective action and 
organisation and, in most cases, employers begun to form their 
own collective organisations largely as reaction to growing 
levels of unionisation and trade-unions activity. As Sisson 
(1987:11) observed, in most of the industrialised countries, 
employers came to an accommodation with trade-unions mainly 
during the first half of this century, with the exceptions of the 
U.K. and Japan which came to an accommodation earlier and later 
respectively.
Analytically, bargaining structures and bargaining behaviour 
consist the two main aspects of collective bargaining. The 
development of collective bargaining has been mainly based upon 
the formation of bargaining structures through which trade-unions 
and employers regulate the employment relationship. While the
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parties * behaviour has largely influenced the shape of national 
bargaining structures, legislation has in many cases played a key 
role in establishing bargaining structures as central elements of 
national systems of industrial relations. According to Cordova 
(1987:308) that was made possible by the incorporation of 
collective agreements, as a new source of rules and regulation in 
the field of labour, in the legal system of various countries.
In the literature there is no commonly agreed benchmark for 
distinguishing and articulating structural and behavioural 
aspects of collective bargaining, probably because the 
interactive relationship between them runs in both directions. A 
recent OECD (1987) study discussed structural aspects as the 
breadth of bargaining and the depth of collective agreements, as 
well as behavioural aspects as the constraints upon, and the 
societal role of, organisations involved in collective 
bargaining. The OECD study adopted the methodology proposed by 
Clegg (1976) who had argued that differences in the level at 
which collective bargaining takes place explain largely 
international variations in unions membership and structure, 
strikes, unions government and workplace organisation.
Even when, for methodological reasons, the distinction between 
bargaining structures and behaviour is made clear, there is no 
commonly agreed definition either of the concept of bargaining 
structure or of its elements or dimensions. The emphasis has been 
put upon varying aspects and dimensions. From this point of view, 
Windmuller (1987:82) proposed the use of the concept of
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collective bargaining structure with reference to bargaining 
levels and bargaining units. The concept of bargaining levels 
refers to hierarchical and horizontal layers at which 
negotiations take place and which, in a sense, form the 
scaffolding of any bargaining structure. The concept of the 
bargaining unit comprehends the groupings of employees and 
employers represented in collective negotiations and subjected to 
terms embodied in agreements.
Windmuller (1987:81-119), in his comparative assessment of 
bargaining structures in the industrialised market economies, 
concluded, first, that great diversity in national bargaining 
structures is observed, and second, that their basic features, 
once put in place tend to persist. Nevertheless, the relative 
stability in bargaining structures does not imply that they do 
escape pressures for change. Such changes may be initiated by 
either of the parties to the bargaining process. If these changes 
become widespread and synchronised, then the national bargaining 
structure as a whole may become under severe pressures for change 
towards relative decentralisation or centralisation. Successive 
waves of such pressures may have long-lasting effects upon the 
coherence of bargaining structures.
2.2.2. Decentralisation in Bargaining Structures.
Chamberlain (1961:5) suggested that to understand the formation 
and evolution of bargaining units, beyond their formal and legal 
sense, especially as far as the workers contribution is
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concerned, it is necessary to take into account that "a 
collective bargaining unit and the power structure within it are 
products of efforts by workers to achieve their aspirations which 
frequently collide as well as coincide with each other". In the 
same line of argument, Weber (1967:20) offered a more technical 
approach to the parties behaviour towards the bargaining 
structure. In the context of decision making on the basis of 
cost-benefit analysis "each party will seek to devise a structure 
that will maximise its capacity for inflicting real or expected 
costs on the other party in the course of the bargaining 
process".
From this point of view and with regard to the relative stability 
of the bargaining structure in the U.S., where bargaining units 
are certified by national or state labour relations agencies, 
Chamberlain (1961:9) argued that it is important to analyse 
collective bargaining structures in broader terms by taking into 
account the "interplay between the administratively determined 
and "appropriate" bargaining unit ... and the informal shifting 
and usually underground combinations of employees within the 
unit". Such informal shifting along with the administratively 
determined levels and units consist what we could designate as 
the real bargaining structure.
Relative long-run stability in many European and the U.S. 
bargaining structures is observed for most of the post-war 
period, and sometimes beyond, back in their formative periods. 
However, according to Clarke (1987:50), over the post-war period, 
even in the context of long-run relative stability, the levels at
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which bargaining is conducted have tended to change in most 
European countries mainly towards bargaining at the level of the 
enterprise or plant. Apart from this slow process, there were 
also periods during which bargaining structures became under 
severe and systematic pressures which resulted in their further 
fragmentation.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s in Europe, where bargaining 
structures have been relatively more centralised than in the 
U.S., decentralisation became a strong tendency initiated by the 
shop-floor militancy of the workforce. It was associated with the 
strike activity at the plant level and characterised by the 
challenges to the managerial prerogatives (Dubois, 1978). 
Decentralisation of bargaining structures offered the means for 
opposing macroeconomic policies of wage restraint and 
microeconomic policies for rationalisation of industrial 
relations at the plant level (Soskice, 1978). The French May in 
1968 and the Italian Hot Autumn in 1969 were tips of the iceberg, 
analysed in Crouch and Pizzorno (1978), which created major 
disturbances in French and Italian bargaining structures.
By contrast to the labour initiated widespread move towards 
decentralisation of bargaining structures, observed in Europe in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, in the 1980s bargaining 
structures became also under pressure but the tendency from 
country to country as well as within countries was not 
homogeneous. Both moves towards decentralisation and 
centralisation were observed. Decentralisation of the bargaining
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structure has again entered the agenda of industrial relations as 
part of the flexibility drive which has been initiated by 
employers and governments. An ILO (1984) review of developments 
in collective bargaining noticed the employers* interest in 
lowering the level of bargaining but concluded that this could 
hardly be generalised to all European countries. In a more recent 
overview Baglioni (1989) concluded that in Europe, while 
collective regulation of industrial relations remains central, 
there has been a general trend towards decentralisation of 
collective bargaining which often reflects employers decisions 
and initiatives.
The role of governments regarding changes in bargaining 
structures varies according to their policies. Incomes policies, 
to increase their chance for success, require centralised 
collective bargaining structures. Deregulation policies aimed at 
increased flexibility in the labour market favour decentralised 
bargaining structures. Therefore, the variety of policies adopted 
by governments have not contributed to the move towards a single 
pattern of bargaining structures.
However, the OECD (1987) study, even after concluding that 
decentralised bargaining provides a setting in which the 
conditions and prospects of individual enterprises bear on wage 
outcomes and that decentralisation would contribute to smoother 
adjustment to changing patterns of labour demand, remains 
sceptical about the possible benefits of decentralised bargaining 
as it recognised that both theoretical analysis and the post-war 
history of industrial relations do not support the inference that
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more decentralised systems always function better in the sense 
of what OECD perceives as "economically sensible wage outcomes".
2.2.3. Fragmentation and Coherence in Bargaining Structures.
Bargaining structures, considered in a comparative perspective, 
have been brought at the forefront of the research and debate 
regarding macroeconomic performance and labour market 
characteristics in industrialised market economies. The alleged 
relatively better unemployment performance of the corporatist 
mode of wage and job regulation has been the theme of both 
normative and positive approaches. This literature has unfolded 
on the basis of the concept of corporatism which is mainly 
developed in the context of the political theory and sociology. 
The common denominator of all definitions of corporatism is the 
concept of centralised bargaining structure. Indeed, in the 
comparative research on industrial relations and macroeconomic 
performance, centralisation in the wage setting is the corner­
stone of the corporatist model.
Calmfors and Driffil (1988) summarised varying definitions of 
corporatism as well as the variations in the specification of 
centralisation in wage setting. For instance, Schmitter (1981) 
emphasised centralisation of the trade-unions structure. Blyth 
(1979) focused upon centralisation with regard to levels of 
bargaining and the existence of join central bodies to which 
employers and unions participate. Cameron (1984) emphasised the 
centralisation of trade-unionism along with the unionisation
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density in the economy. Bruno and Sachs (1985) emphasised 
centralisation in bargaining structures and the existence of 
consensus between labour and employers. But in all cases the 
ranking of countries, according to their degree of corporatism, 
was very similar.
To these specifications Calmfors and Driffil added their own 
emphasising the extent of inter-union and inter-employer co­
operation in wage bargaining. They preferred to focus upon the 
behavioural rather than the formal context of wage setting. Their 
specification of centralisation and corporatism is similar to 
that proposed by Lash (1985), and used by Newell and Symons 
(1987), which emphasised both the tripartite character of the 
corporatist institutions as well as their policy purposes for 
high levels of employment through co-ordination and moderation 
in wage demands. Tarantelli (1984) also proposed an analogous 
specification of centralised industrial relations.
Calmfors and Driffil (1988) on the basis of their 
conceptualisation of corporatism, challenged the literature 
which asserts that the more corporatist is an economy the better 
is its economic performance and criticised the thesis that 
centralisation at the bargaining structure is that component of 
corporatism which may explain the relation between corporatism 
and economic performance. They argued that both highly 
centralised and highly decentralised systems of wage setting work 
best as far as the macroeconomic performance is concerned.
A similar argument was made in the OECD (1987:119-151) study
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which adopted an approach to industrial relations in OECD 
countries beyond the dichotomy of corporatist and non-corporatist 
systems and took into account both structural and behavioural 
aspects of collective bargaining. That study concluded that it 
is not simply the degree of centralisation but rather the degree 
of coherence of bargaining structures, i.e. the lack of multi­
union bargaining and overlapping bargaining structures, that has 
a major influence on how labour markets adjust.
2.2.4. Summary.
To summarise, in the industrialised market economies collective 
bargaining has been a dominant mode of wage and job regulation. 
Bargaining structures, consisting of various levels and units, 
provide the basis for collective bargaining activities. However, 
the behaviour of both parties to the bargaining process may 
transform bargaining structures. A tendency towards more 
decentralised bargaining has been observed in European industrial 
relations. Beyond the dichotomy between centralised and 
decentralised bargaining structures, their stability or change 
are important regarding whether or not they lead to further 
coherence or fragmentation. Coherence or fragmentation may be 
observed in both corporatist and highly decentralised bargaining 
structures.
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2.3. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE FORMAL BARGAINING STRUCTURE IN 
GREECE.
2.3.1. Procedures. Levels and Units of Collective Bargaining.
Greece belongs to those countries where legislation plays a 
central role in the regulation of industrial relations. 
Progressive legislation was introduced in the early decades of 
the century and when in 1948 the ILO studied the Greek labour 
law observed that legislation prior to the dictatorship period 
(1936-40) compared quite favourably with that of most other 
countries (ILO, 1949:16,221). However, it is not only the 
presence of legislation and its content but, indeed, its 
application for the regulation of procedural and/or substantial 
issues in industrial relations which determines whether it is 
satisfactory or not.
In post-war Greece, new labour legislation has been introduced 
which reassured and strengthened the legalistic character of the 
system of industrial relations. Since 1955 industrial relations 
have been dominated by Law 3239 which set up the institutional 
framework for collective bargaining. In fact, the system of 
collective bargaining implemented by Law 3239 was not completely 
new. It was rather similar to that introduced in 1954 by Law 
3086. Law 3239 is still in force and, indeed, consists a form of 
strong state regulation of collective bargaining procedures. On 
the basis of the definitions proposed by Flanders (1970:94)
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regarding the modes of wage and job regulation, the Greek formal 
system seems to be an hybrid form of collective bargaining 
subject to direct state regulation.
According to Law 3239, collective agreements should be in written 
form and must be signed by representatives of the bargaining 
parties concerned. Then, to be ratified and to be given lawful 
enforcement, collective agreements are required to pass through 
formal processes which involve the Ministry of Labour. They 
should be submitted to, and registered in, the Ministry of Labour 
in order to be published in the Government Gazette (article 2.2). 
Collective agreements take effect on publication unless stated 
otherwise in them (art.2.3).
The parties to collective bargaining entitled to conclude 
collective agreements are confined to trade-unions and employers' 
associations which already have acquired legal status as 
entities representing strictly professional interests of sections 
of employees and employers respectively (art.1.2). There are also 
restrictions concerning the number of trade-unions which may 
qualify for collective bargaining (art.23.1). In 1969 the 
Legislative Decree 186 (art.l), clearly influenced by the French 
labour law, introduced the notion of the most representative 
and the simply representative union. In each sector of 
employment, broadly defined in terms of industry, occupation 
and/or region, there could be only two representative trade- 
unions entitled to bargain and to contract collective agreements. 
Any other trade-unions active in the same jurisdiction are not 
entitled to bargain and to conclude agreements.
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with respect to the coverage of collective agreements, according 
to Law 3239, there are two regimes. Collective agreements can be 
either rulings binding solely the members of the parties involved 
in the bargaining process or binding rulings across the board 
for the industry, occupation or region concerned. In principle, 
and in most cases, collective agreements apply to, and are 
legally binding for, members of the signatories trade-unions and 
employers' associations (art.5.1). However, there can be cases 
of collective agreements with extended coverage.
First, when a collective agreement is concluded and signed under 
the auspices, and in the presence, of the Minister of Labour or 
his/her representative, its coverage is extended to every 
employee and employer in the sector, branch, occupation or region 
concerned (art.5.3). Second, a collective agreement contracted by 
the most representative trade-union covers also the simply 
representative union, i.e. the second trade-union entitled to 
bargain and to contract collective agreements in the jurisdiction 
concerned, if the second union did not let be known its 
disagreement with the collective agreement contracted by the 
most representative trade-union (Legislative Decree 186/1969, 
art.4.1). Third, the Minister of Labour can extend the coverage 
of a collective agreement to the entire number of employers of a 
region, if in the region concerned the employers' association 
which contracted it employs more than 60 per cent of the sectoral 
workforce (art.5.2).
The minimum and typical duration of collective agreements is
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fixed to one year. Before the introduction of the Legislative 
Decree 186 in 1969 the minimum period was six months. But the 
typical duration has always been one year. After the one year 
period, collective agreements are terminated as one of the 
contracting parties, normally the trade-union, notifies the other 
of its intention to terminate the existing agreement and to 
negotiate a new one (art. 4.2). This implies that a new 
bargaining round starts. Collective agreements are often signed 
months after expiration of the contract and are applied 
retrospectively if it is so agreed.
However, it is possible for a collective agreement to be 
terminated before its normal duration and new bargaining 
processes to be opened if there have been substantial changes in 
the conditions under which it was concluded. Arbitration courts 
are empowered to decide whether such changes occurred and new 
bargaining process should be allowed (art.15.2). Thus, the life 
of collective agreements may be shortened. But it can also be 
prolonged. The Minister of Labour is entitled to extend the 
validity of a collective agreement, for a maximum period of 
twelve months, even when one of the contracting parties or both 
of them have notified their intention to terminate it (art.4.3).
Law 3239 (art.7.1) has also defined clearly the levels and 
units of collective bargaining. Collective bargaining cannot take 
place at any level and/or between any unit of employers and 
employees. There can be four categories of annually signed 
collective agreements. It is noteworthy that these four
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categories, and the relevant bargaining levels and procedures, 
can be traced back to the provisions of the Legislation Act 1367 
introduced in 1938, which, after a turbulent mid-war period, 
aimed, for the first time ever in Greece, to institutionalise 
collective bargaining and industrial relations.
The four categories of annually signed collective agreements are 
the following:
i) The National General Collective Agreement which 
establishes minimum wages for men, women and apprentices at 
national level (art.7.2). It is concluded and signed by the 
General Confederation of Labour (GSEE) and the employers* 
Confederations (SEV and GSEVE are the principal ones representing 
large-scale manufacturing and handicraft employers respectively). 
In Greece, as in many other European countries, there is legal 
extension of the terms of the National General Collective 
Agreement to non-union firms.
ii) The National Collective Agreements by Occupation which 
cover specific occupational groups at national level. They are 
concluded and signed by the occupational Federations of employees 
and the relevant employers* Federations (art.7.3).
iii) The Local Collective Agreements by Occupation which 
cover specific occupational groups at local or regional level, 
when these groups are not covered by National Occupational 
Collective Agreements. They are concluded and signed by the 
regional occupational Federations and the relevant employers* 
Federations or local representatives of national Federations of 
employers (art.7.4).
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iv) The Special Collective Agreements which cover employees 
of one single company. According to Law 3239 single employers and 
their employees, or part of them, have no right to bargain and to 
reach collective agreements at the company or the plant level. 
Collective agreements, in order to be lawful, need as a
prerequisite at least two employers, i.e. an association of them.
The Special Collective Agreements are an exception. They are
permitted only for clearly stated organisations, usually not 
covered by other categories of collective agreements, such as 
banks, local government, public utilities and corporations which 
belong, in a wide sense, to the public sector, and employ labour 
under private employment contracts (art.7.5).
These four categories of collective agreements are not of equal 
importance. By custom, every other collective agreement is 
concluded and signed after the National General. The National 
General Collective Agreement operates as the guideline for the 
agreements contracted at lower levels of the bargaining
hierarchy. This is partly a symptom of the relatively 
centralised structure of the formal system of collective 
bargaining.
In addition to this extensive regulation of procedural aspects of 
collective bargaining, to protect the national interest, the 
Ministry of Co-ordination and the Ministry of Labour were given 
the right to examine, ratify, amend or reject collective 
agreements reached voluntarily by trade-unions and employers 
(and compulsory arbitration awards) so as to secure that they
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remain in line with the governmental economic and social policy 
(art.20.2).
The rationale for this additional control over substantial 
aspects of collective bargaining was based upon the view that 
under the then prevailing economic conditions (for more than a 
decade wages and salaries did not catch up with the rising cost 
of living and the gap between prices and wages was increasing 
geometrically), the lack of any control of collective bargaining 
procedures would have been detrimental for wage and salary 
earners. These controls were designed, as argued in the 
introductory report of Law 3239, first, so as to protect salary 
and wage earners and second, so that living standards and the 
political regime be maintained without social policy affecting 
the economic development.
This right to amend and reject collective agreements (and 
compulsory arbitration awards) was slightly modified in 1957 by 
Law 3755 (art.8). From then on they had not the right to amend 
and reject collective agreements concerning increases in nominal 
wages not exceeding the annual rate of 3 per cent. This, it was 
argued in the introductory report of Law 3755 , was due to "the 
general conditions of the national economy" which would not 
permit a higher limit. The 3 per cent limit was considered as a 
good start for relaxing the controls when economic development 
would enable the government to drop altogether the right to 
control collective agreements and compulsory arbitration awards.
In fact, this right was dropped in 1974 by the Legislative Decree
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73 (art.2.1). But this did not mean that the Ministry of Labour 
was deprived by the right to control procedural and legal aspects 
of collective agreements. The same decree (art.2.2) ruled that 
the Minister of Labour maintained the right to control the 
legality of collective agreements and compulsory arbitration 
awards as well as to ask the parties to the bargaining process or 
the arbitration court to re-examine the agreement or award 
concerned.
2.3.2. Bargaining Structure and Trade-Unions.
The legalistic institutionalisation of collective bargaining, by 
fixing the bargaining levels and the bargaining units designated 
to contract collective agreements, has probably influenced the 
structure of trade-unionism in Greece. This is because employees 
intending to remain law-abiding and to undertake lawful 
collective activity, have had to conform themselves to bargaining 
levels, units, forms and procedures defined by the legislation. 
This is not to say that legislation is the ultimate determinant 
of both the bargaining and the trade-unions structure. But, at 
least, it has set up limits to the structure through which 
employees have been allowed to undertake collective activities 
concerning wage determination and regulation of industrial 
relations.
By prohibiting bargaining at the company and the plant level, 
the legislation has enhanced the rather centralised collective 
bargaining of the occupation-based and industry-based unionism.
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This type of bargaining, especially the occupation-based, had 
been a preeminent tradition in Greek industrial relations over 
the first half of the century (Seferis, 1976). The bargaining 
structure and the trade-union structure favoured by these legal 
provisions can be represented as a pyramid-shaped one, which 
consists of three separate levels, as shown in Figure 2.3.1. The 
nearest to the basis of the pyramid, the more heterogeneous 
becomes the structure of trade-unionism in Greece. However, the 
formal bargaining structure appears less complex and more 
coherent than the trade-union structure, as the right to bargain 
is restricted to certain levels of the hierarchy.
The primary level contains sectional, craft, company and general 
unions. None of them is entitled to bargain and to contract 
collective agreements. The secondary level contains both 
Federations, based upon occupational or industrial divisions of 
the labour force, and Labour Centres which are organised 
according to the administrative division of the country and 
include primary unions of a certain region. Nevertheless, and 
this is important for the shape of both the bargaining structure 
and the trade-unions structure, only Federations are entitled to 
bargain and to contract collective agreements. In other words, 
within the formal system of wage determination. Federations have 
been given a central role in the function of the bargaining 
structure. The tertiary level contains the General Confederation 
of Labour (GSEE) which is recognised by the Law 3239 (art.7.2) 
as the sole representative organisation entitled to bargain and 
to conclude the annual National General Collective Agreement.
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Figure 2.3.1
BARGAINING STRUCTURE AND 
STRUCTURE OF TRADE-UNIONISM IN GREECE
*
* *
* *
* *
* *
* * General
Tertiary * GSEE * Confederation
Level * * of Labour
* *
* * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
* *
* Federations *
* * Occupational
* 1975:45 * Federations
Secondary * 1984:77 *
Level * *
* Labour Centres * Local
* * Labour
* 1975:77 * Centres
* 1984:65 *
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Primary * *
Level * Sectional, Company, General and Craft *
* Unions *
* *
* 1975:3350 1984:3011 *
* * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Note : Number of Unions, Federations and 
Labour Centres affiliated to GSEE.
Source: GSEE
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What this representation means to do is to provide a basis
for drawing the limits of the legislated formal system of 
collective bargaining. These limits refer first, to the formal 
bargaining structure, that is the certified levels and units of 
collective bargaining, and second, to the structure of trade-
unions with regard to the formal bargaining levels. While every 
union has a place in the pyramid-shaped structure, not all of 
them consist entities recognised as bargaining units. The great 
majority of primary level unions are not considered by the law as 
authorised bargaining units. Consequently, any bargaining 
processes evolving out of the national, federal or specific 
company levels, are considered neither as part of the formal 
bargaining structure nor as lawful.
Apart from the exclusion of primary level unions from the formal
system of collective bargaining, within the formal system itself 
chronic problems have been encountered regarding the recognition 
of trade-unions which can qualify and be entitled to contract 
collective agreements. First, this chronic perplexity has to do 
with the definition of the most representative and the simply 
representative trade-unions for each jurisdiction. When there is 
only one union alleging representation and coverage of a certain 
industrial branch or occupation at the national or regional 
level, no question is raised on whether or not it is 
representative. But, in many cases during the post-war period, 
there have been more than two trade-unions claiming
representation of the same section of the labour force.
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Second, the structure of representation of the trade-unions in 
Figure 2.3.1 does not mean that each primary union belongs to one 
Federation, or that each Federation is a member of the General 
Confederation of Labour. Such a coherence is not observed. 
Indeed, trade-unions, and especially Federations, are not 
organised strictly according to industrial and occupational 
divisions of the labour force. There are cases of Federations 
which are rather general and include primary unions from various 
industrial branches and occupations. The Federation of 
Manufacturing Enterprise Unions (OVES), founded in 1979, is a 
recent and typical case of inter-industry Federation.
In this context, inter-union and intra-union disputes over 
recognition rights have been a permanent feature of trade-union 
developments. As many scholars of Greek trade-unions have pointed 
out organisational problems (exclusions, misrepresentations, 
cancellations etc.) have always plagued trade-unionism in Greece 
(Jechinis, 1967, Fakiolas, 1978, Katsanevas, 1984). Most trade- 
unions have been run with important political interference 
(Katsanevas, 1984:227-248). Behind these organisational
problems, which have been reflected in the bargaining structure, 
lies the fact that the Greek system of industrial relations has 
been dominated by a strong adversarial tradition directly linked 
to political developments, divisions and rivalries (Fakiolas, 
1978:340-392, loannou, 1989:54-68).
To understand how political divisions have been interwoven with 
trade-union developments we must take into account that, over the
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post-war period in Greece, the official trade-unionism has been 
dominated by pro-governmental officers appointed, directly or 
not, via judicial arrangements, by the Ministry of Labour. 
Katsanevas (1984:216-218) described this phenomenon, observed not 
only at the top level of the General Confederation of Labour 
(GSEE) but also at lower levels of the trade-unions structure and 
hierarchy, as "paternalistic unionism".
As Koukoules (1988) has shown, on the basis of the article 69 of 
the Civil Code adopted in the late 1940s, the judiciary has had 
the right to, and the task of, appointing new executives at the 
General Confederation of Labour as well as at every Federation, 
whenever representatives of a single trade-union claimed that the 
executive committee of the General Confederation of Labour, or of 
the Federation in question, is not representative of the rank 
and file and applied for the appointment of a new executive 
committee. During the post-war period successive governments, by 
using this legislation and machinery, and via the referrals of 
internal trade-union conflicts by pro-governmental trade-unions 
to the judiciary, have been appointing executives of their own 
political persuasion.
In 1967-74 there was a shake-out in trade-unionism and only the 
then pro-governmental trade-union officers were left unimpaired 
to perform the role of representing the workforce. The same 
happened, to a lesser extent, in 1975-81. But even then, the 
majority of leaderships in trade-unions entitled to bargain, to 
conclude collective agreements and to invoke the compulsory 
arbitration, remained pro-governmental, or at least not
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affiliated to any of the left-wing opposition parties. For 
instance in the 18th Congress of GSEE in 1976 only 29 per cent 
of the representatives (167 out of 569) were affiliated to the 
socialist or the communist parties and held 31 per cent of seats 
(11 out of 35) in the then elected executive committee (Fakiolas, 
1978:343-344, Katsanevas, 1984:232).
The same pattern of relations between trade-unions and 
governments persisted in the period 1982-88, although the 
tradition of appointing pro-governmental trade-union leaderships 
was limited to the top level of the trade-union hierarchy, i.e. 
the General Confederation of Labour. When, after the imposition 
of the 1985-87 stabilisation program, the ruling party lost the 
majority in the General Confederation of Labour (GSEE) , pro- 
governmental officers were appointed. Until early in 1989, the 
General Confederation of Labour was led by pro-governmental 
trade-unionists who, in line with the long national tradition, 
were appointees.
Behind these synchronised changes in politics and trade-union 
leaderships and the persisting pattern of political affiliation 
of trade-union leaderships to the party in power, lies the fact 
that the official trade-unionism has been always related to, and 
depended on, the Ministry of Labour in a relationship dominated 
by two factors. First, the prevailing role of the judiciary in 
regulating the internal affairs of Greek trade-unions and 
second, the financial dependence of most trade-unions on rather 
discretionary funding by the Ministry of Labour. Greek trade-
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unions are not financially independent. In practice they do not 
rely upon the contributions of their members but are financed by 
a Ministry of Labour dependent fund (Fakiolas, 1978:180-190, 
Katsanevas, 1984: 199-215, Koukoules, 1984).
Federations were acting as parties to the bargaining process led 
by largely appointed leaders and officers financially dependent 
on the Ministry of Labour. And when questions regarding inter­
union conflicts about coverage were raised there was the 
Legislative Decree 186 (art.2-3), introduced in 1969, which 
empowered ever since the arbitration court to determine the 
representative trade-unions in each jurisdiction. In 1974 the 
Legislative Decree 73, by adopting the membership as the single 
major criterion, clarified the standards for determining the 
most representative and the simply representative trade-unions. 
But even their membership claims were not a sound base for 
selecting the representative unions. In many cases electoral 
malpractices dominated internal democracy of trade-unions. 
(Katsanevas, 1984:194-198).
The provisions of Law 3239 which have given the government a 
central role in collective bargaining, and more than thirty years 
of experience, indicate that collective bargaining in Greece is 
different from collective bargaining in the U.S., the U.K. and 
other industrialised market economies. The difference is both of 
degree and of kind. First, of degree because of the persistently 
low union density which only in the early 1980s peaked near 30 
per cent (loannou, 1988:83). Of course, a union density of 30 per 
cent is higher than that in the U.S. but its not the level of
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union density which makes the difference. It is also the limited 
coverage of collective bargaining arrangements, let alone that of 
the annual National General Collective Agreements which establish 
the national minimum wage. Second, of kind because of the type of 
relationship between trade-unions, employers and the state, with 
direct state interventionism in Greek industrial relations 
being predominant. Surprising as it may seem, trade-union 
officers largely appointed and, indeed, primarily financed by 
the Ministry of Labour, have been supposed to be the main actors 
within the legalistic system of collective bargaining, which also 
has been thoroughly regulated by the Ministry of Labour and the 
judiciary.
2.3.3. The Formal Bargaining Structure; Stability or Change?
The legalistic regulation of collective bargaining and the 
restrictions imposed upon trade-unions create the impression of 
a rather ossified bargaining structure. However, even in this 
context there can be some possibility for changes in the formal 
bargaining structure. Such changes can be caused, at least, by 
structural changes in the economy and in the relevant composition 
of the labour force as well as by changes in the political 
environment within which labour undertakes collective activities. 
During the post-war period, and mainly during the 1960s and the 
1970s, impressive changes occurred in all these three areas 
setting the scene of Greek industrial relations (Fakiolas, 
1978:133-148, loannou, 1989:49-53).
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To examine whether the formal bargaining structure has been 
ossified and to discern any changes we analyse the scant 
information available at the Ministry of Labour for the period 
since the implementation of the present system of collective 
bargaining. Table 2.3.1 describes the number of both collective 
agreements and compulsory arbitration awards registered in the 
Ministry of Labour. This number depicts the quantity of 
bargaining units existing within the formal system of collective 
bargaining across all sectors of the economy. In Table 2.3.1 the 
density of bargaining units in the labour force, i.e. the number 
of bargaining units per 100000 employees in employment, is also 
estimated.
On average, at each side of the bargaining process, there were 
recorded less than 300 bargaining units, i.e. less than 20 
bargaining units per 100000 salary and wage earners. This 
quantity of bargaining units does not imply an equal number of 
trade-unions and employers associations. The comparison with the 
number of trade-unions entitled to contract collective 
agreements, shown in Figure 2.3.1, indicates a large incongruity 
between these two sources of information regarding the number of 
actors in the formal bargaining structure. This incongruity is 
due to the fact that, for two reasons, there is not a one-to-one 
relationship between trade-unions and employers associations on 
the one hand and bargaining units on the other.
First, every trade-union, or Federation in particular, does not 
contract only one annual collective agreement. It can contract
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more than one according to its membership and its coverage of 
distinct jurisdictions in the labour market. Second, in every 
jurisdiction there can be two representative trade-unions 
contracting, at least, two different collective agreements, 
different as far as their content and coverage is concerned. 
Therefore, there is not direct relationship between the number of 
bargaining units and the number of trade-unions involved in 
collective bargaining. The same asymmetry applies to the 
employers side too.
Despite the annual fluctuation observed over the period 1955-88, 
from Table 2.3.1 becomes clear that in the 1970s there was a 
strong increasing trend in the number of bargaining units acting 
within the formal bargaining structure. Indeed, during the period 
1975-81 the number of bargaining units increased dramatically 
both in absolute and relative terms. From 1974 with 155 
registered bargaining units and a 10.49 density, to 1981 the 
increase is impressive as there were 563 registered bargaining 
units, i.e. 33 bargaining units per 100000 salary and wage 
earners. It is noteworthy that during the period of the military 
regime, in 1967-74, in comparison with the earlier period 1964- 
66, the density of bargaining units in the labour market 
decreased. Then, in 1975-81 the density more than doubled and in 
1982-88 decreased again.
The wide annual fluctuations observed in the 1980s are mainly due 
to, and are explained by, the type of incomes policies adopted 
during the period 1982-88. The mandatory incomes policies of 1983 
and 1986-87 caused formal collective bargaining processes to
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freeze. The imposition of a "wage freeze" by decree in 1983 made 
redundant and unlawful the great majority of annually contracted 
collective agreements, as well as the annual settlement of 
disputes through arbitration. In 1983 only 137 collective 
agreements and awards were registered, while in 1982 the 
relevant number was 516. Therefore the density of bargaining 
units decreased from 30 in 1982 to 8 in 1983. For the same reason 
in 1984 the number of agreements and awards, and consequently the 
number of bargaining units acting within the formal system of 
collective bargaining, rose again at its 1982 level. Similar 
decrease is observed in 1986-87 because of the tight and 
mandatory incomes policy which was part of the 1985-87 
stabilisation program.
The impressive increase in the number of bargaining units during 
the 1975-81 period indicates, to a certain extent, the growth of 
collective bargaining procedures in the Greek system of 
industrial relations. But this is indicated only to a certain 
extent for two reasons. First, because these estimates include 
those bargaining units either succeeding or failing to reach 
collective agreements voluntarily. The disputes of the latter are 
settled by arbitration courts. Therefore, the resulting increase 
in bargaining units only in a wide sense can be considered as 
indicator of collective bargaining growth, i.e. in the sense that 
arbitration is also part of the bargaining process. Second, 
because statistics referring to the number of agreements and 
awards may be misleading if used to hint the extent of employees 
covered by collective bargaining arrangements. A few industry­
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wide or national agreements may carry more weight that a 
relatively high number of regional or special agreements.
To analyse the composition of the formal bargaining structure. 
Table 2.3.2 presents the breakdown of the total number of 
bargaining units by bargaining level and category. This analysis 
suggests that the formal bargaining structure, as far as the 
number of bargaining units is concerned, is composed by two major 
categories, first those units acting at the national 
industry-wide or occupation-wide level and second, those acting 
at the special organisation and company level. This percentage 
composition does not imply any analogy with regard to the 
coverage of the labour force by collective agreements and 
arbitration awards of the relevant levels.
The distribution of bargaining units in different levels of the 
formal bargaining structure indicates the occurrence of changes 
towards decentralisation and fragmentation in 1975-81 and towards 
centralisation in 1982-88. Compared with the period 1973-74, the 
1975-81 average share of bargaining units acting at the national 
level for industry-wide or occupation-wide bargaining decreased 
from 45.63 to 31.53 per cent. Analogous decrease is observed in 
the average share of bargaining units at the local or regional 
level. The average share of units acting at the lowest level of 
collective bargaining from 37.79 in 1973-74, soared at 55.42 
per cent in 1975-81. These changes indicate decentralisation in 
the formal bargaining structure.
But the tendency towards decentralisation and fragmentation was
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reversed in 1982-88. Then a move towards centralisation is 
observed as the average share of bargaining units at the lowest 
level of the bargaining structure decreased and the average 
shares of national and regional bargaining increased. This 
reversed tendency can be explained by the fact that after 1982, 
under the socialist government, in the context of what it was 
perceived as démocratisation of the Greek trade-union movement, 
the opposition of the 1975-81 official trade-unionism, which as 
opposition was mainly active out of the formal system of 
collective bargaining at the company and plant level, took over 
the control of the official trade-union structure and tried to 
re-establish the dominant role of national industry-wide or 
occupation-based collective bargaining. The incomes policy of the 
period was also favourable to more centralised collective 
bargaining.
To discern the sectoral distribution of the increasing number of 
bargaining units at the special company level. Table 2.3.3 
estimates the share of broad sectors of the economy in the total 
number of special collective agreements (the relevant arbitration 
awards are not available) registered with the Ministry of Labour 
in 1974, 1975, 1982 and 1988. We selected these years as they
coincide with peaks and troughs in the rapid expansion of special 
collective agreements. From 1974 to 1975 the number of special 
collective agreements more than doubled. It doubled again from 
1975 to 1982, and then from 1982 to 1988 their number nearly 
halved.
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From Table 2.3.3 we draw the conclusion that special collective 
agreements and the relevant bargaining units were primarily 
concentrated in the area of public sector institutions, 
organisations, corporations and companies employing labour on the 
basis of private contracts. Only a small percentage of special 
collective agreements refers to manufacturing industries, and 
this happens for companies mainly operating under state 
ownership. Bargaining units at the special organisation or 
company level are confined by the law to clearly stated sectors 
of the economy so that formal bargaining at the company level has 
little to do with manufacturing industries in the private sector.
The composition of the total number of collective agreements in 
the mid-1970s, as described in Table 2.3.3, indicates the 
existence of fragmented bargaining even at the level of state- 
owned organisations and corporations. Its evolution suggests that 
changes occurred in both directions, i.e. towards further 
fragmentation or more coherence. From 1975 to 1982 in transport, 
communications, electricity and water industries the tendency was 
towards more centralisation and coherence in collective 
bargaining, while the labour employed under private contracts by 
Ministries and dependent institutions moved towards more 
decentralised and fragmented bargaining. However, from 1982 to 
1988 in transport and communications a tendency for more 
fragmented bargaining is observed.
To summarise, in the formal system of industrial relations during 
the period 1975-81 collective bargaining expanded in terms of 
multiplied bargaining units. The changing composition of the
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formal bargaining structure suggests that the expansion of 
collective bargaining in the 1970s was primarily caused by the 
surge of special collective agreements and compulsory arbitration 
awards bearing on collective bargaining at the company level. In 
other words, in 1975-81 within the formal system of collective 
bargaining the significance of industry-wide or occupation-wide 
bargaining declined. This development indicates a trend towards 
decentralisation and further fragmentation of the formal 
bargaining structure. However, in 1982-88 this trend was reversed 
towards centralisation. The relatively lower density in 
bargaining units in 1982-88 reflects the influence of two 
factors, first, the move towards national bargaining and second, 
the strict incomes policies and the "freeze" imposed upon 
collective bargaining in 1983 and 1986-87.
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2.4. THE FORMAL BARGAINING STRUCTURE IN MANUFACTURING.
.4.1. Restrictions and Evolution.
In the formal bargaining structure across all sectors changes 
towards more decentralised bargaining occurred in 1975-81, and 
the significance of industry-wide or occupation-based bargaining 
at the national level declined. But prima facie this decline does 
not refer to manufacturing, as within the formal system these 
types of bargaining are defined by the law as the main levels at 
which manufacturing collective bargaining can take place. The 
legal restrictions imposed upon collective bargaining are 
stronger in the manufacturing sector because the limitation on 
bargaining levels and units applies mainly in manufacturing and 
special collective agreements are not normally allowed. From this 
point of view, the legal restrictions imposed upon collective 
bargaining may imply a far more ossified bargaining structure in 
manufacturing than in others sectors of the economy.
Nevertheless, in manufacturing there were more reasons for the 
bargaining structure to change. While changes in political 
relations influence equally all sectors across the board, 
structural changes in the economy and the resulting change in 
employment structures may have exerted stronger influences upon 
the manufacturing bargaining structure than in other sectors of 
the economy because, over the period under consideration, along 
with the rapid expansion in manufacturing employment, its further
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concentration occurred. The number of manufacturing 
establishments employing more than 100 employees increased from 
43 6 in 1969 to 701 in 1978 and their share in large-scale 
manufacturing employment (i.e. establishments employing more than 
10 employees) increased from 48.1 to 54.2 per cent.
To examine the characteristics and the evolution of the formal 
bargaining structure in the Greek manufacturing sector we 
analyse the number of agreements and awards registered with the 
Ministry of Labour over the period 1954-1983. Unfortunately the 
records from where we draw these series of information have 
been discontinued since 1984.
Table 2.4.1 shows the number of manufacturing bargaining units 
registered within the formal system of collective bargaining and 
estimates their density in the manufacturing labour force. On 
average 67 bargaining units were registered over the period 1954- 
83 and there were 26 bargaining units per 100000 wage and salary 
earners employed in large scale manufacturing industry. Its 
evolution over time does not indicate any systematic pattern and 
trend. In comparison to 1955-60 the density of bargaining units 
nearly doubled in 1961-66. In 1967-74 decreased and since then 
remained stable at levels similar to those prevailing in early 
1960s. This trajectory can be indication either of decline in the 
significance of manufacturing collective bargaining or of rapid 
centralisation in the manufacturing bargaining structure. But 
the evolution in the composition of the formal manufacturing 
bargaining structure suggests that the relatively low density of 
bargaining units in 1975-81, compared to 1961-66, is mainly due
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to the further centralisation of the bargaining structure.
The composition of the total number of bargaining units by level 
over the period 1954-83, presented in Table 2.4.1, shows that the 
main bulk of manufacturing collective agreements and awards 
registered with the Ministry of Labour refers to national 
industry-wide or occupation-based collective agreements. It also 
indicates the existence of a clear pattern of change in the 
formal bargaining structure from local and regional collective 
bargaining to national bargaining. The share of manufacturing 
bargaining units acting at the national level increased from 
22.18 in 1955-60 to 72.58 per cent in 1975-81. By contrast, the 
share of manufacturing bargaining units acting at the local or 
regional level decreased from 69.95 in 1955-60 to 11.84 per cent 
in 1975-81. This trade-off clearly indicates a tendency towards 
more centralised bargaining. The share of bargaining units at the 
special company level had also an increasing tendency but 
remained at low levels.
2.4.2. Regulation of the Formal Bargaining Structure in 
Manufacturing.
Table 2.4.2 provides a breakdown of the total number of 
manufacturing bargaining units involved in collective agreements 
and compulsory arbitration awards according to the seven 
different procedures of regulation of formal collective 
bargaining available according to Law 3239. These are i) the 
voluntarily reached collective agreements, ii) collective
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agreements made compulsory for non-members of the signatory 
parties, iii) compulsory arbitration awards, iv) agreements and
awards amended by the Ministry of Labour, v) agreements and
awards corrected by the Ministry of Labour, vi) agreements and
awards rejected by the Ministry of Labour and vii) agreements and
awards of which the duration was extended unilaterally by the 
Ministry of Labour.
These procedures indicate the degree of voluntarism and 
compulsion in manufacturing bargaining procedures. The share of 
collective agreements voluntarily reached and of those with 
extended coverage represent the area of voluntary collective 
bargaining while the rest represent the regulated area of the 
formal system of collective bargaining. Over the period 1955-83 
the majority of bargaining units falls into the category of 
regulated collective bargaining. In 1955-60, i.e. during the 
period of the implementation of the system, 73.20 per cent of the 
manufacturing bargaining units were under the direct regulation 
of the Ministry of Labour. This regulation diminishes in the 
following periods but remains at levels above 50 per cent.
Certain methods of regulation were used in some periods and 
abandoned completely in others. In general the use of direct 
methods of regulation, i.e. amending, correcting, rejecting and 
extending the duration of collective agreements and awards, 
decreased from period to period and was replaced by arbitration 
i.e. the indirect method of collective bargaining regulation.
For instance, column 7 in Table 2.4.2 indicates that the
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provisions permitting the extension of collective agreements for 
one more year was mainly used in the 1960s and till the early 
1970s, i.e. over a period of low inflation -if any at all. The 
same procedure was also used extensively in 1976, probably 
without much success as in the following years it completely 
vanished. This practice of extending the duration of collective 
agreements may be compatible and consistent with periods of low 
inflation as then there is no strong need new agreements to be 
contracted for keeping up with inflation. The abandonment of 
this procedure can be attributed to the rise and persistence of 
price inflation which made necessary, for wages to keep up, 
annual bargaining rounds and new collective agreements.
The period of implementation of the formal system of collective 
bargaining was also the golden era of direct governmental 
intervention in manufacturing collective bargaining. Column 8 in 
Table 2.4.2 indicates that in 1955-60 27 per cent of agreements 
and awards were amended by the Ministry of Labour, and, as 
already mentioned, 73.20 per cent fall in the category of one way 
or another regulated settlements. In 1967-74 the degree of 
intervention for amendment of collective agreements was 
relatively lower, but the degree of intervention for extending 
the duration of agreements and awards had its highest share of 
all periods. In 1967-74 while the total degree of regulation was 
near the all periods average, if we take into account the 
political conditions under the military regime, it seems 
reasonable to infer that the degree of interventionism was quite 
high. However, in 1975-81 under conditions of parliamentary
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democracy and more liberal industrial relations compulsory 
arbitration became the predominant method for regulation of 
collective bargaining in manufacturing.
The composition of the voluntary and regulated areas of the 
formal bargaining structure in manufacturing by category 
indicates that regulation was mainly exerted at the national 
level and the local level and not at the level of special 
collective agreements. Table 2.4.3 provides a breakdown of the 
voluntary and the regulated areas of the formal bargaining 
structure by bargaining level. The regulated area refers mainly 
to national collective bargaining. Regulation of bargaining units 
active at the company level remained all over the period low 
while regulation of national collective bargaining in 
manufacturing was steadily increasing from 18 per cent in 1955-60 
to 82 per cent in 1975-81. In fact the focus of regulation moved 
from local collective bargaining in 1955-66, to national 
collective bargaining in 1975-83. However, in the voluntary area 
of the formal manufacturing bargaining structure the share of 
collective bargaining at the company level is characterised by a 
steadily increasing trend.
2.4.3. Formal Pressures Towards Decentralisation.
This asymmetry between the voluntary and the regulated areas of 
the formal bargaining structure in manufacturing is more clearly 
indicated by Table 2.4.4 where only collective agreements and 
compulsory arbitration awards are analysed by bargaining level.
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Both their average shares and their trends suggest that in the 
voluntary area occurred relatively more decentralised bargaining 
and a tendency towards further decentralisation while in the 
regulated area centralised bargaining dominated and the tendency 
was towards further centralisation. Consider first the share of 
compulsory arbitration awards at the national level of 
bargaining. It increased from 18 per cent in 1955-60 to 83 per 
cent in 1975-81. The share of collective agreements at the 
national level increased too, but never exceeded 53 per cent. 
Consider now the share of voluntarily reached collective 
agreements at the special company level. It increased from 13 per 
cent in 1955-60 to 31 per cent in 1975-81 while the relevant 
share of compulsory arbitration awards was always at levels below 
10 per cent and decreasing.
The increasing presence of bargaining units acting at the company 
level, in the voluntary area of the bargaining structure and 
contracting special collective agreements reflects the fact that 
the Ministry of Labour had, in face of the changing structure of 
manufacturing, to ease the restrictions upon collective 
bargaining at the plant level in order to reconcile the 
restrictive legislation on collective bargaining and its 
machinery with the changing employment structure in manufacturing 
as well as pressures exerted upon the bargaining structure. The 
Legislative Decree 186 (art.9) adopted in May 1969 ruled that 
disputes which have not the typical characteristics of the formal 
dispute (i.e. level, unit and scope of bargaining) so that to be 
settled through the formal procedures of collective bargaining or
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compulsory arbitration, but concern the employment relationship, 
could be settled by a committee through a procedure of 
tripartite collaboration. Members of the committee are the Labour 
Inspector, the union representative and the employers 
representative. In the event of settlement, a written statement 
is signed which, nevertheless, is not binding for the parties 
involved and their members.
However, later in the mid 1970s the Ministry of Labour had in 
many cases, following trade-union requests and pressures, to 
grant to many tripartite collaboration agreements the status of 
special collective agreements so that to make them binding for 
the signatory parties. These exceptions mainly applied to some 
of the largest, in term of employment, companies and plants in 
Greek manufacturing. Of course, the national industry-wide or 
occupation-based bargaining remained dominant in the formal 
bargaining structure in manufacturing but these developments 
indicate that in 1975-81 even in the context of the formal 
manufacturing bargaining structure its voluntary area was 
characterised by a trend towards decentralisation.
To summarise, the formal manufacturing bargaining structure was 
relatively more ossified than bargaining structure in other parts 
of the economy because of the restrictions regarding collective 
bargaining at the company level. Therefore, it mainly consisted 
of bargaining units acting at the national or regional level and 
the tendency was from local and regional to national collective 
bargaining. Indeed, bargaining procedures were excessively
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regulated via both direct and indirect procedures. After 1975 
direct regulation or collective bargaining by the Ministry of 
Labour (i.e. amending, correcting, rejecting and extending 
agreements and awards) gave way to indirect methods of 
regulation, namely compulsory arbitration. Regulation and 
especially compulsory arbitration applied to manufacturing 
collective bargaining at the national level. However, in the 
voluntary area of the formal bargaining structure in 
manufacturing a tendency towards decentralised bargaining at the 
company and plant level occurred after 1975. After all, even in 
the over-regulated and restricted formal bargaining structure in 
manufacturing pressures towards decentralisation were observed.
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2.4. CONCLUSIONS
Collective bargaining has a long tradition in industrialised 
market economies where bargaining structures have been changing 
towards more decentralisation. Contrary to this tradition, in 
Greece there has been no long tradition of wage setting through 
collective bargaining. Indeed, both procedural and substantial 
issues of wage and job regulation are subject to strong 
governmental intervention as within the formal system of 
collective bargaining the government maintains the right to 
intervene on numerous aspects and occasions. Therefore, the 
system of industrial relations is over-regulated by the existing 
legislation.
Collective bargaining is restricted to certain levels of the 
bargaining structure. The formal system of collective 
bargaining excludes company and plant level collective 
agreements. These restrictions and the regulation of trade-unions 
create a rather ossified bargaining structure. Nevertheless, in 
1975-81, even within the formal bargaining structure strong 
tendencies towards decentralised collective bargaining, i.e. at 
the company level, occurred through the increase of special 
collective agreements. The procedural arrangements provided by 
the formal system of collective bargaining, which favours 
centralised bargaining and excludes decentralised bargaining at 
the company and plant level, contributed to the fragmentation of 
the real bargaining structure, especially in the Greek
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manufacturing sector.
In the context of the formal system of collective bargaining, 
wage formation has never been a process independent of direct 
and indirect state intervention. The legal right of the 
Ministry of Labour to reject and modify any collective agreement 
or compulsory arbitration award if considered as not being in 
line with the governmental policy, dominated wage determination 
processes, throughout the post-war period.
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Table 2.3.1
BARGAINING UNITS IN THE FORMAL BARGAINING STRUCTURE.
1955-1988
ALL SECTORS
Year Number of Bargaining Units^ Density of Bargaining Units^
Agreements Awards Both Agreements Awards Both
1955 42 n.a n.a 3.76 n.a n.a
1956 69 n.a n.a 6.09 n.a n.a
1957 51 n.a n.a 4.43 n.a n.a
1958 40 n.a n.a 3.43 n.a n.a
1959 46 n.a n.a 3.88 n.a n.a
1960 58 n.a n.a 4.82 n.a n.a
1961 64 n.a n.a 5.25 n.a n.a
1962 72 n.a n.a 5.83 n.a n.a
1963 58 n.a n.a 4.64 n.a n.a
1964 97 93 190 7.67 7.35 15.02
1965 121 93 214 9.45 7.27 16.72
1966 105 82 187 8.11 6.33 14.44
1967 63 79 142 4.81 6.03 10.84
1968 63 93 156 4.76 7.02 11.77
1969 50 100 150 3.73 7.46 11.20
1970 53 67 120 3.91 4.95 8.86
1971 46 43 89 3.36 3.14 6.50
1972 88 38 126 6.26 2.70 8.96
1973 88 60 148 10.96 4.16 15.12
1974 70 85 155 4.74 5.75 10.49
1975 131 143 274 8.65 9.45 18.10
1976 144 120 264 9.29 7.74 17.03
1977 146 179 325 9.20 11.29 20.49
1978 166 214 380 10.23 13.19 23.43
1979 173 247 420 10.43 14.90 25.33
1980 220 299 519 12.99 17.65 30.63
1981 233 330 563 13.47 19.07 32.54
1982 284 232 516 16.57 13.53 30.10
1983 57 80 137 3.36 4.71 8.07
1984 252 264 516 14.67 15.37 30.03
1985 175 167 342 9.89 9.44 19.32
1986 44 82 126 2.48 4.62 7.10
1987 76 84 160 4.24 4.68 8.92
1988 210 83 293 11.64 4.60 16.24
Average
1955-60' 51 n.a n.a 4.40 n.a n.a
1961-66' 86 89^ I 9 7 C 6.83 6.98^ 15.39C
1967-74: 65 71 136 5.32 5.15 10.47
1975-81: 173 219 392 10.61 13.33 23.94
1982-88: 157 142 299 8.98 8.14 17.12
Notes : a. The number of bargaining units refers to both
collective agreements and compulsory arbitration awards.
b. Density of Bargaining Units = Number of Units per 
100000 employees in employment.
c. Average of the period 1964-66.
Source: Ministry of Labour.
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BARGAINING
Table
UNITS BY 
1973-
2.3.2
BARGAINING LEVEL
1988
Level General Occupational Special Total
National Local
Year % % % %
1973 0.00 49.32 15.75 34.93 146
1974 0.00 41.94 17.42 40.65 155
1975 1.09 32.48 17.88 48.54 274
1976 0.38 31.06 19.32 49.24 264
1977 0.31 33.54 13.54 52.62 325
1978 0.26 26.84 8.16 64.74 380
1979 0.48 32.14 9.76 57.62 420
1980 0.19 31.98 10.02 57.80 519
1981 0.00 32.68 9.95 57.37 563
1982 0.19 40.89 15.50 43.41 516
1983 0.00 40.15 12.41 47.45 137
1984 0.19 42.05 7.17 50.58 516
1985 0.29 45.03 14.04 40.64 342
1986 0.79 48.41 23.81 26.98 126
1987 0.63 38.75 21.25 39.38 160
1988 0.34 43.00 17.06 39.59 293
Average
1973-74 0.00 45.63 16.59 37.79 301
1975-81 0.39 31.53 12.66 55.42 392
1982-88 0.35 42.61 15.89 41.15 299
Source: Ministry of Labour.
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Table 2.3.3
SPECIAL COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS BY ECONOMIC SECTOR
Selected Years
Year 1974 1975 1982 1988
Sector % % % %
Manufacturing 11.8 4.7 6.4 7.1
Electricity and
Water 8.8 8.2 4.1 4.1
Transport and
Communications 55.9 42.3 23.8 44.9
Banks and
Insurances 2.9 7.1 4.7 6.1
Ministries 5.9 10.6 19.1 12.3
Local Government - 10.6 2.9 2.0
Health and
Social Security - - 2.3 2.0
Army, Navy and
Air Force - 4.7 17.5 4.1
Education and
Research 2.9 5.9 10.5 7.1
Miscellaneous 11.8 5.9 8.7 10.3
Total Number of
Special Collective 34 85 172 98
Agreements
Note: Data refer to the number of annual collective agreements 
concluded during the year in question.
Source: Ministry of Labour
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Table 2.4.1
EVOLUTION AND COMPOSITION OP THE FORMAL
IN MANUFACTURING
1954-1983
BARGAINING STRUCTURE
Level National Local Special All Density^
Year % % % %
1954 25.00 62.50 12.50 100 16 b
1955 30.30 54.55 15.15 100 33
1956 18.92 78.38 2.70 100 37
1957 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
1958 18.60 81.40 0.00 100 43
1959 19.15 70.21 10.64 100 47 23.38
1960 23.91 65.22 10.87 100 46 23.58
1961 35.71 51.43 12.86 100 70 35.48
1962 35.21 53.52 11.27 100 71 35.60
1963 36.49 58.11 5.41 100 74 36.71
1964 47.27 41.82 10.91 100 110 53.22
1965 31.73 54.81 13.46 100 104 47.50
1966 40.59 52.48 6.93 100 101 44.46
1967 55.71 35.71 8.57 100 70 31.26
1968 58.62 31.03 10.34 100 58 26.42
1969 50.79 41.27 7.94 100 63 28.11
1970 64.71 25.49 9.80 100 51 20.49
1971 70.21 12.77 17.02 100 47 17.72
1972 70.59 20.59 8.82 100 68 24.37
1973 51.92 25.00 23.08 100 52 17.31
1974 61.29 20.97 17.74 100 62 18.68
1975 71.88 14.06 14.06 100 64 19.06
1976 59.48 17.24 23.28 100 116 33.97
1977 76.83 6.10 17.07 100 82 23.49
1978 77.11 8.43 14.46 100 83 23.61
1979 71.25 10.00 18.75 100 80 22.71
1980 68.42 15.79 15.79 100 95 27.29
1981 83.10 11.27 5.63 100 71 21.23
1982 78.26 14.13 7.61 100 92 27.34
1983 67.86 10.71 21.43 100 28 7.62
Average
1955-60 22.18 69.95 7.87 41 23.48^
1961-66 37.83 52.03 10.14 88 42.16
1967-74 60.48 26.60 12.92 59 23.05
1975-81 72.58 11.84 15.58 84 24.48
1982-83 73.06 12.42 14.52 60 17.48
Note: a. Number of bargaining units per 100000 salary and wage 
earners in large-scale manufacturing industries (i.e. 
establishments employing more than 10 employees).
b. There are no data on manufacturing employment for 1954-58
c. Average of the 1959-60 period.
Source: Ministry of Labour
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Table 2.4.2
PROCEDURES OF REGULATION OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS AND AWARDS 
IN THE FORMAL SYSTEM OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN MANUFACTURING
1954-1983
Procedure
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Year
1954 81.25 0.00 18.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 18.75
1955 6.06 0.00 87.88 6.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 93.94
1956 43.24 0.00 16.22 35.14 5.41 0.00 0.00 56.76
1958 12.12 3.03 24.24 36.36 0.00 0.00 24.24 84.85
1959 28.26 8.70 26.09 26.09 0.00 2.17 8.70 63.04
1960 23.91 8.70 15.22 30.43 4.35 2.17 15.22 67.39
1961 62.86 8.57 4.29 20.00 0.00 2.86 1.43 28.57
1962 35.21 5.63 15.49 12.68 1.41 1.41 28.17 59.15
1963 32.43 8.11 22.97 12.16 2.70 0.00 21.62 59.46
1964 46.36 9.09 18.18 4.55 0.91 0.00 20.91 44.55
1965 44.23 9.62 15.38 7.69 0.00 1.92 21.15 46.15
1966 29.70 2.97 21.78 10.89 0.00 0.00 34.65 67.33
1967 54.29 2.86 15.71 10.00 0.00 0.00 17.14 42.86
1968 32.76 5.17 15.52 13.79 0.00 0.00 32.76 62.07
1969 36.51 3.17 22.22 1.59 0.00 0.00 36.51 60.32
1970 47.06 3.92 9.80 11.76 0.00 0.00 27.45 49.02
1971 38.30 8.51 10.64 6.38 0.00 0.00 36.17 53.19
1972 39.71 8.82 14.71 7.35 1.47 0.00 27.94 51.47
1973 51.92 1.92 25.00 7.69 0.00 3.85 9.62 46.15
1974 50.00 8.06 27.42 9.68 1.61 0.00 3.23 41.94
1975 46.88 6.25 35.94 1.56 0.00 0.00 9.38 46.88
1976 37.07 13.79 31.03 0.86 0.86 0.00 16.38 49.14
1977 25.61 13.41 48.78 0.00 0.00 1.22 10.98 60.98
1978 31.33 20.48 45.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.41 48.19
1979 30.00 15.00 52.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.50 55.00
1980 32.63 25.26 42.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 42.11
1981 32.39 23.94 42.25 1.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 43.66
1982 27.17 23.91 46.74 2.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 48.91
1983 28.57 7.14 60.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.57 64.29
Average
1955-60 22.72 4.08 33.93 26.82 1.95 0.87 9.63 73.20
1961-66 41.80 7.33 16.35 11.33 0.84 1.03 21.32 50.87
1967-74 43.82 5.31 17.63 8.53 0.39 0.48 23.85 50.88
1975-81 33.70 16.88 42.63 0.55 0.12 0.17 5.95 49.42
1982-83 27.87 15.53 53.73 1.09 0.00 0.00 1.79 56.60
Notes; [1] Collective Agreements
[2] Collective Agreements made compulsory for non-members
[3] Compulsory Arbitration Awards.
[4] Agreements and Awards Amended by the Ministry of 
Labour.
[5] Agreements and Awards Rejected
[6] Agreements and Awards Corrected.
[7] Agreements and Awards of which the Ministry of Labour
extended the duration.
[8] Share of Regulated settlements: Sum of 3,4,5,6,7. 
Source: Ministry of Labour
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Table 2.4.3
VOLUNTARY AND REGULATED COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN MANUFACTURING
BY LEVEL
1954-1983
Voluntary^ Regulated^
Level National Local Special National Local Special
Year
1954 30.77 53.85 15.38 0.00 100.00 0.00
1955 50.00 0.00 50.00 29.03 58.06 12.90
1956 25.00 75.00 0.00 14.29 80.95 4.76
1957 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
1958 40.00 60.00 0.00 15.79 84.21 0.00
1959 35.29 58.82 5.88 10.00 76.67 13.33
1960 33.33 60.00 6.67 19.35 67.74 12.90
1961 34.00 52.00 14.00 40.00 50.00 10.00
1962 34.48 58.62 6.90 35.71 50.00 14.29
1963 33.33 60.00 6.67 38.64 56.82 4.55
1964 42.62 42.62 14.75 53.06 40.82 6.12
1965 32.14 55.36 12.50 31.25 54.17 14.58
1966 48.48 39.39 12.12 36.76 58.82 4.41
1967 47.50 42.50 10.00 66.67 26.67 6.67
1968 50.00 45.45 4.55 63.89 22.22 13.89
1969 36.00 52.00 12.00 60.53 34.21 5.26
1970 73.08 15.38 11.54 56.00 36.00 8.00
1971 72.73 13.64 13.64 68.00 12.00 20.00
1972 72.73 15.15 12.12 68.57 25.71 5.71
1973 50.00 25.00 25.00 54.17 25.00 20.83
1974 50.00 27.78 22.22 76.92 11.54 11.54
1975 64.71 17.65 17.65 80.00 10.00 10.00
1976 59.32 22.03 18.64 59.65 12.28 28.07
1977 59.38 12.50 28.13 88.00 2.00 10.00
1978 65.12 11.63 23.26 90.00 5.00 5.00
1979 58.33 11.11 30.56 81.82 9.09 9.09
1980 54.55 21.82 23.64 87.50 7.50 5.00
1981 82.50 10.00 7.50 83.87 12.90 3.23
1982 70.21 17.02 12.77 86.67 11.11 2.22
1983 50.00 10.00 40.00 77.78 11.11 11.11
Average
1955-60 36.73 50.76 12.51 17.69 73.53 8.78
1961-66 37.51 51.33 11.16 39.24 51.77 8.99
1967-74 56.50 29.61 13.88 64.34 24.17 11.49
1975-81 63.41 15.25 21.34 81.55 8.40 10.06
1982-83 60.11 13.51 26.38 82.22 11.11 6.67
Notes:
b.
The Voluntary area includes columns 1 and 2 from 
Table 5.2.2.
The Regulated area includes columns 3 , 4, 5, 6 and 
7 from Table 5.2.2.
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Table 2.4.4
COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS AND COMPULSORY ARBITRATION AWARDS
IN MANUFACTURING BY LEVEL
1955-83
Level National Local Special Total
Year A C A C A C A C
% % % % % %
1955 50.00 24.14 0.00 62.07 50.00 13.79 2 29
1956 25.00 16.67 75.00 83.33 0.00 0.00 16 6
1957 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
1958 25.00 25.00 75.00 75.00 0.00 0.00 4 8
1959 30.77 7.69 61.54 69.23 7.69 23.08 13 13
1960 27.27 8.00 63.64 71.43 9.09 14.29 11 7
1961 27.27 0.00 56.82 100.00 15.91 0.00 44 3
1962 28.00 18.18 64.00 54.55 8.00 27.27 25 11
1963 33.33 41.18 58.33 52.94 8.33 5.88 24 17
1964 35.29 55.00 47.06 40.00 17.65 5.00 51 20
1965 28.26 43.75 56.52 50.00 15.22 6.25 46 16
1966 46.67 45.45 40.00 54.55 13.33 0.00 30 22
1967 44.74 90.91 44.74 9.09 10.53 0.00 38 11
1968 42.11 77.78 52.63 11.11 5.26 11.11 19 9
1969 39.13 71.43 47.83 28.57 13.04 0.00 23 14
1970 70.83 80.00 16.67 20.00 12.50 0.00 24 5
1971 66.67 80.00 16.67 0.00 16.67 20.00 18 5
1972 66.67 70.00 18.52 20.00 14.81 10.00 27 10
1973 51.85 61.54 22.22 15.38 25.93 23.08 27 13
1974 48.39 88.24 25.81 11.76 25.81 0.00 31 17
1975 60.00 82.61 20.00 4.35 20.00 13.04 30 23
1976 51.16 55.56 23.26 19.44 25.58 25.00 43 36
1977 42.86 92.50 14.29 0.00 42.86 7.50 21 40
1978 53.85 92.11 11.54 5.26 34.62 2.63 26 38
1979 45.83 85.71 8.33 9.52 45.83 4.76 24 42
1980 38.71 87.50 25.81 7.50 35.48 5.00 31 40
1981 73.91 86.67 13.04 10.00 13.04 3.33 23 30
1982 56.00 90.70 20.00 9.30 24.00 0.00 25 43
1983 50.00 76.47 0.00 11.76 50.00 11.76 8 17
Average
1955-601 31.61 17.56 55.03 72.21 13.36 10.23
1961-661 33.14 33.93 53.79 58.67 13.07 7.40
1967-74r 53.80 77.49 30.63 14.49 15.57 8.02
1975-81. 52.33 83.24 16.61 8.01 31.06 8.75
1982-831 53.00 83.. 58 10.00 10.53 37.00 5.88
Notes: A = Collective Agreements,
C = Compulsory Arbitration Awards.
Source: Ministry of Labour.
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CHAPTER 3. THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION AND COMPULSORY ARBITRATION.
3.1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
Compulsory arbitration is another main feature of the post-war 
system of industrial relations in Greece which has been based 
upon Law 3239 introduced in 1955. Arbitration is an additional 
way of regulation of collective bargaining evolving within the 
formal system. Its main aim has been to control industrial 
conflicts arising during formal collective bargaining. Its 
compulsory character has been the target of frequent criticism 
during the last two decades. But is the problem just the 
compulsory character of arbitration?
This chapter discusses the role of compulsory arbitration in 
theory and in practice and examines the extent to which 
arbitration has been used and the institutional developments 
associated with the bargaining behaviour of salary and wage 
earners. Strike activity is used as the major indicator of their 
bargaining behaviour. The analysis focuses upon developments in 
the manufacturing bargaining structure.
Section 3.2 discusses theoretical and methodological questions 
about the compatibility of arbitration with collective 
bargaining. Section 3.3 presents and evaluates the Greek system 
of compulsory arbitration in use since 1955. Section 3.4. 
presents the strike activity record in Greece and discusses its 
significance regarding the bargaining structure and wage setting
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procedures in the manufacturing sector. Section 3.5. summarises 
the findings and presents the conclusions of this chapter.
Our analysis suggests that the problem in the Greek system of 
industrial relations is not simply one concerning the operation 
of arbitration as it incorporates both the formal structure of 
collective bargaining and the characteristics of compulsory 
arbitration. In Greece arbitration is not compatible with 
collective bargaining, not because of its compulsory element but 
because of the lack of the essential characteristics that an 
efficient arbitration system should maintain. It is not 
independent from the Ministry of Labour and is dominated by 
incomes policies.
The combination of regulation of both procedural and substantial 
aspects of collective bargaining has been associated with 
increasing trends in strike activity dominating Greek industrial 
relations since 1975. Especially in the manufacturing sector in 
1975-81 strike activity at the company and plant level extended 
the system of collective bargaining from the formal secondary and 
tertiary levels towards the primary level of the trade-unions 
structure creating thus an informal system of collective 
bargaining. Its characteristics and its frequency make strike 
activity the more relevant industrial relations variable for 
the analysis of developments as far as wage determination in the 
Greek manufacturing sector is concerned.
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3.2. ARBITRATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING.
3.2.1. Third Party Intervention and Arbitration.
In wage setting under collective bargaining cases of impasse 
arise between unions and employers. Such an impasse is caused if, 
as Hunter (1983) analysed, the initial positions and the 
bargaining concessions of the parties to the bargaining process 
do not lead to the creation of a contract zone within which 
settlements may be reached. Strike activity and lock-outs provide 
to both parties the means for imposing disagreement costs upon 
the other party so as to promote the creation of a contract zone 
and lead to a settlement of the dispute.
As strikes impose costs on both parties, and in the case of 
essential services imply costs to the public, governments become 
involved in policies aiming to affect the behaviour of employees 
and employers in cases of impasse in collective bargaining. Long- 
lasting institutional policies regarding third party 
intervention can be considered as governmental involvement in the 
procedural aspects of wage determination. Such policies, 
undertaken for facilitating the creation of contract zones in 
cases of impasse in collective bargaining, are aimed also at 
promoting stability in the system of industrial relations by 
minimising the number of industrial disputes and the intensity of 
conflict.
Third-party intervention policies aimed at the behaviour of
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employees and employers involved in collective bargaining take 
various forms. Conciliation and mediation are weaker forms of 
third party intervention. As Webb (1986:249) pointed out, 
"conciliation is usually described in terms of the third party 
acting as a "go-between" without making a substantive 
contribution to negotiations" while "mediation is described as a 
more influential, substantive role where the third party may 
employ techniques . . . directed at discovering negotiated 
solutions to the dispute".
Arbitration is a stronger form of intermediation as arbitral 
bodies have usually the authority to suggest or even dictate a 
certain dispute resolution. Arbitration can take different forms. 
It can be voluntary or compulsory, binding or not, conventional 
or pendulum, i.e. based on final offers by the parties involved 
in the dispute. Strike activity and arbitration are considered 
as alternative impasse resolution procedures. As Ashenfelter 
(1985:29) put it "the purpose of arbitration systems is to 
produce the settlement of disputes in a way that is less costly 
than the alternatives".
According to ILO (1980) systems of arbitration have been used in 
some 22 countries and are the principal mode of labour dispute 
resolution in a further 14 countries. From those systems three 
main models of arbitration can be discerned, namely those used in 
the U.S. the U.K. and Australia. In the U.S. binding arbitration 
is mainly used in the public sector and is provided by 
independent professional arbitrators. In the U.K. arbitration is
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a voluntary process and arbitration services are provided by 
ACAS, an independent institution. In Australia compulsory 
arbitration dominates the national system of industrial 
relations. ACAC an independent and autonomous committee of 
industrial relations experts plays the central role in the 
federal and state system of compulsory arbitration. The basic 
characteristics of these systems are discussed in Appendix 1.
3.2.2. The Behaviour of Arbitrators.
From a theoretical standpoint the main question about arbitration 
is whether or not it is compatible with collective bargaining. 
This question can be discussed at two levels. First at a micro 
level concerning unions and employers behaviour given the 
availability of independent arbitration procedures. This type of 
approach to third party intervention as conflict resolution 
device has been criticised as being based on "an instrumental 
individualistic model of social relations" and as ignoring "the 
social control aspect of third parties function". (Webb,1986). 
Second, at the macro level with regard to the influence, formal 
or informal, that governments may exert upon arbitration 
procedures and outcomes. In both cases, arbitrators behaviour 
towards employers, unions and governments is central for 
determining whether or not arbitration is compatible with 
collective bargaining.
For those considering arbitration incompatible with collective 
bargaining, arbitration has a "freezing" or "chilling" effect
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upon collective bargaining because, so the argument runs, 
favours the persistent failure of the bargaining parties to 
create a contract zone and bargain within this voluntarily 
created zone. In the broad literature on arbitration, the 
discussion on the "freezing" or "chilling" effect depends 
on the assumption made with regard to arbitrators behaviour.
Stevens (1966), for instance, argued that conventional 
arbitration tends to discourage serious bargaining because 
conventional arbitrators are perceived by bargainers to split the 
difference between the parties to the bargaining process. 
However, Stevens (1966:49-50) argued that a strong compulsory 
arbitration system, i.e. a system of final-offer-arbitration, 
may be compatible with collective bargaining as the availability 
to the parties of an arbitration strategy, regarding one party's 
offer vis-a-vis the other party's expected offer, under this 
type of arbitration "would serve some of the functions usually 
associated with a strike strategy".
Farber and Katz (1979) formalised Stevens' analysis and examined 
the conditions under which such a "chilling" effect may be 
caused. According to them, a contract zone may be generated 
either by the costs of arbitration or, by at least one bargainer 
having overly pessimistic expectations about the arbitrator's 
award. Conversely, a contract zone will tend to be small or non­
existent when at least one bargainer has overly optimistic 
expectations about an arbitrators award.
In other theoretical attempts to examine the compatibility of
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arbitration with collective bargaining. Bloom (1981) argued that 
even if the parties have no uncertainty about the arbitration 
award they will still have an incentive to negotiate as long as 
their expected costs of arbitration exceed their expected costs 
of negotiation. Farber (1980) analysed theoretically the system 
of final-offer-arbitration and one of his conclusions was the 
recognition of the stochastic nature, i.e. the unpredictability, 
of arbitrators decisions. Thus, in theory, arbitration can be, 
under certain circumstances, compatible with collective 
bargaining.
In the U.S. literature it has been argued that arbitration does 
not cause any "freezing” or "chilling" effect upon collective 
bargaining. Ashenfelter (1985), in a survey of the results of 
quantitative analyses of interest arbitration systems operating 
in the U.S., concluded that arbitrators do not behave in the way 
assumed by the "chilling" effect literature. In other words, 
their behaviour is not dominated by a "splitting the differences" 
attitude, regardless the type of systems under which they 
operate, and they independently arrive to a reasonable award 
based on the facts and on a unique assessment of each individual 
case. "The chilling effect disappears so long as arbitrators 
introduce exogenous information into their decisions in a way 
that is to some extent unpredictable by the parties” (Ashenfelter 
1985:7). The recognition of the stochastic nature of arbitrators 
decisions was also stressed in Ashenfelter (1987) .
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3.2.3. Arbitration and Incomes Policy.
The second aspect on whether or not arbitration is compatible 
with collective bargaining has to do with the question whether 
and to what extent, autonomous arbitration can, in practice, 
remain independent from governmental incomes policies. 
Governments are concerned not only with the procedural aspects of 
collective bargaining, which are dealt with long-lasting policies 
on third-party intervention for conflict resolution, but, indeed, 
with the substantial issues of the wage setting process. Over the 
post-war period, incomes policy has been a widely used 
macroeconomic tool (Flanagan et al, 1983). As arbitration 
requires freedom of scope, which is denied by the prescriptions 
of any incomes policy, a contradiction is created between 
arbitration and incomes policy.
Hunter (1983) discussed those problems posed by arbitration 
during periods of incomes policy and pointed out that "whatever 
the form of incomes policy, the intention must be to affect the 
outcome of bargaining, and hence by implication, the process of 
bargaining itself. The establishment of a pay limit or norm, for 
example, may influence the starting point for bargaining on one 
or both sides, or the rate of convergence to a contract range". 
Furthermore, in conditions of an independent arbitration service 
the government may need, and therefore legislate, the right to 
overrule awards directly, when it considers the outcome of the 
arbitration process as damaging to its incomes policy. But, then, 
arbitration awards are neither independent nor of stochastic
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nature, i.e. not predictable by the parties of the dispute.
According to Clarke (1987b;398) in many countries state 
arbitration services have been faced with friction and problems 
as their independent even-handed attitude has been questioned by 
either side of collective bargaining when dealing with cases in 
which governments have been interested on the outcome. The 
obvious solution to these problems has been the separation of 
state arbitration services from direct governmental 
administration, as it happened in the U.K. with the creation of 
the autonomous ACAS in 1975 which assumed the arbitration 
functions earlier carried out by the Department of Employment.
Arbitration with defined criteria is an alternative to the right 
to overrule awards. In the context of an independent and 
autonomous arbitral body, as Hunter (1983:74) put it "one 
response to the charge that arbitration does not take into 
account the national interest as expressed in governmental policy 
is the suggestion that the national interest should be explicitly 
represented in arbitration". In this case, the autonomous 
arbitral body becomes another independent actor of key importance 
for the implementation of incomes policy.
'The extent to which autonomous arbitration services maintain 
their independence or become part of the governmental machinery 
for incomes policy implementation is a matter of empirical 
«evidence. In the context of the U.K. and the Australian systems 
( O f  industrial relations where more extensive use of arbitration 
machinery is observed and where successive incomes policies have
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been at work, the question of compatibility of arbitration with 
collective bargaining becomes more complicate.
Nevertheless, the voluntary character of arbitration in the U.K. 
seems to be rather compatible with collective bargaining. Indeed, 
according to Hunter (1983:72), in the U.K. "arbitrators have 
generally taken the view that arbitration should take incomes 
policy into account, but should not allow the policy to be the 
overriding consideration governing the award". Recent 
developments such as the refusal of the government, which acts 
both as employer and third-party, to refer the ambulance drivers* 
pay dispute to arbitration indicates that arbitration may well be 
independent from governmental policies and, from this point of 
view, can be considered as compatible with collective bargaining.
As far as the Australian system of compulsory arbitration is 
concerned it appears that it is rather compatible with collective 
bargaining too. Bamber and Lansbury (1987:11) observed that 
"there is relatively little "compulsion" in practice and the 
arbitration tribunals rely mainly on advice and persuasion". 
Braun (1975) on whether or not compulsory arbitration in 
Australia served as a form of incomes policy, had criticised the 
attempts by the Government, employers and economists "to convert 
the Commission into a recognised instrument for achieving a non- 
inflationary development of wages" because they "were distorting 
a valuable institution which should have been used within the 
broader framework of an incomes policy instead of being virtually 
the sole instrument of such a policy".
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However, Lansbury and Davis (1987:102) noticed that the lack of 
power to act in industrial relations, particularly in regard to 
pay policy, has frustrated Australian governments of all 
political persuasion. The Fraser government (1975-83), for 
instance, had strong exchanges with the Commission which 
responded that they were not an arm of Governmental economic 
policy but "an independent body required to act according to 
equity, good conscience and the substantive merits of each case".
Yet, the distinct pattern of short strike activity observed in 
Australia is, to a certain extent, associated with the system 
of compulsory arbitration. First it consists of tactical strikes 
designed to soften up employers or to pressurise the tribunal, 
and second, it consists of the grievance and protest strikes 
which reflect frustration with the inability of local industrial 
relations machinery to resolve local disputes. According to 
Mulvey (1986:21) this strike pattern is not linked only to the 
workings of the arbitration system but is also associated with 
the malfunction of poorly developed arrangements for industrial 
relations at plant level. But, as Creigh (1986) concluded, there 
is no evidence that the existence of the arbitration system as 
opposed to those based on collective bargaining has significantly 
affected stoppage incidence over the period 1962-81.
3.2.4. Summary
To summarise, third party intervention, and arbitration in 
particular, is used as an alternative to strike activity for
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resolving impasse situations in the bargaining process. Both in 
theory and in practice compulsory arbitration can be compatible 
with collective bargaining if the arbitral bodies are autonomous, 
remain independent from governmental policies and do not become 
part of the governmental machinery for incomes policy 
implementation. Otherwise, if arbitral bodies do not maintain 
such characteristics, "chilling" or "freezing" effects upon 
collective bargaining can be caused. In any case, the 
relationship between arbitration and incomes policy is, at least, 
a permanent source of friction. Finally, as the Australian 
experience suggests, compulsory arbitration may influence the 
pattern of strike activity.
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3.3. THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION IN GREECE: COMPULSORY-NOT-OUITE 
ARBITRATION.
3.3.1. Provisions. Evolution and Origins.
In the event that unions and employers are unable to reach
voluntarily a collective agreement, Law 3239 (art.9.1) offers a
mechanism for referring the dispute to the jurisdiction of 
compulsory arbitration. Reference can be made unilaterally, or 
jointly, or may be derived from statutory authority. In other
words, either parties to the dispute have the right to invoke the 
arbitration procedure. Indeed, the Ministry of Labour has too the 
right to activate arbitration proceedings (art.17.1).
Arbitration in Greece is clearly a compulsory process. In 
addition to the compulsory features of reference of a dispute to 
arbitration, during the arbitration process there is no right to 
strike (art.18.2). Consequently, any industrial action in 
progress should be abandoned after the referral of the dispute 
to the arbitration court. Sanctions are imposed when a party does 
not comply with the compulsory arbitration award (art.18.3). 
Arbitration awards are legally binding rulings as collective 
agreements (art.19.2). However, an arbitrated award can be 
challenged at an arbitration court of higher level, the award 
of which is final and cannot be challenged (art.12).
Under compulsory arbitration, disputes are settled by an arbitral 
body, the compulsory arbitration court, which is composed of four
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members: i) one judge as president of the court, ii) one official 
of the Ministry of Labour, iii) one trade-union representative 
appointed by the trade-union involved or the General 
Confederation of Labour and iv) one representative of the 
employers Association involved in the dispute (art.10.1). The 
composition of the compulsory arbitration court, according to the 
introductory report of Law 3239, was designed so as to secure 
impartiality and ability to take into account all the aspects of 
any dispute referred to. For this reason the judge and the 
Ministry of Labour official became rather permanent members of 
the arbitral body.
The system of compulsory arbitration was introduced along with 
the formal system of collective bargaining in 1955 by Law 3239. 
The system of compulsory arbitration was the relatively new 
element provided by Law 3239. In the earlier legislation the 
procedure of dispute resolution through arbitration was not 
homogeneous as far as the bodies dealing with dispute resolution 
are concerned. According to Law 3 086 labour disputes were 
referred to arbitral bodies of two different types, one rather 
legal and the other administrative, not because of the varied 
character of the disputes (distinguishing for instance between 
interest and rights disputes), but according to their location, 
i.e. the place where the parties involved in the dispute were 
based.
In addition to institutional homogeneity, another reason given 
for that reform was that in the case of disputes settled by
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judges the industrial relations affairs were dealt as being 
strictly of juridical nature and the outcome was wholly depended 
on the judge. Moreover, as the introductory report of the Law 
3 2 39 stressed, the earlier system was not accepted by both 
parties because serious questions on lack of impartiality of the 
arbitral bodies were raised.
The Greek system of compulsory arbitration has many similarities 
with arbitration systems used in other countries. Similarities 
exist with the systems used in Australia and in New Zealand, the 
compulsory arbitration machinery used in the U.K. during the 
second world-war period, and the machinery for wage controls 
enacted during the Korea war in the U.S. Probably, the 
comparative labour law was used in designing the Greek system of 
compulsory arbitration. Of course, there is also the Greek 
tradition, mainly the fascist-corporatist model of collective 
bargaining established by, and used during, the Metaxas 
dictatorship (1936-1940). However, our comparative analysis 
suggests that the British system of war-period arbitration was 
used as the main model for the design of the Greek system of 
compulsory arbitration.
The resemblance between the Greek system and the National 
Arbitration Tribunal constituted in August 194 0 under the 
Emergency Powers (Defence) Act for settling trade disputes during 
the war period in the U.K. (Turner-Samuels, 1951) is impressive. 
In that system a dispute is reported by either party to the 
Minister, who after considering mediation and conciliation, is 
empowered to refer the dispute to the National Arbitration
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Tribunal. The National Arbitration Order forbids strike action 
unless the dispute is reported to the Minister and is not 
referred by him for settlement. Till the Tribunal make its award 
and during the period of reference, lock-outs and strikes are 
prohibited. An award is possible to be made retrospective to the 
date on which the issue of the dispute arose. The terms of the 
award become incorporated on the existing agreement. Questions of 
revision are to be dealt with in the same way as every other 
dispute. Rates of wage and conditions of employment are to be 
regarded as minima. The tribunal consists of five members 
appointed by the Minister of Labour: three independent members 
and two members chosen to represent employers and unions. Panels 
of the latter have to be constituted by the Minister after 
consultation with CBI and TÜC.
The Greek system of compulsory arbitration has also some 
similarities with the system of arbitration proposed by Meade 
(1982:108-110) for the U.K. He called it "not-quite-compulsory- 
arbitration” and it has some similarities with the system of 
final-offer-arbitration. Its four major features, as summarised 
by Dolton and Treble (1985), have to do first, with the 
arbitrators preferences (the statutory duty of the arbitral body 
to lay stress on the promotion of employment in the sector under 
review), second, the right to activate the arbitral procedure (it 
would operate only if at least one of the parties to the dispute 
or the government itself wished to), third, the provision for a 
cooling-off period (during which the parties would be free to 
negotiate for an agreed settlement) and fourth, the effect of
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arbitral decisions upon strikes and lock-outs (it would not be 
unlawful for either side in the dispute to take industrial 
action, but if this is in opposition to the terms of an award the 
party should penalised).
The conditions under which all the above mentioned systems were 
introduced or proposed indicate that nearly all systems of 
compulsory arbitration are introduced during periods of social 
crisis and tension in industrial relations. The Australian and 
the New Zealand systems were both introduced and implemented 
after a period of strikes, strife, unemployment and severe 
confrontations between unions and employers (Holt, 1986, 
Plowman, 1989). The British war-period system was clearly related 
to emergency conditions while the Meade proposal was made in the 
aftermath of a period of major crisis in British industrial 
relations and in the context of stagflation.
In Greece the formal system of collective bargaining, and 
especially the system of compulsory arbitration, was introduced 
after a period of civil-war, which made ILO (1949:19) to observe, 
with reference to industrial relations, that "nothing in Greece 
is understandable except against the background of political 
insecurity and economic difficulties which are the factors 
dominating Greek life today". The expressed aim of Law 3239 was 
two-fold. Apart from the regulation of labour disputes, it aimed 
at the development of tripartite collaboration and, therefore, 
provided for the constitution, with tripartite participation, of 
the National Council for Social Policy which was designed to
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study and advise on living conditions, standards of living and 
social policy (art.28-33). That initiative was in line with the 
recommendations of the ILO examination committee, which visited 
Greece in 1948, as well as with the suggestions of the American 
Mission in Greece. The tripartite body was supposed to contribute 
in programming with regard to social policy.
However, that institution never played an important role in the 
national system of industrial relations. The institution of 
similar tripartite bodies at the national level has been a 
recurring phenomenon but, not surprisingly, they did not prosper 
in the environment of excessive state regulation in industrial 
relations. Similar institutional arrangements such as the 
Committee of Prices and Incomes, established by the military 
government in May 1972, with a view to supervise price and income 
developments, or the institution of a Prices and Incomes 
Committee under the chairmanship of the Minister of Co-ordination 
and Planning in August 1974 produced little change in the 
statutory regulation of wages and industrial relations.
As analysed in section 3.2, the governmental intervention even 
in the organisational issues of trade-unionism created the 
tradition of an always pro-governmental leadership in the General 
Confederation of Labour. Under conditions of continuous 
governmental intervention to the internal organisational issues 
of the Greek trade-unions, and with the trade-unions side being 
the one having, literary, its leadership reshuffled according to 
political changes, any tripartite collaboration at the national 
level cannot be meaningful, effective and efficient and cannot
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incorporate the trade-unions rank-and-file. Thirty years of 
experience indicate that the recipe of tripartite collaboration 
is called up every time that less popular policies are to be 
imposed as far as wage determination is concerned.
It is noteworthy that, in spite of the socialist promises since 
1981 for a radical change in the area of trade-unionism and 
industrial relations, those constants of the Greek national 
system of industrial relations were in full work during the 
1980s. Developments during the second term of the socialist 
government, in the period 1985-89, are indicative for the 
treatment of tripartite collaboration in Greek industrial 
relations. After the June 1985 election was won a stabilisation 
programme was being designed. At the same time, the National 
Council for Planning and Development was established, in which 
representatives of government, business and labour were to 
participate. That was supposed to be the highest tripartite 
advisory body for economic policy. But the government was also 
prepared to follow, and did follow, the tradition. When, after 
the imposition of the stabilisation program, the ruling party 
lost the majority in the General Confederation of Labour (GSEE), 
pro-governmental leadership was appointed. Until early in 1989, 
the General Confederation of Greek Workers was led by pro- 
governmental trade-unionists who, in line with the deep seated 
national tradition, were appointees.
98
3.3.2. Compulsion versus Arbitration; ^ Corporatist Model?
The similarities between the Greek system of compulsory 
arbitration and systems either used elsewhere or consisting 
normative approaches to industrial relations indicate that apart 
from the universal problems arising in the context of collective 
bargaining, comparâtivism, as far as labour legislation is 
concerned, has been a major influence upon policy-making in
industrial relations. However, as Kahn-Freund (1974:27) stressed
"the use of the comparative method requires a knowledge not only
of the foreign law, but also of its social and above all its
political context".
In Greece the framework of rather centralised collective 
bargaining, the availability of compulsory arbitration and the 
set up, from time to time, of institutions aiming at the 
tripartite collaboration may create the impression of a 
corporatist model. The formal system of collective bargaining and 
the trade-unions structure may appear as its corner-stone. In 
fact, due to the Civil War (1946-49) and its repercussions, the 
Greek post-war corporatism, if any, is completely different from 
the "voluntarist" or "bargained" north European corporatism 
analysed by Crouch (1977), Schmitter and Lembruch (1979). In the 
mixture of coercion and voluntarism, as Alivizatos (1983) has 
shown, coercion maintained, at least until 1974, the predominant 
role.
Apart from the context of regulated collective bargaining.
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another important aspect which distinguishes the system of 
compulsory arbitration used in Greece from those in the U.S., the 
U.K. and Australia has to do with the behaviour of the third 
party which is supposed to perform the role of arbitrator by 
considering the parties' offers along with external information 
in order to arrive to the final award. In the Greek system 
arbitrator is neither the independent individual professional 
arbitrator as in the U.S., nor the independent arbitral body 
appointed by autonomous institutions as the ACAS and the ACAC in 
the U.K. and in Australia respectively. It is the judge and the 
civil servant of the Ministry of Labour.
In fact. Law 3239 stipulates that arbitral bodies should consider 
disputes without any influence and as independent agents (art. 
11.2-3). It also defines the general criteria upon which awards 
should be based (art. 15.3). In practice, as it was recognised 
by high rank Ministry of Labour civil servants with large
experience in arbitration proceedings, it is the Ministry of
Labour representative who influences and even dictates the 
outcome of the arbitration process. Judges are mainly responsible 
for the procedural part of the compulsory arbitration process. 
The Ministry of Labour representative plays the key role in
settling the substantial issues of the dispute (Committee of 
Review on Incomes Policy, 1976:115). Thus, the Ministry of
Labour itself is the arbitrator and, therefore, there is complete 
identity between the Government and the third party which is 
supposed to arbitrate.
Under these circumstances, the third parties of the arbitral body
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are far from independent. The criticism of the judiciary for lack 
of autonomy has been a permanent feature in the Greek political 
and social life. As Alivizatos (1983) and Pollis (1987) have 
shown, successive governments have manipulated both the law and 
the judiciary to promote their policies regardless of 
constitutional and legal restrictions. Moreover, as judges lack 
any special knowledge on industrial relations and labour market 
issues, and given the presence of the Ministry of Labour 
representative, there is no much room for judges to remain, 
during the arbitration procedure, autonomous and independent from 
the policy of the Ministry of Labour. Judges simply agree with 
the theses supported by the Ministry of Labour representatives 
(Committee of Review on Incomes Policy, 1976:115).
The Ministry of Labour has preferences originating from the, 
explicit or implicit, governmental incomes policy. Its 
representatives, not surprisingly, have to follow the 
instructions of the political leadership of the Ministry, the 
Minister himself (up to the present there has never been a woman 
minister), and his advisers. In this context arbitrators not 
only have had to take account of the incomes policy but they 
have been supposed to implement it. This is due not only to the 
character of the civil service as part of the governmental 
machinery, but, indeed, to the functional relationship between 
the Ministry of Co-ordination (currently Ministry of National 
Economy) and the Ministry of Labour.
In practice, the Ministry of Labour is assigned the role to
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implement and to handle the incomes policy adopted by the 
Government and supervised by the Ministry of National Economy. 
Using the categorisation proposed by Meade (1982:98), we can say 
that the Ministry of National Economy acts as a "centralised 
wage-guidance institution" while the Ministry of Labour acts as 
a "centralised wage-fixing institution". In many cases, when a 
dispute became of political importance, the Minister was involved 
in person in mediation and arbitration procedures. His advisers 
are often involved, informally, in arbitration processes. But 
usually, when the dispute takes place at low levels of the
bargaining structure the job is left to the Ministry of Labour 
civil servants acting as members of the arbitral body.
Recently, in 1988, there have been episodes of deviant behaviour 
of the Ministry of Labour regarding the implementation of the 
incomes policy, as the then Minister of Labour (Mr. Genimatas) 
vetoed the policy of the Minister of National Economy (Mr. 
Simitis), with regard to the level of automatic indexation. Such 
episodes, which were the tip of the iceberg of socialists' intra­
party and intra-governmental conflict, are the exceptions 
verifying the existence of this working relationship between
these two ministries. After all, this relationship affects 
directly, if not decisively, the arbitrators behaviour.
Usually, in conditions of an independent arbitration service, 
governments adopting incomes policies may need the right to 
overrule arbitration awards where they see the outcome of the
arbitration process as damaging to their policies. When the
arbitral body is largely a governmental body, as it is in the
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case of the Greek system of compulsory arbitration, such a right 
might be considered redundant. However, since 1955 in Greece, 
Law 3239 (art.20.2) provided for the governmental right to amend 
or to reject collective agreements and compulsory arbitration 
awards (in the outcome of which the government itself plays the 
central role) when considered as not in line with the 
governmental wage policy. This right was dropped in 1974, in a 
move towards a more liberal system of collective bargaining.
Arbitration with defined criteria and representation of the 
national interest, as expressed by the governmental policy, in 
the arbitral body are usually considered as alternatives to the 
right to overrule awards. In the Greek system of compulsory 
arbitration. Law 3239 (art.15.3) defines the criteria upon which 
the arbitral bodies should base their awards. Indeed, it 
provides that the Ministry of Labour has the right to deal with 
the substantial issues settled by compulsory arbitration court, 
where also the Ministry of Labour civil servant represents the 
national interest as perceived and expressed by the government in 
office. Thus, the Ministry of Labour is clearly and directly 
represented in the arbitration process. The governmental, as well 
as the national interest, is therefore over-represented in 
compulsory arbitration proceedings, before and after them. This 
unique over-representation completes a system of strong 
legalistic and bureaucratic regulation upon wage determination.
From an economic point of view and in the context of incomes 
policy, the right to amend and to reject collective agreements
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and compulsory arbitration awards has some similarity with the 
tax-based incomes policy proposed by Layard (1982). The rejection 
of collective agreements or compulsory arbitration awards 
considered not in accordance with the governmental policy can be 
understood as sort of the Layard incomes policy with the tax 
multiplier of the excess increase in wages being indefinite. 
Furthermore, some similarities, regarding the key role of judges 
and Ministry of Labour representatives in the arbitration 
processes, exist between the Greek system of compulsory 
arbitration and the rationale of the incomes policy proposed by 
Meade (1982:83-118).
In this environment there is not much uncertainty regarding the 
impartiality of arbitrators and concerning arbitration outcomes. 
Therefore, there is not room for considering the arbitrators 
behaviour as one of stochastic nature. While in the U.K. and in 
Australia arbitrators may well take the view that incomes policy 
should be taken into account but not as the factor governing the 
award, in Greece, as the arbitrator is a Ministry of Labour civil 
servant and as the Ministry of Labour is assigned with the 
implementation of incomes policy, we cannot expect the third 
party to simply take into account the incomes policy. As the 
Committee of Review on Incomes Policy (1976:114-115) concluded, 
in arbitration procedures the governmental incomes policy is the 
overriding consideration.
Probably this difference in arbitrator behaviour lies behind the 
fact that in the U.K., for instance, there have been cases 
where governments opposed the referral of a dispute to
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arbitration because of running the risk of contravention of their 
policy. In Greece, however, successive governments keen to 
implement their incomes policy had no hesitations about the 
arbitration outcome and, thus, they used the compulsory 
arbitration procedure systematically and extensively. The 
formal system of collective bargaining and especially the 
compulsory arbitration machinery was designed to be, and was 
used, as an instrument of national incomes policy.
3.3.3. The Centralitv of Comoulsorv Arbitration.
Compulsory arbitration has dominated the formal system of wage 
determination. Table 3.3.1 presents the number of both collective 
agreements and compulsory arbitration awards registered with the 
Ministry of Labour and indicates the extent to which compulsory 
arbitration has been used. Since 1964, nearly half of the 
disputes evolving within the formal system of collective 
bargaining have been settled by compulsory arbitration courts. 
Data referring to the number of employees covered by compulsory 
arbitration awards would be more precise in measuring its 
coverage in the Greek labour market. Unfortunately, neither the 
Ministry of Labour ever recorded such information, nor data on 
the membership of trade-unions involved in compulsory arbitration 
processes are available. Only data on the number of disputes 
settled by compulsory arbitration are available.
Through the years the number of disputes resolved by 
arbitration increased not only in absolute terms but percentage­
105
wise as well. The average share of arbitration increased from 
45.42 in 1964-66 to 54.87 per cent in 1975-81. During the period 
1982-88 it was lower, namely 49.89 per cent, but this slight 
decrease is due to the fact that in 1988 the share of compulsory 
arbitration awards in dispute settlement was only 28.33 per cent, 
i.e. the lowest ever recorded. In 1988, after the end of the 
1985-87 stabilisation program, the government, to show its 
determination to promote collective bargaining and to reform the 
system of compulsory arbitration, decided to minimise the use of 
compulsory arbitration. Therefore, the 1988 developments 
influence the image of the whole period 1982-88. But the average 
share of arbitrated settlements in 1982-87 is much the same as in 
1975-81. Despite these changes between periods the overall 
comparison between the number of collective agreements reached 
voluntarily and the number of disputes settled through compulsory 
arbitration reinforces the line of argument that compulsory 
arbitration played a dominant role.
Compulsory arbitration played a dominant role at every level of 
the formal bargaining structure. Table 3.3.2 presents the shares 
by level of compulsory arbitration awards in the total number of 
both collective agreements and compulsory arbitration awards 
registered over the period 1973-88. The role of compulsory 
arbitration is more predominant in settling disputes at the level 
of the National General and the National Occupational collective 
bargaining. It is noteworthy that while the recourse to 
arbitration for the settlement of disputes at the national level 
of industry-wide or occupation-wide bargaining increased through
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the periods 1973-74, 1975-81 and 1982-88, the reverse trend is
observed with regard to disputes evolving at the special company
level. For every ten disputes evolving at the national level
seven of them are normally settled by arbitration courts. 
However, for every ten disputes evolving at the lowest level of
the formal bargaining structure in 1975-81 five of them, and in
1982-88 only three of them, are settled by arbitration. In 
other words, within the formal bargaining structure the move 
towards decentralised and fragmented bargaining is followed by 
relatively less use of arbitration procedures.
Tables 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 suggest that within the formal system of 
collective bargaining, compulsory arbitration was the preeminent 
method of wage and job regulation. It was not predominant only in 
the 1960s but throughout the 1970s and the 1980s. After 1975 in 
particular, primarily for dispute resolution at the national and 
the regional level of collective bargaining, arbitration was 
resorted to extensively. Given that the parties had probably to 
bargain repeatedly in the face of the same fixed rules, the 
question is what was their behaviour towards arbitration, and 
especially which side invoked the arbitration procedure and to 
what extent.
Trade-unions and employers can exert some discretion on whether 
or not to refer a dispute to arbitration but this is where their 
discretion ends as they cannot oppose referrals and do not have 
the right to select arbitrators either. As during the award- 
making process third parties are not really autonomous there is
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no point for such a selection. However, the parties behaviour 
would be rather stable unless important changes occurred in 
arbitrators behaviour and would be associated with what they 
expect from arbitration. Even though both parties participate, 
not always directly, to the arbitral body, third parties alone 
can determine the arbitration outcome as the award is decided by 
majority vote and in the event that two members are in favour and 
two against it is the judge* s vote which determines the outcome 
(art.11.4). In other words, third parties play the central and 
dominant role.
Third parties have preferences, arising from incomes policy 
considerations, and the intention to affect the outcome. The two 
parties of the dispute have their own preferences and normally 
are not equally in favour of, or in opposition to incomes policy. 
While one side may be reluctant to refer the dispute to 
arbitration the other may be keen to do so. The knowledge that 
this "preferential** arbitration is always available reduces the 
efforts of the party feeling more familiar with the governmental 
incomes policy to reach an agreement voluntarily during the 
negotiations phase. Moreover, the knowledge of the arbitration* s 
preferences makes the optimistic party to maintain a rigid 
bargaining position.
As in most cases over the period 1967-88 the employers* side was 
more supportive for the governmental incomes policy and its 
offers were closer to the favoured award (with the exception of 
the incomes policy adopted in 1982 by the newly elected Socialist 
government) , the trade-union side should have been keen to avoid
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the referral of disputes to arbitration. Instead, it should have 
sought better settlements through strike activity and collective 
bargaining. Consequently, trade-unions should have been the more 
unwilling party for referral of disputes to arbitration.
Systematic data on which side initiated arbitration proceedings 
are not available. But successive Ministers and Ministry of 
Labour civil servants in interviews and public statements said 
that the majority of compulsory arbitration processes was invoked 
and initiated by trade-unions. Surprising as it may seem, 
according to Ministers and civil servants responsible for 
arbitration proceedings, more than 70 per cent of the compulsory 
arbitration processes were initiated by the trade-union side. 
There is no further way to certify it by using statistical 
information, but both Ministers and civil servants repeatedly 
made similar statements and nobody argued against. Trade-union 
officers interviewed agreed with those statements.
Is this a paradox? Yes, it is given first, the role of 
compulsory arbitration in the implementation of successive 
incomes policies, and second the above described rationale on why 
the trade-union side should have been the less optimistic side as 
far as the arbitration outcome is concerned. However, it seems 
that trade-union leaders were more familiar with referring 
disputes to compulsory arbitration, than the theoretical overview 
of the system suggests. Indeed, as shown in Tables 3.3.1 and
3.3.2, the increasing share of arbitration awards indicates that 
the parties' dependence upon compulsory arbitration, especially
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of those involved in industry-wide or occupation-wide collective 
bargaining at the national level, increased over time. It 
appears that trade-unions had the initiative towards this 
increasing dependence. How can this trade-union behaviour be 
explained?
An explanation put forward by some trade-unionists focuses upon 
the lack of independence of trade-union leaders of a certain 
category of unions active within the formal system of collective 
bargaining. Trade-union officers have been largely, directly or 
not, appointed by the Ministry of Labour. Therefore, they, so the 
argument runs, simply do properly their job as "agents" of the 
Ministry of Labour within the trade-union movement by providing 
the Ministry of Labour with the chance to regulate collective 
agreements. Although there is lot of truth in this argument, a 
more complete explanation should take into account that trade- 
unions of low bargaining power, if any at all, might have had to 
make compromises and settle for the compulsory arbitration award. 
Therefore, they had to take the initiative and refer disputes to 
compulsory arbitration in order to get awards effective from the 
date of reference. The earliest the dispute is referred to 
arbitration the more retrospective is the arbitration award.
In this context arbitration procedures may well operate as a 
"face-saving" process for trade-union leaderships. "Heroic" 
claims cost nothing and provide the trade-union leaders with 
credentials of militancy, quite necessary to maintain control 
over their rank-and-file. For the referral of the dispute to 
arbitration the employers' rigid bargaining position is blamed.
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For the outcome the blame goes to arbitrators and the Ministry of 
Labour. However, high wage claims which remain persistently 
unfulfilled could reinforce trade-unions' weakness as members may 
end up considering the unions not effective in getting their wage 
demands and therefore being reluctant to join them. Such a 
development is consistent with the increasing financial 
dependence of trade-unions by the Ministry of Labour fund.
To explain further this type of behaviour of union leaders 
there is another dimension which concerns the reproduction of the 
trade-union structure. As Sabethai (1986:4) observed "it has 
been pointed out repeatedly in the past that compulsory 
arbitration (apart from limiting the free exercise of the right 
to collective bargaining) has permitted the survival of unions 
without any real représentâtivity, merely on the strength of 
their formal right to be parties to a collective dispute and 
thus initiate arbitration proceedings". From this point of view 
one of the causes, as well as effects, of the union initiated 
referrals of disputes to arbitration have been the conservation 
and perpetuation of the existing trade-union structure.
To this respect, arbitration procedures sustained the 
conservation of the formal bargaining structure as well. 
Compulsory arbitration courts played a central role by granting 
legal recognition to trade-unions of low bargaining power and 
seriously questioned representativity. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that, as indicated in Table 3.3.2, the share of 
arbitrated settlements bearing at industry-wide or occupation-
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wide bargaining at the national level was persistently high and 
slightly increasing after 1973. It is in this area of the formal 
bargaining structure that most trade-unions lacking 
representativity and bargaining power can be traced. An 
observation made by Braun (1975:206) regarding the Australian 
system of compulsory arbitration is quite relevant to this 
category of Greek trade-unions, as she referred to "the 
existence of close and continuous personal contacts, on an almost 
day-to-day basis, between relatively few individuals with 
considerable authority in the employers* organisations, unions 
and government departments" which "are obviously easier to 
achieve in a small than in a large economy".
The existence of similar relations between a large category of 
trade-union officers and the governmental apparatus carrying out 
industrial relations policies, and their behaviour regarding 
compulsory arbitration lead to the conclusion that in Greece the 
system of arbitration has operated as the vehicle of a mutual 
exchange between governments and trade-union leaders and 
officers. On the one hand, governments exert a degree of control 
upon trade-union developments and, thus, facilitate the 
implementation of their policies. On the other, trade-union 
officers maintain their positions and status. At the same time, 
the formal bargaining structure is preserved as much as possible.
Compulsory arbitration plays the central role in all these 
processes. Therefore, its centrality in the formal system of 
collective bargaining arises not only from its extensive and 
increasing use, but, indeed, concerns its crucial role for the
112
survival and reproduction of bargaining units and trade-unions 
acting within the formal system. In such conditions of 
compulsory-not-quite-arbitration, as the Committee of Review on 
Incomes Policies (1976:114-115) observed, the parties* offers 
during the bargaining process, as well as their claims presented 
to arbitration proceedings, are designed more as "face-saving" 
than as credible tactical bargaining positions. This is more 
plausible for the trade-unions side. This behaviour indicates a 
"chilling" or "freezing" effect upon collective bargaining. But, 
it is not arbitration per se which bears the responsibility. It 
is the predominance of compulsion and the lack of independence 
and autonomy of the arbitral bodies versus the Ministry of 
Labour and the governmental incomes policy.
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3.4. STRIKE ACTIVITY AND DECENTRALISATION OF THE MANUFACTURING 
BARGAINING STRUCTURE.
3.4.1. Compulsory Arbitration and Strike Activity.
Arbitration is considered and used as an impasse resolution 
procedure alternative to strike activity. If arbitration is 
successful, other things being equal, there should be a negative 
association between the use of strike activity and the use of 
arbitration procedures. Normally, as Feuille (1979) pointed out, 
strikes and arbitration are negatively correlated. From this
point of view, strike activity provides a major criterion for 
evaluating the effectiveness of arbitration systems.
The Greek system of compulsory arbitration initiated by Law 3239 
aimed exactly at the regulation of labour disputes. Compulsory 
arbitration was adopted as a means for minimising industrial 
conflicts and their costs. During the arbitration process the 
right to strike is suspended and consequently, any industrial 
action in progress should be abandoned after the referral of the 
dispute to the arbitration court. And strikes challenging 
arbitration awards are consider unlawful. On this basis the 
system of compulsory arbitration aimed also at the promotion of 
a tripartite collaboration through the tripartite character of 
the arbitral bodies as well as through the establishment of a 
tripartite committee at the national level to study and advise on 
living conditions, standards of living and social policy.
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Ashenfelter (1985:30) argued that "whether arbitration will grow 
in popularity depends on whether it is a less costly system than 
the alternatives and on whether the parties are able to obtain 
the information and experience necessary for determining whether 
it is less costly". On this micro dimension of conflict 
resolution through arbitration depends its growth and its 
performance in a national system of industrial
relations. However, as argued in section 3.3 the Greek system can 
not be considered as a system of independent arbitration because 
of the dependence of the arbitral body from the Ministry of 
Labour. In other words, it really is a compulsory system but it 
is not a system of arbitration because of the arbitrators 
behaviour which no way can be considered as of stochastic nature. 
The popularity of the Greek system of compulsory arbitration may 
not depend only on whether it is more or less costly than strike 
activity. It may also depend on its character as part of the 
governmental machinery for incomes policy implementation.
Surprising enough, over most of the post-war period this system 
of compulsory-not-quite-arbitration has been popular among trade- 
union leaders acting within the formal system of collective 
bargaining. This popularity might suggest that, despite its 
idiosynchratic characteristics, trade-unions prefer dispute 
resolution through arbitration rather than through strike 
activity. The questions regarding union leaders' independence 
from the Ministry of Labour may imply that arbitration has not 
been equally popular to the unions rank-and-file and among
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salary and wage earners in general. In the case of the Greek 
system of compulsory arbitration the distinction between trade- 
unions leadership and rank-and-file, proposed by Ashenfelter and 
Johnson (1969) , is particularly appropriate. According to 
Ashenfelter and Johnson there are three parties in the bargaining 
process and not two, namely management, union leaders and union 
rank-and-file.
In the model of Ashenfelter and Johnson, strikes occur during 
the bargaining process as the rank-and-file has high expectations 
about the wage setting. Leaders are more realistic but agree to 
take strike action for political reasons, i.e. to avoid the 
political cost of concluding an agreement at lower levels than 
their rank-and-file expects. Obviously, in the Greek system of 
compulsory arbitration trade-union leaders do not seem to behave 
this way as they themselves prefer to refer disputes to 
arbitration rather than to undertake strike activity. But has 
arbitration been popular among their rank-and-file too? Have 
they followed the same behaviour?
Strike activity provides the best available criterion for 
evaluating compulsory arbitration from the industrial relations 
point of view because industrial action reflects the attitudes 
and the behaviour of unions rank-and-file. The formal bargaining 
structure, the labour initiated extensive use of arbitration and 
the structure of the official trade-unionism may create the 
impression of a corporatist and efficiently operating system of 
industrial relations. But to evaluate the performance and 
effectiveness of the Greek system of compulsory arbitration we
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examine the strike activity record over the long period 
compulsory arbitration has been in use.
Three indices on strike activity, given in Table 3.4.1, denote 
that, in Greece, since the institution of the formal system of 
collective bargaining in the mid-50s, there has been a steadily 
increasing trend which had its peak in the period 1979-80 and 
then remained at high levels. This trend in strike activity over 
the past three decades indicates that the formal system of 
collective bargaining and the mechanism of compulsory arbitration 
were not effective in resolving labour disputes and controlling 
strike activity. Table 3.4.1 makes clear that from the period 
1953-62 to the period 1976-81 the strikers* density increased 
eight times, the relative days lost increased ten times and the 
frequency of strikes increased three times. The period 1976-81 is 
the one with the highest strike activity ever recorded in Greece. 
In the period 1982-88 strike activity remained at similar high 
levels. The period 1967-74 is omitted because under the military 
regime the right to strike was suspended and trade-unions freedom 
curtailed.
To discern any relationship between compulsory arbitration and 
strike activity we examine the bivariate correlation between a 
set of variables indicating the use of arbitration and strike 
performance. Methodologicaly it is not easy to discern and 
quantify the influence of compulsory arbitration upon strike 
activity because strike activity is determined by both 
institutional and economic factors ( Kennan, 1986, Paldam, 1983,
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Paldam and Pedersen, 1984). Yet, the results provided in Table 
3.4.2 suggest the existence of a positive relationship between 
the use of arbitration and the recourse to strike activity. As 
the data on arbitration refer to the number of disputes settled 
by arbitration courts, the strikes frequency variable is the most 
relevant to be associated with the number of disputes settled by 
arbitration. Correlation coefficients for this variable as well 
as for relative days lost are found positive and significant.
This simple correlation analysis suggests the lack of the 
hypothesised in the literature negative correlation between 
strike activity and arbitration and provides only a rough 
indication of their relationship as other sources of influence 
upon strike activity are not controlled for. Can the positive 
correlation between arbitration and strike activity be considered 
as indicative of smooth operation of the Greek system of
compulsory arbitration? This might be the case if strikes
precede arbitration procedures and, therefore, strike activity 
causes and explains the use of arbitration. But it is rather the 
case of a causal relationship running the other way round. We 
base this inference not only on the fact that arbitration 
proceedings were mainly invoked by trade-union leaders, but 
indeed, upon the observation that a high percentage of strikes 
did not take place within the formal system of collective 
bargaining.
Strike activity did not cause the extensive use of arbitration 
because it largely evolved out of both the tertiary and the 
secondary level of the bargaining structure, i.e. the bargaining
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levels at which disputes can be referred to compulsory 
arbitration. Over the period 1976-80, for which analytical data 
are available in the Ministry of Labour, less than 10 per cent of
the total number of strikes took place within the secondary and
the tertiary level of the formal system. These findings are
presented in Table 3.4.3. The number of strikes undertaken
within and above the secondary level of the trade-union 
structure, indicates that over the period 1976-81 not every 
secondary level organisation, which was entitled to contract 
formal collective agreements or to invoke arbitration 
proceedings, resorted to industrial action during the annual 
bargaining rounds. In other words most of the conflicts recorded 
by strike activity statistics were not part of formal bargaining 
processes.
As Paldam (1989:63-64) observed "the number of industrial 
conflicts always works better in economic models than the 
variables referring to the number of workers involved (the size 
of conflicts) and days lost, as these two series are heavily 
influenced by a few large conflicts between the organisations, 
while the sheer number of conflicts is a grass-roots measure of 
labour market tensions". Furthermore, Paldam reported that "the 
series of number of conflicts for different countries have 
different, and often dramatic, long-run trends, which are 
causally related to institutional factors, notably to the 
relative size and degree of centralisation of the trade-unions in 
the country".
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Of course, even if strike activity and arbitration are normally 
considered as alternative impasse resolution procedures, 
arbitration is not a perfect form of no-strike insurance. It does 
not protect from "wildcat" strikes or stoppages over issues and 
at levels outside the scope and the structure of the formal 
system of collective bargaining. But the existence in 1976-81 of 
such a great number of industrial conflicts at the lowest level 
of the bargaining structure along with its positive correlation 
with the use of arbitration cannot be considered as a simple 
imperfection of the system of compulsory arbitration.
Allowing for statistical errors in recording strike activity, we 
can say that, since the higher the organisational level of 
industrial action the easier to record it, the defects of strike 
statistics may underestimate strike activity undertaken and 
especially industrial conflicts occurring, at the plant level. 
From this point of view the number of strikes indicating the 
number of open conflicts suggests the existence of more 
bargaining units in the bargaining structure than those 
officially registered through formal collective agreements and 
arbitration awards. These bargaining units were probably active 
out of the formal system of collective bargaining and associated 
with the trend towards decentralisation observed even within the 
formal bargaining structure.
This deviant behaviour on behalf of salary and wage earners 
suggests that in analysing the Greek system of industrial 
relations the distinction between leaders and rank-and-file 
should be taken into account as a crucial factor of developments
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in industrial relations. As trade-union leaders acting within the 
formal system were less dependent on their rank-and-file and the 
latter became, especially in 1975-81, rather strike-prone, the 
system of industrial relations ended up in a vicious circle of 
fragmented bargaining and lack confidence between governments, 
employers, union leaders and union rank-and-file.
The failure of compulsory arbitration incorporates and 
intensifies the lack of confidence of the participants, or at 
least of the substantial part of them, which is essential for a 
system of arbitration to be effective. Given that the arbitration 
was never independent and autonomous the main obstacle to its 
effectiveness, i.e. the influence exerted by by the Ministry of 
Labour, has been long-lasting. This has affected industrial 
relations in general as the attitudes of the parties, and 
especially those of salary and wage earners, are crucial for the 
function not only of a system of arbitration but for the system 
of industrial relations as a whole. Strike activity did not 
simply try to pressurise arbitral bodies. To the extent that it 
was neither part of formal bargaining processes nor of compulsory 
arbitration, it consisted the only way available for setting up 
new bargaining relationships out of the formal system of 
collective bargaining and its bargaining structure.
To summarise, the strike activity record in Greece over the post­
war period indicates that compulsory arbitration has been 
unsuccessful in controlling labour disputes. This is consistent 
with the idiosynchratic character of the system of arbitration
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which has been mainly used as machinery for incomes policy 
implementation. Compulsory arbitration has been popular among 
trade-union leaders but not among their rank-and-file. Strike 
activity should not be simply considered as indicating the 
malfunction of the system of compulsory arbitration but indeed, 
as a mean for the creation of bargaining units out of the formal 
system of collective bargaining. It seems that this growth of 
collective bargaining out of the formal system occurred far from 
any collaboration and consensus, but on the basis of inter-union 
and intra-union conflicts.
3.4.2. Strike Activity and Informal Collective Bargaining in 
Manufacturing.
Strike activity in Greek manufacturing, according to the indices 
presented in Table 3.4.4, follows the trend observed at the 
aggregate level of analysis. It had its peak during the 1975-81 
period and then remained at similar high levels. Moreover, strike 
activity in manufacturing is strongly and positively associated 
with the use of compulsory arbitration as well as the use of 
other procedures of regulation of collective bargaining provided 
by Law 3239.
Table 3.4.5 provides the estimated correlation coefficients 
relating sets of variables for arbitration and regulation of 
bargaining, within the formal system, with three variables for 
strike activity undertaken by wage and salary earners in 
manufacturing. Nearly all the specifications on the use of
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compulsory arbitration and other methods of regulation are found 
with positive, significant and, indeed, strong correlation 
coefficients. These results suggest that the use of compulsory 
arbitration and other methods of regulation failed to minimise 
industrial conflict in manufacturing.
As the number of conflicts exceeds overwhelmingly the number of 
formal bargaining units registered in manufacturing it seems 
reasonable to infer that it is not strike activity which precedes 
the use of arbitration and regulation, but, mainly arbitration 
and regulation of collective bargaining are followed by strike 
activity. This means that largely strikes are not part of the
arbitration process but they rather are protest strikes, at
least, or strikes attempting to set up new bargaining
relationships out of the formal system which is regulated by the
Ministry of Labour directly or indirectly via the arbitration 
machinery.
The index for strikes frequency in manufacturing, presented in 
Table 3.4.4, compared to that referring to all sectors, presented 
in Table 3.4.1, indicates a higher than average frequency of 
strikes in manufacturing. In other words, more strikes per 
100000 employees occur in manufacturing than in the rest of the 
economy, and therefore it seems that conflicts in manufacturing 
are relatively more decentralised.
The high frequency of industrial conflicts in manufacturing is 
the main feature of the period 1975-81 as far as strike activity 
is concerned. In 1976, in particular, the number of industrial
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conflicts was the highest ever recorded in Greece. The record 
number of 184 strikes per every 100000 salary and wage earners 
in manufacturing were recorded. In 1975 the relevant number may 
have been high as well but the available strike activity 
statistics cover only the period from September to December of 
that year. In 1976, the then Conservative government adopted new
legislation, namely Law 330, aiming to control "wildcat" and
"informal" strikes at the company level which dominated
manufacturing industrial relations after the fall of the military 
regime in July 1974. Presumably between the adoption of Law 330 
and the high frequency of strikes at plant level in 1976 there is 
a causal relationship running both directions as the new 
legislation faced a wave of strikes expressing the employees
disagreement and discontent.
In the literature varying definitions of informal aspects of 
industrial relations have been discussed. As far as strike 
activity is concerned Clarke (1987b;394), for instance, 
distinguished "wildcat" strikes, as those taking place contrary 
to procedure agreements for dispute resolution, from the 
"unofficial" strikes i.e. those taking place outside the rules 
of their own union. According to Clegg (1976:82) "plant 
bargaining leads to a relatively large number of official 
strikes, and industry or regional bargaining to a smaller number 
of larger official strikes. ... The number of strikes (most of 
them small and where the distinctions are relevant also 
unofficial and unconstitutional) is likely to be high where 
disputes procedures are absent or defective, and where the
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distinctions between unofficial and official strikes and/or 
unconstitutional and constitutional strikes are blurred or non 
existent".
In Greek manufacturing after 1975, strike activity evolving at 
the primary level of the bargaining structure and the trade- 
unions structure was dominant. In 1975-77 most manufacturing 
disputes were combined struggles for the right to organise at the 
company level and for higher pay. The early enterprise unions 
were often involved in clashes with state agencies and employers 
who tried to suppress them. Typically the full recognition of 
union rights came in 1982. Over the period 1975-81 along with 
the plant level strike activity, the structure of unionism 
underwent substantial changes. Employees got rid of the 
occupation-based unionism and created a factory unionism which 
organised the labour force at the plant level regardless of the 
occupational and technical division of labour (Kasimatis, 1978, 
Manicas, 1984, loannou, 1986).
Table 3.4.6 examines the extent to which industrial conflicts 
expanded at the plant level during the 1975-81 period and 
favours the argument about decentralisation as the ratio of 
strikes per 100 establishment more than doubled in 1976-81 
compared to 1962-66. Furthermore, its dispersion over the period 
1976-81 is narrower than in 1962-66 and this implies that in 
1976-81 the expansion of strike activity at the plant level was 
less asymmetric than in 1962-66. This observation reinforces the 
argument regarding the decentralisation of the bargaining process 
through plant level strike activity. Indeed, in 1976-81 the ratio
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of strikes per 100 establishments is higher than in 1962-66 
despite the fact that more labour force was concentrated in 
large-scale industries.
The ratio of strikes per 100 establishments in each two-digit 
manufacturing industrial branch, presented in Table 3.4.7, 
indicates the existence of large asymmetries among them, which 
are mainly associated with the varying number and size of 
establishments in each branch. In heavily concentrated industries 
as in branch 34: Basic Metal Industries, in 1976-81 occurred on 
average four strikes at every ten establishments, while in branch 
29: Leather Manufacturing, which is dominated by handicraft 
plants occurred less than two strikes per 100 establishments. 
However, the test on stability of the dispersion of industrial 
conflicts across the twenty two-digit industrial branches, 
presented in Table 3.4.6, denotes the existence of stability 
over time, which is probably related to structural 
characteristics of manufacturing production and employment and 
behavioural characteristics of the labour force in each branch.
During the period 1976-81, the plant level strike activity was 
not equally developed across the manufacturing sector. The index 
of strikers density, which describes the number of strikers per 
1000 employees, indicates that employees in certain industrial 
branches were more strike-prone and active from average. The set 
of active industrial branches in terms of strikers density over 
the period 1976-81 include the following: i) 34: Basic Metal
Industries, ii) 27: Paper Industry iii) 37: Electrical Machinery
126
iv) 28: Printing and Publishing v) 38: Transport Equipment
(loannou, 1988:106). The ranking in descending order of the same 
data-set on strikers density across the twenty two-digit 
industrial branches, presented in Table 3.4.8, has a 0.55 
coefficient of concordance. This coefficient denotes a rather 
unstable hierarchy in terms of strike-prone industrial branches 
in the Greek manufacturing sector over the period 1976-81. Data 
unavailability on the number of strikers by industrial branch 
does not allow us to calculate the same coefficient for the whole 
period 1975-88.
An alternative set of data, the index of days lost per 1000 
employees, is used instead. The ranking in descending order of 
the twenty industrial branches according to the index of days 
lost per 1000 employees, which is presented in Table 3.4.9 has a
0.25 coefficient of concordance. This value implies that, over 
the period 1975-88, the hierarchy of industrial branches as far 
as strike activity is concerned is quite unstable. Statistic 
evidence on the inter-industry variation in strike activity is 
summarised in Table 3.4.10. It appears that, during the period
1975-88 in the Greek manufacturing sector, there were no clearly 
distinguished industrial branches which were leading the plant 
level strike activity and branches either following the leaders 
or remaining away of strike activity at the plant level.
The evidence on the expansion and the dispersion of the plant 
level strike activity indicates the bargaining aggressiveness and 
the militancy of employees across the manufacturing sector. But 
by no means should it be perceived as indicator of their
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effectiveness. There are no data recorded on the effectiveness of 
the plant level strike activity. The only evidence available 
refers to the total number of strikes and strikers over the 
period 1976-81. This evidence suggests that only 20 per cent of 
the total number of strikes were reported as being of full or 
partial success, and only 6 per cent of the total number of 
strikers were reported as being fully or partially successful 
(loannou, 1988:102).
The difference of percentages between successful strikes and 
successful strikers may suggest that strikes undertaken at the 
lower level of the bargaining and trade-unions structure, by 
relatively small groups of employees, were more successful as far 
as their objectives are concerned. But, in fact, the 
effectiveness of the strike activity cannot be properly recorded 
directly by the strike statistics. Moreover, strike activity is 
not a good indicator of bargaining power. Groups of employees and 
whole industrial branches without any significant bargaining 
power may go out to strike and may be strike-prone.
In any case the plant level unionism aimed at ad hoc single 
employer arrangements concerning wage determination and job 
regulation, thus, initiating an informal system of collective 
bargaining. Such bargaining processes may imply the weakening of 
the centralised formal system of collective bargaining. Both the 
formal and the informal system can be considered as parts of a 
dual system via which primary unions and informal groups of 
employees tried to "beat" the formal annual collective agreements
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and compulsory arbitration awards. As compulsory arbitration has 
been used to implement incomes policies, it seems that its 
extensive use caused the rise of informal bargaining procedures 
by those who disagree with both procedural and substantial 
aspects of the governmental policies.
To summarise, despite the restrictions imposed upon wage 
determination through collective bargaining at the plant level, 
after 1975, successive waves of strike activity developed at 
the plant level in manufacturing industries This strike
activity evolved out of the formal system of collective 
bargaining as well as out of, and in conflict with, the official 
structure of the Greek trade-unionism. It resulted in the 
creation of an informal system of wage determination and created 
rather erratic wage rounds in the Greek manufacturing sector. 
Thus, despite the long lasting characteristics of undeveloped and 
over-regulated institutions and processes of formal collective 
bargaining, plant level strike activity and informal collective 
bargaining led to decentralisation and fragmentation of the 
manufacturing bargaining structure and can be considered as a 
potential source of influence with regard to wage developments in 
the Greek manufacturing sector.
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3.5. CONCLUSIONS.
Third party intervention, as expressed in systems of arbitration, 
can be compatible with collective bargaining if arbitrators are 
and remain independent and, therefore, arbitration procedures 
work as less costly procedures, than strike activity, for impasse 
resolution in collective bargaining.
The system of arbitration is a unique aspect of the Greek system 
of industrial relations. Implemented in 1955 along with the 
formal system of collective bargaining, as part of it, and 
dominated by the Ministry of Labour, it rather consists a part of 
the governmental machinery for incomes policy implementation, 
rather than an independent arbitration service. By granting legal 
recognition to unions lacking représentâtivity, compulsory 
arbitration became the "raison d* etre" of a certain category of 
trade-union leaders and thus it has been also a machinery for the 
preservation of the formal bargaining structure. Not 
surprisingly, it has been used extensively, especially after 1975 
when, in the context of the new parliamentary democracy in 
Greece, collective bargaining was re-established and direct 
methods of regulation of collective bargaining were abandoned.
Within the formal system of collective bargaining, over the 
period 1955-88, the parties* dependence upon compulsory 
arbitration increased over time. This indicates a "freezing" or 
"chilling" effect upon collective bargaining caused by compulsory
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arbitration. It seems that the main source of this effect is 
neither the compulsory aspect of arbitration nor arbitration per 
se. It is the combination of its compulsory character with the 
lack of the essential characteristics of arbitration procedures, 
i.e. independent and autonomous arbitral bodies. In other words, 
the Greek system of compulsory arbitration is found incompatible 
with collective bargaining not because it is compulsory but 
because it is not a system of arbitration.
However, salary and wage earners developed, especially in 1975- 
81, strike activity at record levels. Strike activity, which is 
found positively correlated to the use of compulsory arbitration, 
indicates the failure of the system of compulsory arbitration in 
controlling industrial conflicts. Moreover, as strike activity 
developed largely out of the formal bargaining levels and units, 
reflects initiatives of bargaining units located out of the 
formal bargaining structure for decentralised collective 
bargaining. This development is mainly associated with collective 
bargaining in manufacturing industries where legislation excludes 
plant level collective agreements. In 1975-81 strike activity 
at the plant level initiated an informal system of decentralised 
collective bargaining, parallel to the formal industry-wide or 
occupation-based bargaining at the national level. Thus, a dual 
structure of manufacturing wage determination became at work.
The rise of strike activity and the creation of the informal 
system of collective bargaining indicate that since 1975, mainly 
in manufacturing, there was a switch to an alternative route of 
wage determination initiated by strike activity at the plant
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level. This can be mainly attributed to the legalistic character 
of the formal system of collective bargaining as well as to the 
ossified bargaining structure imposed upon salary and wage 
earners.
Of course, strike activity is influenced by substantial issues 
regarding wage formation. And these very substantial issues 
have been directly affected by the settlements imposed through 
compulsory arbitration. But, as already argued in Chapter 2, the 
procedural arrangements provided by the formal system of 
collective bargaining, which favours centralised bargaining and 
excludes decentralised bargaining at the company and plant level, 
contributed to the fragmentation of the real bargaining 
structure, especially in the Greek manufacturing sector.
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Table 3.3.1
COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS AND COMPULSORY ARBITRATION AWARDS
ALL SECTORS 
1964-1988
Number of Bargaining Units^ Density of Bargaining Units
Year Both C/Both A C Both
1964 97 93 190 48.95 7.67 7.35 15.02
1965 121 93 214 43.46 9.45 7.27 16.72
1966 105 82 187 43.85 8.11 6.33 14.44
1967 63 79 142 55.63 4.81 6.03 10.84
1968 63 93 156 59.62 4.76 7.02 11.77
1969 50 100 150 66.67 3.73 7.46 11.20
1970 53 67 120 55.83 3.91 4.95 8.86
1971 46 43 89 48.31 3.36 3.14 6.50
1972 88 38 126 30.16 6.26 2.70 8.96
1973 88 60 148 40.54 10.96 4.16 15.12
1974 70 85 155 54.84 4.74 5.75 10.49
1975 131 143 274 52.19 8.65 9.45 18.10
1976 144 120 264 45.45 9.29 7.74 17.03
1977 146 179 325 55.08 9.20 11.29 20.49
1978 166 214 380 56.32 10.23 13.19 23.43
1979 173 247 420 58.81 10.43 14.90 25.33
1980 220 299 519 57.61 12.99 17.65 30.63
1981 233 330 563 58.61 13.47 19.07 32.54
1982 284 232 516 44.97 16.57 13.53 30.10
1983 57 80 137 58.39 3.36 4.71 8.07
1984 252 264 516 51.16 14.67 15.37 30.03
1985 175 167 342 48.83 9.89 9.44 19.32
1986 44 82 126 65.08 2.48 4.62 7.10
1987 76 84 160 52.50 4.24 4.68 8.92
1988 210 83 293 28.33 11.64 4.60 16.24
Average
1964—66 108 89 197 45.42 8.41 6.98 15.39
1967-74 65 71 136 51.45 5.32 5.15 10.47
1975-81 173 219 392 54.87 10.61 13.33 23.94
1982-88 157 142 299 49.89 8.98 8.14 17.12
Notes; a. The number of bargaining units refers to both 
collective agreements and compulsory arbitration 
awards.
b. Density of Bargaining Units = Number of Units per
100000 employees in employment.
c. Collective agreements.
d. Compulsory arbitration awards.
e. Share of compulsory arbitration awards in the total
number of both agreements and awards.
Source: Ministry of Labour.
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COMPULSORY 
AS PERCENTAGE OF BOTH
Table 3.3.2
ARBITRATION AWARDS 
AGREEMENTS AND AWARDS BY LEVEL 
ALL SECTORS 
1973-1988
Level General Occupational Special All
Year
National 
% %
Local
% % %
1973 — 34.72 21.74 54.90 40.54
1974 - 67.69 44.44 46.03 54.84
1975 0.00 66.29 73.47 36.09 52.19
1976 100.00 63.41 52.94 30.77 45.45
1977 0.00 73.39 65.91 40.94 55.08
1978 100.00 63.73 54.84 53.25 56.32
1979 100.00 69.63 60.98 52.07 58.81
1980 100.00 67.47 51.92 53.00 57.61
1981 - 70.65 53.57 52.63 58.61
1982 100.00 66.82 47.50 23.21 44.96
1983 - 83.64 52.94 38.46 58.39
1984 0.00 78.34 40.54 30.27 51.16
1985 0.00 66.88 39.58 32.37 48.83
1986 0.00 70.49 76.67 47.06 65.08
1987 100.00 66.13 67.65 30.16 52.50
1988 0.00 34.13 44.00 15.52 28.33
Average
1973-74 51.21 33.09 52.72 47.69
1975-81 - 67.78 59.09 45.54 54.87
1982-88 - 66.63 52.70 31.01 49.89
1982-87 — 72.05 54.15 33.59 53.49
Source: Ministry of Labour
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Table 3.4.1
STRIKERS DENSITY. FREQUENCY OF STRIKES AND RELATIVE DAYS LOST
IN GREECE. ALL SECTORS 
1953-1988
Index
Year
Density^ Frequency^ Days Lost°
1953 79 18 108
1954 45 16 36
1955 45 19 62
1956 n.a n.a n.a
1957 100 15 124
1958 78 10 94
1959 35 8 50
1960 46 11 68
1961 43 9 72
1962 46 15 104
1963 80 18 265
1964 130 32 274
1965 200 34 355
1966 269 47 550
1967° 69 7 87
1975° 31 9 145
1976 196 62 501
1977 357 36 769
1978 295 38 579
1979 773 36 938
1980 845 44 1571
1981 236 27 419
1982 204 52 672
1983 132 40 286
1984 90 27 244
1985 613 41 621
1986 861 19 715
1987 1213 21 1308
1988 249 30 462
Average
1953-62 57 13 80
1963-66 170 33 361
1976-81 450 40 796
1982-88 480 33 615
Notes: a. Number of Strikers per 1000 employees.
b. Number of Strikes per 1000001 employees.
c. Number of Working Days Lost per 1000 employees.
d. From January to April.
e. From September to December.
Source: Ministry of Labour.
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Table 3.4.2
BIVARIATE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
RELATING COMPULSORY ARBITRATION AND STRIKE ACTIVITY
IN GREECE ALL SECTORS
Variables
Strike
Activity
1953-1988
Compulsory
Arbitration
Density^ Frequency® Days Lost^
Number 0.306399 0.49074 0.51885
of 0.1363® 0.0127 0.0079
Awards^ 25I 25 25
Degree 0.22957 -0.10737 0.14279
of 0.2696 0.6095 0.4959
Intervention® 25 25 25
Density 0.24542 0.47537 0.47533
of 0.2370 0.0163 0.0163
Awards® 25 25 25
Notes: a. Number of Compulsory Arbitration Awards.
b. Percentage of Awards in both Agreements and Awards
c. Number of Awards per 100000 employees.
d. Number of Strikers per 1000 employees.
e. Number of Strikes per 100000 employees.
f. Number of Working Days Lost per 1000 employees.
g. Correlation Coefficients
h. Probability of |r | under Ho: Rho=0
i. Number of Observations
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Table 3.4.3
NUMBER OF STRIKES ACCORDING TO ORGANISATIONAL LEVEL
1976-1981
Above the Total Number Total Number 
Federations Level of of of
Federations Strikes Bargaining Units
Year
1976 19 2 947 264
1977 21^ 1 563 325
1978 30 13 616 380
1979 41 13 588 420
1980 55 17 726 519
1981 n.a 3 466 563
Note: a. From March to December 1977.
Source: Ministry of Labour.
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Table 3.4.4
STRIKERS DENSITY. FREQUENCY OF STRIKES AND RELATIVE DAYS LOST
IN GREEK MANUFACTURING 
1959-1988
Index
Year
Density*Frequency^Days Lost*
1959 25 69 152
1960 34 78 212
1961 30 68 100
1962 40 76 337
1963 118 52 393
1964 250 110 680
1965 264 81 806
1966 254 86 738
1967* 13 9 34
1975* 54 26 325
1976 283 184 964
1977 371 107 1355
1978 134 89 594
1979 226 102 744
1980 187 124 699
1981 185 81 764
1982 452 205 1640
1983 n.a n.a 1554
1984 n.a n.a 886
1985 n.a n.a 530
1986 171 27 188
1987 n.a n.a 286
1988 n.a n.a 839
Average
1959-60 30 74 182
1961-66 159 79 509
1976-81 231 115 853
1982-88 n.a n.a 846
Notes : a . Number of Strikers per 1000 employees.
b . Number of Strikes per 100000 employees.
c . Number of Working Days Lost per 1000 employees.
d. From January to April.
e. From September to December.
n.a = Not available.
Source: Ministry of Labour.
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Table 3.4.5
BIVARIATE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS RELATING BARGAINING REGULATION 
WITH STRIKE ACTIVITY IN MANUFACTURING
1959-1983
Variables Strikes
Regulation
Density# Frequency*! Days Lost!-
Number 0.79124Î 0.71842 0.72261
of 0.0001* 0.0001 0.0001
Awards® 2 4 I 24 25
Degree 0.61855 0.57058 0.73660
of 0.0013 0.0036 0.0001
Intervention^ 24 24 25
Density 0.85801 0.88579 0.68836
of 0.0001 0.0001 0.0006
Awards^ 20 20 21
Number of 0.83732 0.83609 0.68861
Regulated 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Settlements^ 24 24 25
Degree 0.29255 0.36748 0.47712
of 0.1654 0.0773 0.0159
Regulation® 24 24 25
Density of 0.81155 0.76725 0.52276
Regulated 0.0001 0.0001 0.0150
Settlements^ 20 20 21
Notes:
a. Number of Compulsory Arbitration Awards.
b. Compulsory Arbitration Awards as percentage of both 
Agreements and Awards.
c. Number of Compulsory Arbitration Awards per 100000 employees 
in large-scale Manufacturing.
d. Arbitration Awards and Agreements Amended, Corrected, Rejected 
and Extended by the Ministry of Labour.
e. Regulated Agreements and Awards as percentage of voluntary 
Collective Agreements.
f. Number of Regulated Agreements and Awards per 100000 
employees in large-scale Manufacturing.
g. Number of Strikers per 1000 employees.
h. Number of Strikes per 100000 employees.
i. Number of Working Days Lost per 1000 employees.
g. Correlation Coefficients
k. Probability |r | under Ho: Rho=0
1. Number of Observations
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Table 3.4.6
STRIKES PER 100 MANUFACTURING ESTABLISHMENTS : 
FREQUENCY DISPERSION AND STABILITY
1962-1981
Year Strikes per Coefficient of
100 establishments° Variation" R-square°
1962 1.41 293.76 1.000
1963 1.87 255.74 .839
1964 1.96 139.23 .746
1965 2.97 177.42 .776
1966 3.18 155.73 .822
1967° .33 248.28 .917
1975° 1.12 245.11 .969 .892
1976 7.68 117.12 .839 1.000
1977 4.52 216.20 .948 .884
1978 3.74 111.26 .692 .695
1979 4.26 214.66 .959 .910
1980 5.03 124.54 .719 .783
1981 3.16 133.32 .759 .782
Average
1962-66 2.28 196.87 1.000
1976-81 4.73 151.44 .878
Notes; a. Average of 20 two-digit industrial branches.
b. Variability across twenty two-digit industrial 
branches.
c. Coefficient of stability is measured by correlating 
relative strike performance of industries among pairs 
of years, one of which is the base year. N=20 (two- 
digit manufacturing industrial branches).
d. From January to April.
e. From September to December.
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Table 3.4.7
STRIKES PER 100 MANUFACTURING ESTABLISHMENTS BY BRANCH. 1962-1981
Year 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 Average
Branch 1962-66
20 1.70 2.52 1.78 2.77 3.01 0.75 2.36
21 0.82 0.00 0.87 0.85 0.00 0.00 0.51
22 1.74 1.26 8.54 7.04 7.19 0.00 5.16
23 1.57 1.30 2.74 2.34 3.41 0.47 2.27
24 1.14 0.90 1.03 1.97 2.05 0.15 1.42
25 0.34 0.00 1.33 2.21 2.49 0.30 1.27
26 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.79 0.44 0.00 0.55
27 5.28 1.96 3.85 4.76 6.36 0.00 4.44
28 0.89 2.97 1.66 3.29 4.82 0.00 2.73
29 4.02 1.92 1.44 0.94 1.33 0.00 1.93
30 0.00 0.00 1.97 1.88 1.18 0.00 1.01
31 3.15 8.43 3.53 12.44 9.74 0.97 7.46
32 0.00 25.00 8.82 22.22 15.79 0.00 14.37
33 0.93 2.91 1.37 2.39 1.95 0.16 1.91
34 43.75 64.29 20.00 47.37 40.00 4.76 43.08
35 0.29 1.08 1.96 4.31 6.05 0.47 2.74
36 0.00 0.68 0.83 0.96 0.62 0.00 0.62
37 0.00 0.00 2.39 2.67 1.59 0.51 1.33
38 0.00 0.44 1.06 1.23 2.06 0.00 0.96
39 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.00 4.26 0.00 0.97
All 1.41 1.87 1.96 2.97 3.18 0.33 2.28
Year 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 Average
Branch 1976-81
20 0.34 3.14 1.82 1.67 1.51 1.61 0.76 1.75
21 1.09 4.26 5.82 11.90 3.54 15.35 9.05 8.32
22 2.15 14.29 4.35 0.00 7.20 5.06 8.75 6.61
23 0.89 10.37 2.93 3.36 2.80 7.47 4.98 5.32
24 0.48 2.93 2.46 1.55 1.07 1.44 2.09 1.92
25 0.91 2.42 5.74 3.40 2.21 4.19 1.31 3.21
26 0.00 4.46 1.96 1.35 0.52 0.75 0.00 1.50
27 4.76 20.61 17.42 11.57 8.64 4.80 4.00 11.17
28 3.58 12.50 7.83 4.25 7.39 8.04 2.47 7.08
29 0.88 0.83 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.33
30 1.28 10.06 1.81 3.86 6.15 2.31 10.20 5.73
31 1.07 12.37 5.21 6.99 7.04 6.46 1.24 6.55
32 0.00 17.95 0.00 2.40 6.62 14.29 3.92 7.53
33 0.66 11.80 3.25 6.41 6.48 5.46 2.34 5.96
34 30.77 65.00 92.50 25.78 90.44 43.75 29.41 57.81
35 1.02 9.67 4.60 2.50 6.25 5.65 3.21 5.31
36 0.24 3.30 2.80 6.18 4.35 4.91 2.66 4.03
37 2.77 13.17 10.78 5.88 7.23 5.11 4.78 7.82
38 1.89 12.53 13.37 6.38 8.31 16.63 5.41 10.44
39 0.00 2.98 1.19 0.00 2.64 2.10 0.00 1.48
All 1.12 7.68 4.52 3.74 4.26 5.03 3.16 4.73
Note: Index calculated as [(number of strikes in branch i / number 
of establishments in branch i)*100].
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Table 3.4.8
RANKING OF INDUSTRIAL BRANCHES ACCORDING TO STRIKERS DENSITY
(descending order)
1976-1981
Industrial
Branch
Year 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
1976 16 18 8.5 8.5 15.0 14.0 13.0 1 6 20.0
1977 12 11 16.0 8.0 3.0 6.0 15.0 2 4 19.5
1978 10 7 19.5 14.0 9.0 3.0 15.0 2 6 17.0
1979 18 16 5.0 10.0 13.0 11.0 19.0 6 8 20.0
1980 18 11 13.0 6.0 16.0 2.0 19.0 14 4 20.0
1981 18 6 12.0 8.0 3.5 3.5 19.5 5 16 13.5
Industrial
Branch
Year 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39
1976 5 11 17.0 10.0 2 7 12.0 3 4 19.0
1977 18 10 19.5 9.0 1 13 17.0 5 7 14.0
1978 13 8 18.0 4.0 1 16 12.0 5 11 19.5
1979 4 12 17.0 2.0 1 15 7.0 3 14 9.0
1980 15 7 8.0 9.0 1 5 17.0 10 3 12.0
1981 2 17 10.0 9.0 1 15 13.5 7 11 19.5
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Table 3.4.9
RANKING OF INDUSTRIAL BRANCHES 
ACCORDING TO RELATIVE DAYS LOST IN STRIKES 
(descending order)
1975-1988
Industrial
Branch
Year 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
1975 16.0 8 14.0 12 13 6 19.0 1 7 2.0
1976 12.0 19 17.0 10 13 14 7.0 1 4 20.0
1977 14.0 10 13.0 12 7 5 6.0 1 2 19.5
1978 12.0 3 19.5 13 8 2 14.0 1 4 17.0
1979 13.0 11 5.0 14 17 18 16.0 12 3 20.0
1980 18.0 15 14.0 1 17 16 19.0 12 4 20.0
1981 17.0 3 10.0 2 6 5 19.5 1 13 18.0
1982 10.0 14 16.0 6 9 4 12.0 1 17 19.0
1983 9.0 12 5.0 11 4 20 17.0 2 7 18.0
1984 11.0 3 10.0 4 15 17 12.0 9 19 14.0
1985 16.5 2 10.0 9 6 1 20.0 15 19 8.0
1986 11.0 2 6.0 12 14 20 13.0 16 9 17.0
1987 12.0 1 2.0 14 19 17 16.0 10 13 18.0
1988 15.0 3 4.0 7 8 12 19.0 11 17 13.0
Industrial
Branch
Year 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39
1975 4 15 19.0 9 5 11 17 3 10.0 19.0
1976 6 9 16.0 11 2 5 15 3 8.0 18.0
1977 16 11 19.5 8 3 15 17 4 9.0 18.0
1978 9 11 18.0 5 7 16 15 6 10.0 19.5
1979 4 7 19.0 9 2 15 6 1 10.0 8.0
1980 13 10 9.0 6 5 7 8 11 3.0 2.0
1981 7 12 16.0 14 4 11 8 9 15.0 19.5
1982 15 11 18.0 5 2 8 3 7 13.0 20.0
1983 16 3 6.0 10 8 15 1 13 14.0 19.0
1984 18 13 1.0 16 8 2 7 6 5.0 20.0
1985 7 12 5.0 11 4 3 18 14 16.5 13.0
1986 5 18 7.0 8 1 4 10 15 19.0 3.0
1987 5 6 4.0 9 7 11 15 3 8.0 20.0
1988 14 16 2.0 10 1 6 18 9 5.0 20.0
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Table 3.4.10
INTER"INDUSTRY VARIATION IN STRIKE ACTIVITY
1975-1988
Coefficient of Variation in:
Year Strikers Density Relative Days Lost
1975 n.a 267.98
1976 115.6 159.98
1977 164.6 175.10
1978 106.0 140.81
1979 118.1 130.19
1980 100.7 104.93
1981 136.5 215.75
1982 n.a 122.20
1983 n.a 85.65
1984 n.a 175.01
1985 n.a 96.95
1986 n.a 155.78
1987 n.a 194.91
1988 n.a 141.09
Coefficient
of 0.55 0.25
Concordance
Notes :
Coefficient of Variation = Standard deviation / mean, n=20.
Coefficient of Concordance = Variance of rank sums / 
maximum possible variance of rank sums. Called also 
Kendall's W statistic. By definition cannot be negative 
and its maximum value is 1. For further information see 
Hays, W. L. 1973: Statistics for Social Sciences. Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston Inc., New York, pp. 801-803.
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CHAPTER 4. WAGE AND EMPLOYMENT REGULATION IN GREECE.
4.1 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.
In the context of the formal system of collective bargaining, 
wage formation has never been a process independent of direct 
and indirect state intervention. The extensively used mechanism 
of compulsory arbitration, along with the legal right of the 
Ministry of Labour to reject and modify any collective agreement 
or compulsory arbitration award if considered as not being in 
line with the governmental policy, dominated wage determination 
processes, throughout the post-war period.
This chapter examines the types, the characteristics and the 
rationales of policies pursued on the basis of the extensive 
procedural regulation of industrial relations in Greece. These 
policies, which consist the substantial regulation of the Greek 
labour market, refer to wage setting as well as to employment 
adjustment, and thus set the scene for flexibilities or 
rigidities in the Greek manufacturing sector.
Section 4.2 discusses both the rationales and the mechanics of 
policies adopted in Greece over the period under examination. 
Section 4.3 examines wage developments and the variability in the 
Greek manufacturing wage structure and discusses it in the 
context of the question of flexibility in relative wages. Section 
4.4 presents the existing legislation and the mechanics for 
employment regulation and examines the evolution of employment in
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the Greek manufacturing sector.
Our analysis suggests that after 1975 wage determination was 
under the influence of two types of incomes policy. First, in 
1975-81 there was the norm-based incomes policy and then, in 
1982-88, indexation policies followed. Indexation policies 
involved relatively more compulsion. In this context of wage 
regulation, the wage structure, although stable as far as the 
distinction between high-wage and low-wage industries is 
concerned, became wider in 1975-81 and narrowed again in 1982-88 
and, overall, variability in relative wages is observed 
throughout the period 1965-88.
Variability in relative wages is coupled with noticeable changes 
in manufacturing employment. Throughout the period 1965-88 
employment in Greek manufacturing was expanding, with the most 
rapid expansion observed in 1967-74. But employment adjustments 
were regulated by the Ministry of Labour on the basis of the 
legislation setting limits on collective dismissals. Despite wage 
and employment regulation, variability in relative wages and 
expansion in manufacturing employment set a scene in which 
contradictory forces conducive either to flexibility or rigidity 
operated.
146
4.2. INCOMES POLICY IN GREECE.
4.2.1.Types and Characteristics of Incomes Policy.
In the literature, in Braun (1986) and Artis (1981) for 
instance, incomes policy is normally defined in terms of anti­
inflation measures aiming to improve the trade-off between 
inflation and unemployment. Measures concerned with income 
distribution, i.e. inequality, protection of low paid, reduction 
of poverty, are not comprehended by the term. But in practice 
such measures are often adopted as part of incomes policies. As 
Blackaby, quoted in Braun (1986:4), noticed "one of the general 
comments on the experience of incomes policy in Western Europe is 
that it has been impossible to evade the distributional aspect of 
even the simplest kind of incomes policy". In another occasion 
he pointed out that incomes policies "inevitably have effects on 
the distribution of incomes; they affect the broad distribution 
between employment and profit incomes, and more narrowly, the 
differentials between pay in different occupations and 
industries" (Blackaby, 1971:34).
Incomes policies vary considerably in design, sophistication, 
objectives and rigour. Various classifications have been 
proposed, but wage freezes, guidelines or norms and indexation 
are the types of policy most frequently used. However, even 
within these categories, specifications vary too. The reviews on 
incomes policies implemented in industrialised market economies
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suggest that norms and guidelines were mostly used in the late 
1950s and early 1960s, while indexation was widely used in the 
late 1960s and the 1970s. But, in the late 1970s, there was a 
general shift away from incomes policies (Blackaby, 1971, Brown, 
1986, Flanagan et al, 1983).
Suzuki (1980) examined the extent of use of wage indexation in 
the industrialised market economies and divided the relevant 
cases in four categories, that is those with widespread use of 
indexation (Belgium, Denmark, Israel, Italy, Ireland, 
Netherlands, Luxemburg), those where it applied to a part of the 
labour force (Canada, France, Switzerland, U.S.), those where has 
been practically non-existent (Austria, West Germany, Japan, 
Sweden) and those where it was introduced and abandoned (Finland, 
Norway, France, Australia, U.K. Netherlands, Ireland). In a more 
recent work Chan-Lee et al (1987) after observing that prices and 
incomes policies played a comparatively minor role in the 1980s, 
argued that "the single most important institutional change in 
many European countries in the 1980s has been the weakening of 
explicit or implicit indexation provisions". Exception to this 
trend have been France and Spain, where incomes policies were 
adopted within a framework of ex ante indexation based on 
inflation targets.
In Greece, governmental involvement in wage determination has 
been the rule over the whole post-war period. But formal incomes 
policy was adopted only after 1975. Incomes policies undertaken 
since then fall into two categories. First, were the norm- 
based policy of the 1975-81 period. Second, was the policy based
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on partial indexation which was in operation throughout the 
period 1982-88. In other words, Greece too followed the 
exceptional pattern of adopting indexation policy in the 1980s as 
in France and Spain. Presumably, there must be some association 
with the fact that over that period Socialist parties were in 
power in these countries.
To classify the rationale of successive incomes policies the 
distinction between nominal and real policies, as proposed by 
Flanagan, Soskice and Ulman (1983:22), is a fruitful starting 
point. As nominal policies are perceived those designed to reduce 
the rate of inflation without restraining real wages or affecting 
unemployment, by attempting, for instance, to alter expectations 
directly. Real incomes policies are considered those which aim to 
restrain real wages, to bolster profitability, to improve 
international competitiveness or to enable unemployment to be 
reduced. While there is no real dichotomy between nominal and 
real incomes policies, their explicit or implicit objectives, as 
well as the criteria they are based on, suffice to classify them 
in one category or the other.
From this point of view, since 1975 in Greece there has been a 
sequence of nominal incomes policies interrupted by real ones 
which, in the event of severe deteriorations of the balance of 
payments, were aiming to create breathing space for the economy. 
Both schemes of policy, the norm-based and the partial 
indexation, were at first conceived, designed and implemented so 
that to reduce the rate of inflation without restraining real
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wages. But both had to be radically changed to restrain real 
wages as well.
As far as the wage structure is concerned, the nominal policies 
which were pursued through the norm-based scheme were not 
especially concerned with the wage structure and pay 
relativities. Even when the governmental concern about the low 
paid was being announced, it was not clearly shown in incomes 
policy making. But, real incomes policies pursued through either 
the norm or the partial indexation were clearly tuned to compress 
the wage structure. Indeed, the partial indexation policy, even 
during its nominal stages, that is when it was not aiming to 
restrain real wages, was clearly in favour of the low paid and 
tuned to compress the dispersion of relative wages.
Overall, the course of incomes policy in Greece indicates the 
existence of a political cycle. Newly elected governments after 
taking-over used to award increases in order to compensate wage 
earners for income losses suffered during the period of their 
predecessors. They also used to adopt loose incomes policy in 
their way to re-election for a second term. And, then, after been 
re-elected, they used to discover the need to control real wages 
and cost-push inflation. It seems that, during the periods of 
formal incomes policy, wage determination remained part of the 
political game as it was throughout the post-war period. It is 
also noteworthy that a trend in favour of compressing pay 
relativities was in work and it was explicitly taken into 
account in incomes policy making since the late 1970s.
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4.2.2. The Benchmark Period 1967-74.
The 1967-74 period, which is used as benchmark, should not be 
perceived as one free of wage controls. In fact, during those 
years there was no formal incomes policy promoted. Wages 
were largely being set unilaterally by the government. The right 
to strike was suspended by the military governments of the 
period. One strike of the drivers and the ticket collectors of 
the electric urban buses in Athens in 1971 is considered as an 
event of historical importance. No other strike activity was 
recorded. Probably, due to the political conditions, industrial 
conflict was not overt but covered. The massive migration abroad, 
while the level of unemployment was at its lowest level ever 
recorded in post-war Greece, suggests that an "exit” mechanism 
might have been at work.
The last National General collective agreement of the 1960s was 
signed in February 1967. As all such agreements referred to 
minimum wage rates, which were set at 20 per cent above those 
prescribed in the precedent general national collective agreement 
signed in December 1965. Two thirds of the increase were payable 
from the 1st February while the remainder was due from the 1st 
July 1967.
In April 1967 the military government seized the power and 
statutory regulation of minimum wages became the rule for wage 
determination. Throughout the period, the common rule in use for 
wage setting was based upon the growth of economy-wide
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productivity in order to keep unit labour costs stable. Till 1971 
the continuation of relatively loose labour market conditions 
helped the authorities in their aim of keeping aggregate wage 
increases in line with the rate of aggregate productivity 
advance. The floor of the wage structure was being set by minimum 
wages determined by the government. Collective bargaining was 
typical, but not essential. It was taking place between employers 
and industry-wide or occupation-based unions which were rather 
weak and had no strong links with the labour force they were 
supposed to represent.
Apart from the political conditions, developments in the official 
structure of trade-unions caused the collective bargaining 
processes to become rather typical and sterile. Trade-union 
officials were mainly governmental appointees. Indeed, collective 
agreements were subject to review by the Ministry of Labour 
either through legislation entitling the government to reject 
and/or modify any collective agreement and compulsory 
arbitration award or through the direct control of the compulsory 
arbitration courts. In fact, the government was influencing wage 
developments in two ways. First, through statutory adjustment of 
the minimum wage rates. Second, through dictating these 
adjustments as guidelines which had to be followed by the 
Ministry of Labour, the compulsory arbitration courts and the 
appointed trade-union leaders.
In those conditions, after the general national collective 
agreement signed in February 1967, the legal minimum wage was 
increased by 7 per cent on 1st October 1968 and by 8 per cent on
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1st May 1969, with no further adjustment in 1970. In the early 
1970s, an OECD (1971:14) report pointed out that "avoidance of 
wage inflation partly explains Greece* s success in containing 
price inflation". In the same report, it was intuitively noted 
that "the possibility that the causal connection runs the other 
way cannot be discarded". A year later similar comments praised 
the Greek performance in the field of wage and price inflation. 
"Greece* s favourable inflationary performance throughout the 
recent phase of generalised inflation abroad no doubt owes much 
to the policies pursued on the wage/price front. In respect of 
wages the aim has been to contain average nominal increases to 
the rate of productivity growth. Success in this field has been 
greater that in most member countries for various reasons -an 
important one having to do with the relative strength or weakness 
of trade-unions in different countries" OECD (1972:23).
While labour prices were controlled, labour quantities were not. 
Large scale immigration of Greek labour into Western Europe in 
the late 1960s and the early 1970s can be considered as a 
response of the labour force to such a statutory regulation of 
wage adjustments. Despite the declared rationale that wage rates 
should follow changes in productivity, they were in 1968-69 and 
1972 falling behind rises in productivity, creating thus the 
higher ever recorded rates of profits in the Greek manufacturing 
sector. Presumably, political conditions along with favourable 
job prospects in European labour markets for migrant labour, 
mainly in West Germany where the Greek labour force had created a 
long tradition since the late 1950s, encouraged skilled workers
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to quit the country.
Labour's option for exit caused the employers to bid up pay, thus 
increasing average wage rates. But the tightening of the labour 
market also forced the military governments to speed up 
adjustments in minimum wage rates. During 1973 three increases in 
minimum wages were awarded. In May the legal minimum wage for 
male workers was increased by 8.7 per cent; in September it was 
raised by 10.4 per cent; and in December a further 20 per cent 
increase was awarded. Nevertheless, labour shortages were not 
avoided. During the 1971-74 period, shortages of skilled and 
semi-skilled labour were being reported. The 1967-74 period ends 
with the restoration of a civilian government in July 1974. In 
September legal minimum wages for male workers were raised by 10 
per cent so that employees be compensated for the accelerating 
inflation and income losses suffered during the period of the 
military governments.
To summarise, this period was one with neither free operation of 
the labour market nor formal incomes policy at work, with the 
government regulating directly wage determination. Indeed, there 
were no representative trade-unions in the labour market and no 
essential collective bargaining processes.
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4.2.3. The Period 1975-81: Norm-based Policy.
Throughout the period 1975-81, with conservative governments in 
office a norm-based incomes policy was in operation. Successive 
governments aiming at decelerating wage inflation used to 
announce in the beginning of each year, when new annual 
collective agreements were to be contracted, a norm or guideline 
for nominal wage increases in two semestriel instalments.
As far as wage determination processes are concerned, the legal 
right of the Ministry of Labour to reject and/or modify 
collective agreements and compulsory arbitration awards was 
abandoned and the right of collective bargaining was re­
established on the basis of the legislation observed in the mid- 
1960s, before the military regime. Minimum wage rates became 
again negotiable. They were being determined either by the 
General Confederation of Labour and the Employer's Associations 
or by the compulsory arbitration courts. The minimum wage rates 
were being established before any other rates and were serving as 
guideline for subsequent negotiations. Nevertheless, new 
appointees were during that period leading the General 
Confederation of Labour and the official trade-union structure.
The pattern of annual increases through two instalments was 
followed in minimum wage setting throughout the 1975-81 period. 
The governmental influence on wages determination was 
substantial for two main reasons. First, since the early 1970s, 
the public sector in its wide sense ( i.e. including civil
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Table 4.2.1
THE NORM-BASED INCOMES POLICY 
1975-1981
/ •\
Year
Inflation
Jan to Jan 
change
Norm for 
Increases 
in Minimum 
Wages
Special
Characte­
ristics
Implemented
via
1975 13.4% 12% : 1 March 
8% : 1 Aug.
General National 
Coll. Agr.
1976 13.3% 10% :13 Feb. 
7% : 1 July
Compulsory
Arbitration
1977 12.2% 10% :15 Feb. 
5% : 1 July
General National 
Coll. Agr.
1978 12.5% 16% :l Feb. 
6% : 1 July
Compulsory
Arbitration.
1979 19.0% 15% :l Feb. Only the low 
paid to get 
the full 15%
Compulsory
Arbitration.
1980 24.9% 15% :l Feb. Only the low 
paid to get 
the full 15%
Compulsory
Arbitration.
1981 24.5% 19% : 1 Jan. 
7% : 1 July
Threshold 
clause for 
inflation 
higher than 
20%
The norm for 
public sector 
used as guide­
line in private 
sector.
\- •/
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service and local government, public corporations and entities, 
the central bank, commercial banks and companies under state 
ownership) , has been employing more than 3 5 per cent of 
employees in employment. In 1987, according to the annual Labour 
Survey, public sector employment amounted to 41 per cent. 
Second, in the private sector, formal collective bargaining was 
restricted at the secondary and tertiary level of the official 
trade-union structure. Indeed, the mechanism of compulsory 
arbitration was supposed to control any deviation from the norm 
for annual increases in wages.
During the 1975-77 period, in contrast to many other European and 
OECD countries, Greece was pursuing expansionary demand 
management aimed at achieving high levels of economic activity 
and employment. In technical terms, there were two main criteria 
for setting the norm : changes in consumer prices and
productivity growth. In fact, as an advisor of the government at 
the time argued, the norm was ad hoc dominated by a rationale 
favouring the maintenance of real wages and salaries above their 
early 1970s levels (Economou, 1981:207). The economic criteria 
for setting the norm were becoming vague on its way from 
conception and design to announcement, as political criteria were 
taking priority.
In 1975, the new civilian government moved to what they 
considered as a cautious expansionary policy aimed to overcome 
the 1973-74 recession. In 1975 the minimum wage was increased by 
about 20 per cent, of which 12 per cent was effective on 1st 
March and the rest 8 per cent was scheduled for 1st August. In
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1976 the norm for wage increases was ratified by the compulsory 
arbitration court which awarded a 17 per cent increase in minimum 
wage rates, again in two instalments. A 10 per cent increase was 
effective on 13th February with a 7 per cent becoming effective 
on 1st July. For 1977, in view of inflationary risks, the 
authorities decided to slow down increases in wage rates to a 
range below 15 per cent. Only the low paid were supposed to 
receive the full 15 per cent increase. Thus, minimum wages 
increased by 10 per cent on 15th February and 5 per cent on 1st 
July 1977. Favouring the low paid in order to reduce gradually 
any large disparities in pay became more emphasised in 1977 but 
was already declared as an aim of the wage policy in 1975.
In 1978 the view was adopted that the most important immediate 
task of economic policy was to bring down appreciably the rate of 
inflation. Domestic factors, notably the substantial annual 
nominal rises of wages and salaries were blamed. As the inflation 
rate remained comparatively high and accelerating in the first 
half of 1978, the government changed its stance and introduced 
more restrictive fiscal, monetary and incomes policy.
The anti-inflationary policy placed the emphasis on the 
moderation of labour cost increases. The norm for the annual 
increase in the minimum wage rates in 1979 was announced nearly 
seven months before the discussions for the next pay round were 
to begin. The pro-governmental leadership of the General 
Confederation of Labour was reluctant to sign a general national 
collective agreement involving the norm. The case was referred to
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compulsory arbitration, which awarded an increase in line with 
the norm. In 1979, instead of the usual increase in two 
semestrial instalments, an increase of 15 per cent was granted 
from the beginning and for the whole year. Under conditions of 
accelerating inflation an identical incomes policy was adopted in 
1980. The norm was set for a 15 per cent increase from the 15th 
February. In 1979 and 1980 the government made explicit the aim 
to stop the norm for increases in minimum wages from going 
automatically into every pay settlement as if the norm was only 
the floor for further collective bargaining. The emphasis was set 
so that to compress the wage structure.
Incomes policy in 1981, year of elections crucial for the 
conservative governments in office since 1974, was designed with 
two rather contradictory aims: first, to combat inflation, and
second, to do it without leading to a further sharp reduction in 
real earnings as it had happened in 1979 and 1980. On the basis 
of a forecast for an increase in consumer prices during the year 
lower than 20 per cent, the norm was set for a 12.5 per cent 
increase in January and a further 7.5 per cent increase 
effective on 1st July. A threshold clause was included in this 
year's policy. The authorities announced that there would be an 
additional increase by the end of the year if inflation were to 
exceed the 20 per cent forecast. In the October 1981 election the 
conservative government was defeated and thus ended the period of 
norm-based incomes policy.
To summarise, this period was one with a formal incomes policy 
based upon the announcement and the promotion of the governmental
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norm for annual increases in nominal wages. Successive 
governments were trying to influence wage determination rather 
indirectly in comparison with the previous period. The 
compression of the wage structure became an explicit target of 
the norm-based incomes policy only after 1978.
4.2.4. The Period 1982-88: Partial Indexation Policv.
In the period 1982-88, with socialist governments in office, 
systems of partial indexation of nominal wages to the consumer 
prices index on a trimestrial basis were in operation. 
Nevertheless, in the same period, there were two wage freezes, in 
1983 and 1985, and important amendments of both the plateau and 
the index used for the automatic and partial indexation.
In 1982, the new socialist government, to offset the erosion of 
real earnings of employees suffered in the 1979-81 period, and to 
fulfil electoral pledges, awarded substantial increases mainly 
for the lower paid wage and salary earners which took effect on 
1st January 1982. Minimum wage rates were increased by about 32 
per cent by fiat. Moreover the new government changed its stance 
with respect to incomes policy's rationales and mechanics. To 
preserve real wages, it introduced an indexation system for four- 
monthly adjustments on the basis of the consumer prices rises in 
the preceding four months. The indexation policy was also tuned 
in favour of the lower paid. Full indexation was provided for 
average monthly earnings up to Dr.35000. The band of earnings 
between Dr.35000 and Dr.55000 was indexed only to half of the
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consumer prices increase. The next band, between Dr.55000 and 
Dr.80000 was entitled a 25 per cent indexation, while no 
indexation was provided for the band of monthly earnings above 
Dr.80000. This system of formal and partial indexation took 
effect in January 1982 with the first four-monthly adjustment due 
on 1st May.
As the wage increases awarded in 1982 along with deterioration in 
productivity performance fuelled the wage-price inflationary 
spiral, in 1983 the government was obliged to modify, only for 
1983, the indexation scheme introduced the very previous year. It 
was decided to postpone the automatic adjustment due on 1st 
January 1983 for the rate of inflation over the previous four 
months. Only one half of this adjustment, namely 4.5 per cent, 
was awarded on 1st January with the second half scheduled for the 
1st of May. The automatic adjustment due on 1st September was to 
compensate for consumer price increases during the first eight 
months of 1983. There was no modification of the scales for 
partial indexation. Indeed, those arrangements became, by law, 
compulsory for both the private and the public sector. Penalties 
were to be applied to those firms exceeding the guidelines for 
partial and delayed indexation. But there was no real mechanism 
to control for compliance with and evasion from the policy. This 
is why no real sanctions were imposed. Sanctions were speculative 
to ease the implementation of the wage freeze.
In 1984 and 1985 the indexation scheme was followed in its 
original version as it was conceived and adopted in 1982.
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Table 4.2.2
THE INDEXATION INCOMES POLICY 
1982-1988
/ \
Year
Annual
Inflation
Automatic 
Increases 
in Wages 
Freezes
Scales
of
Indexation 
(in drachmas)
Implemented
via
1982 21.0% 5000dr:l Jan 
7.3%;1 May 
2.0%:1 Sep
100% :<35000
50% :35000 - 
55000
Decree. 
Compulsory 
Arbitration.
1983 20.2% 8.8%:1 Jan 
Wages Freeze 
for 8 months 
10.2%:l Sep
25% :55000 - 
80000
0% :>80000
Compulsory 
by Decree.
1984 18.5% 8.9%: 1 Jan 
6.9%:1 May 
2.2%:1 Sep 100% K50000
General National 
Coll. Agr.
1985 19.3% 8.2%: 1 Jan 
6.6%:1 May 
2.1%:1 Sep 
Wage Freeze 
for 3 months 
Index 
Modified
50% : 50000 - 
75000
25% :75000 - 
100000
General National 
Coll. Agr.
Compulsory 
by Decree.
1986 23.0% 4.5%:1 Jan 
1.4%:l May 
4.7%:1 Sep
0% :>100000 General National 
Coll. Agr.
1987 16.4% 4.1%:1 Jan 
1.0%:1 May 
4.5%:1 Sep
100% :<60000
50% :60000 - 
75000
Compulsory
Arbitration.
1988 13.5% 8.5%:1 Jan 
1.0%:1 May 
6.5%:1 Sep
25% :75000 - 
100000
0% :>100000
General National 
Coll. Agr.
\- ■/
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Automatic pay adjustments were provided every four months. 
Partial indexation remained strongly in favour of the lower paid, 
with slightly modified scales, as full indexation was offered to 
monthly earnings up to Dr.50000. The next band covered earnings 
between Dr. 50000 and Dr.75000. The band of earnings entitled a 25 
per cent indexation was set between Dr.75000 and Dr.100000.
In 1982-85, unit labour costs were increasing rapidly, leading to 
a severe deterioration in the current account. It was then 
realised that wage rises every four months in line with the 
inflation performed during the past four months were not allowing 
inflationary expectations to decelerate and, indeed, were not 
allowing sufficient time for any productivity gains to exert any 
significant downward pressure on prices before the next rise in 
wages was to take place. But political calculus rather than 
economic considerations led the government to maintain the system 
of indexation in its original version. The government was then 
trying to compensate for rising unit labour costs through slow 
devaluation of the national currency.
After the socialist government was re-elected in the June 1985 
election, an economic stabilisation programme was prepared. It 
was introduced in October 1985. One of its four main measures was 
a wage freeze for the last quarter of 1985 along with a 
modification of the indexation scheme. The rationale for the 
modified indexation scheme was to decelerate increases in unit 
labour costs. The indexation scheme underwent two-fold 
modification. First, the impact of import prices was excluded 
from indexation. Second, instead of adjusting wages on the basis
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of the past price rises, the adjustment was, from January 1986, 
to be on the basis of the projected inflation. Corrective 
adjustments were announced for the end of 1986 and 1987 if the 
increase in consumer prices exceeded the projected inflation. 
This modified indexation scheme was also made, by law, compulsory 
for both the public and the private sector up to the end of 1987. 
Penalties were to be imposed to firms exceeding the guidelines 
for indexation. But these penalties were again notional due to 
the lack of effective mechanism for controlling compliance with 
and evasion from the guidelines for partial indexation. Scales 
for partial indexation remained stable in 1985 and 1986. In 1987 
the limit for full indexation was raised to monthly earnings not 
exceeding the amount of Dr.60000, with the average level of 
monthly wage and salaries being, in 1987, just over Dr.70000.
In 1988, after the end of the stabilisation programme, the 
modified system of indexation was maintained and was used as the 
formal and official incomes policy. Wages were adjusted to 
projected inflation and a corrective percentage increase was due 
at the end of the year. The main elements in the package 
announced in November 1987 were : a 4.5 per cent increase in pay 
in the public sector to compensate for loss of purchasing power 
in 1987 (which was expected to produce a similar concession in 
the private sector where all restrictions on bargaining were 
lifted); freedom for employers to give productivity bonuses at 
the end of 1988 based on performance throughout the year; 
continuation of the indexation system with "imported inflation" 
being included in the calculations for pay up to Dr. 60000 and a
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payment of the first automatic indexation increase from 1 
January 1988. The incomes policy's emphasis remained on favouring 
the low paid.
The level of the adjustment which was to be made at the end of 
1987 became a matter of political debate. The package agreed and 
announced by Mr. Simitis, the Greek Minister of National Economy, 
provided for that first increase to be delayed until May 1988, 
but Prime Minister Papandreou reversed the cabinet decision and 
this prompted Mr. Simitis' resignation as the government adopted 
a loose policy by awarding substantial increases in the beginning 
of 1988.
To summarise, during this period of formal indexation, incomes 
policy was at first tuned so that to preserve automatically real 
wages. Indeed, it was clearly oriented in favour of the low paid. 
But falls in productivity and rises in unit labour costs obliged 
the authorities to impose two short-term wage freezes and, then, 
to modify the indexation scheme and impose it through statutory 
regulation. Thus, the socialist governments which were claiming 
that they would protect real wages, mainly of the low paid, had 
to recourse to direct intervention in wage determination to 
implement incomes policies aimed to restrain real wages.
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4.3. WAGE DEVELOPMENTS IN GREEK MANUFACTURING.
4.3.1. Wages and the Wage Structure across Manufacturing 
Industries.
Given the policies described in Section 4.2, Tables 4.3.1 and 
4.3.2 illustrate the labour market conditions prevailing over the 
period 1965-88 and indicate the basic developments in the Greek 
manufacturing labour market as far as wages and unemployment are 
concerned. Developments regarding the nexus nominal wages- 
productivity-unit labour costs indicate the distinct 
characteristics over the periods under consideration. 
Productivity growth slowed down in 1975-81 and became negative in 
1982-88. Unit labour costs soared in 1975-81, following the 
increases in nominal wages, and were slightly moderated during 
the 1985-87 stabilisation programme as increases in nominal wages 
were also restrained.
As far as real wages are concerned, while in 1975-81, compared to 
1967-74, productivity growth slowed down, real wages rise at a 
rate twice that of productivity. In 1982-88, along with the 
negative productivity performance, real wages remained stable as 
the real incomes policy of the 1985-87 stabilisation programme 
counter-balanced the impressive increases awarded in 1982 and 
1984. In other words, while both periods of norm-based and 
indexation policy are characterised by soaring unit labour 
costs, during the norm-based policy increases in real wages
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exceeded productivity growth and during indexation policy 
negative productivity growth led to stagnating real wages. 
However, the course of real wage during the indexation period is 
less smooth than in earlier periods as is characterised by 
regressive moves. Distinct unemployment levels characterise also 
the periods under consideration. In 1967-74 and 1974-81 low 
levels of unemployment are observed, with the labour market being 
relatively tighter in 1974-81. But the period 1982-88 is 
characterised by relatively high unemployment.
The minimum wage as percentage of average wage played an 
important role in 1967-74, as it represented the 70 per cent of 
the average wage, but its ratio decreased in 1975-81 and in 
1982-88 to levels around 55 per cent. These levels and trends are 
comparable to those prevailing in most industrialised market 
economies. In the late 1970s the relevant ratio was in the U.S. 
1978:50 per cent, in Canada 1977:51 per cent, in Japan 1975-77:50 
per cent, in Australia 1978:52 per cent, in France 1977:63 per 
cent and in the Netherlands 1977:75 per cent (Starr, 1981:42-47). 
But in the 1980s statutory minimum wages as a percentage of 
average earnings in the 1980s play a reduced role, though they 
remained highly significant in the Netherlands, Spain and France, 
where in 1984 they were equivalent to respectively 65 per cent, 
41 per cent and 37 per cent of average manufacturing earnings 
OECD (1987:41). It appears that in Greece, compared to 
countries such as Spain and France, with socialist governments in 
office following indexation policies, minimum wages played a 
relatively more important role.
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At the disaggregated level one interesting feature of the 
manufacturing wage structure is the high degree of stability 
over time in the hierarchy of relative wages in the twenty two- 
digit industrial branches. The coefficient of concordance in the 
ranking of the manufacturing wage structure for male workers in 
the period 1965-1988 is 0.82. This value means that male 
employees of certain high-wage industrial branches in Greek 
manufacturing maintained, throughout this period, their higher 
position in the wage structure.
The ranking in descending order of the average pay for male 
workers, as presented in Table 4.3.4, shows clearly that the 
composition of the top five high-wage industrial branches is very 
stable. Membership is restricted to the following branches ; i) 
34: Basic Metal Industries, ii) 32: Products of Petroleum and
Coal iii) 28: Printing and Publishing, iv) 31: Chemicals, v) 38: 
Transport Equipment and vi) 33: Non-Metallic Mineral Products. In 
parallel, the club of the bottom five low-wage industrial 
branches has also stable composition and permanent members such 
as : i) 26: Furniture, ii) 25: Wood and Cork iii) 39:
Miscellaneous Manufacturing iv) 36: Non-Electrical Machinery and 
v) 24: Clothing and Footwear.
This stability at the top and the bottom of the wage structure 
hierarchy is not a Greek-specific phenomenon. Marsden (1981) and 
Saunders and Marsden (1981) showed that in the 1970s there was an 
overall stability of inter-industry ranking in West European 
countries. Roughly the same industries were found among the
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high-wage and among the low-wage industries in each country. The 
"energy" sector and printing dominated the high-wage industries, 
and textiles, clothing, and footwear were the most common among 
the low-wage. A more recent study by OECD (1985:92) reported 
findings consistent with previous research as at the lower end 
of the earnings distribution there was considerable uniformity 
across countries : textiles, clothing, and food and beverage 
industries dominated the low end. Moreover, while there was less 
uniformity across countries among the high-wage industries there 
was a tendency for chemical, primary metals, petroleum-refining 
and transportation equipment industries to be consistently in the 
high-wage sector.
Marsden (1983) reviewed the evidence on the factors accounting 
for different pay levels across industries. These factors include 
the relative skill composition of the industry labour force 
(skilled labour is paid better), the working conditions (wage 
differentials compensate for worse conditions), the industrial 
concentration in relatively few large firms (large firms pay 
better) and the sex composition of the labour force (female 
labour is paid less than male).
These factors account largely for different pay levels observed 
across the twenty two-digit industrial branches in Greek 
manufacturing. Table 4.3.5 presents estimates of the determinants 
of the manufacturing wage structure, based on cross-section 
regression analysis. Four variables, namely productivity, size, 
skill (as proxied by the share of salary earners to both salary 
and wage earners) and sex composition, are used as independent
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variables in order to explain the manufacturing wage structure 
across twenty two-digit industrial branches. Size, skill and sex 
composition were found significant in 1981 and, indeed, their 
influence was stronger than 1976. In other words, factors such as 
size, sex and skill showed themselves up over the period 1976-81, 
during which the norm-based incomes policy was in use, strike 
activity soared and the informal system of collective bargaining 
became at work.
The inter-branch variance of hourly earnings can be described by 
the coefficient of variation. When the coefficient of variation 
is used as a summary indicator of wage differentials, the 
manufacturing wage structure in Greece, compared with other OECD 
countries, is classified in the category of those countries with 
considerable fluctuation -upward and downward- in the dispersion 
of inter-industry wages (OECD, 1985: 85) . The OECD study arrived 
to this conclusion by examining the variability in wages for both 
male and female workers over the period 1975-83. Our analysis, 
presented in Table 4.3.6, arrived to the same conclusion by using 
wages of both sexes, of male workers and of female workers for 
a longer period that the OECD study, namely for 1965-88. However, 
throughout the period 1965-88, variability of wages across 
manufacturing was far greater in the case of male workers than in 
the case of female workers. Overall, the wage structure was 
rather narrow in 1967-74, became wider in 1975-81 and was 
compressed again in 1982-88 near its 1967-74 level.
In other European countries over the 1970s, as Saunders and
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Marsden (1981:126) observed, the size of the differentials 
between industrial branches changed towards a very moderate 
narrowing. Only in Italy, where the differentials were rather 
wide in the early 1970s, was there a substantial narrowing, which 
appears to reflect the equalising policy of the unions. And only 
in Germany, where the differentials were relatively narrow, was 
there a widening. Thus in Greek manufacturing during the 1970s, 
and especially over the period 1975-81, a rather different course 
than in other European countries was followed. The widening of 
the wage structure in 1975-81 coincides with the use of the norm- 
based incomes policy as well as with the rise of strike activity 
and the creation of the informal system of collective bargaining.
4.3.2. Indices of Flexibilitv in Manufacturing Relative Wages.
When changes in relative wage ranking are used to measure the 
stability of the manufacturing wage structure, it appears that 
industry wage ranking in the Greek manufacturing is, as in the 
case of other European countries, relatively less stable, 
compared with non-European OECD members (OECD, 1985:85). The OECD 
study examined the ranking in industry wages for workers of both 
sexes. Our analysis of industry wages for all three categories of 
wages, presented in Table 4.3.6, found that the inclusion of 
wages of both sexes provides higher coefficients of variation 
indicating higher variability, as well as higher coefficients of 
determination indicating less unstable ranking. This implies that 
the existing variability does not affect the hierarchy as far as 
ranking is concerned, but evolves within the limits of the
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existing hierarchy.
A different view on variability in industry wages is taken by 
focusing upon the evolution of the relative wage in each 
industrial branch separately, over the period 1966-81 and the 
sub-periods of distinct incomes policies. From Table 4.3.7, 
which presents the variability of relative wages over time in 
each of the twenty two-digit industrial branches, we can infer 
that there was no great variability in branch relative wages over 
the period 1966-88. According to Table 4.3.7, over the period 
1966-88 only one industrial branch had a coefficient of 
variation exceeding 10 per cent. Six branches had a coefficient 
of variation exceeding 5 per cent. The majority, 13 branches, had 
a coefficient of variation which did not exceed 5 per cent.
The annual coefficients of variation in relative wages across 
manufacturing branches denote the existence of a rather flexible 
wage structure. But the branch coefficients of variation in 
relative wages over time indicate the existence of less 
variability in industry relative wages. This slight mismatch is 
of course due to methodological reasons as not exactly the same 
kind of variability is examined in each case. Annual inter-branch 
coefficients of variation refer to the positions of industrial 
branches relative to the average during a certain year. Branch 
coefficients of variation refer to the variability of industry 
relative wages over time with regard to their all-period average 
relative wage. Therefore the findings in Tables 4.3.6 and 4.3.7 
indicate that while variability exists, does not result in
172
important changes in ranking as high-wage branches maintain their 
top positions and low-wage branches remain at the bottom of the 
hierarchy even if the gaps between them widen or narrow.
The examination of three sub-periods, selected according to the 
type of wage policy in force, leads to the identification of 
distinct levels of variability in the wage structure. At the 
aggregate level from Table 4.3.6 we infer that wage dispersion 
was wider in 1975-81 than in 1967-74 and 1982-88 for wages of 
both sexes and wages of male workers as well. At the 
disaggregated level. Table 4.3.7 where coefficients of variation 
estimated for the three sub-periods of distinct wage policies are 
compared, indicates that the sub-period 1968-74 is characterised 
by higher over time variability in relative wages of the majority 
of industrial branches. It is during that period that, in the 
context of rapidly expanding manufacturing employment, most 
changes in the relative position of branches occurred. During 
the sub-period 1982-88 relatively lower variability is observed, 
whatever happened in the precedent sub-periods. This suggests 
that, even if over the full period 1966-88 there was some, though 
small, "restructuring” in the wage structure, in 1982-88, a 
period during which growth in manufacturing employment slowed 
down and indexation policies were in use, this variability 
becomes smaller.
The examination of separate sub-periods suggests the existence 
of three patterns of over time variability in branch relative 
wages. First, there is a pattern of variability diminishing 
period after period. This pattern is mainly followed by low-wage
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branches. Second, there is a pattern of variability peaking 
during 1975-81. This pattern is mainly followed by high-wage 
industries which display the higher variability in their relative 
wage during 1975-81. Third, the remaining branches, that is the 
majority, had the lowest variability in their relative wages 
during 1975-81. These centrifugal tendencies indicate that, when 
the evolution of relative wage of each industrial branch is 
considered separately, for the majority of them, the sub-period 
1975-81 appears to be pivotal, in the sense that it is the one of 
the wider disturbances in the manufacturing wage structure as far 
as variability across manufacturing and over time are concerned.
Of course we must recognise the limits of indices such as the 
coefficient of variation in relative wages for assessing any 
flexibility in the wage structure. For such an assessment to be 
valid the wage structure should be related to other labour market 
outcomes such as changes in employment, productivity as well as 
trade-unions and collective bargaining developments. As the 
analyses with regard to the Australian wage structure by Keating 
(1983) and Withers et all (1983) suggest, there was more 
variation in wage relativities than it was usually alleged, even 
if the labour force responded to quite small adjustments to 
industry wage relativities. Indeed, as quantity adjustments 
(employment) are usually more important than price (wage) 
adjustments, an important role can be played by small variations 
in relative wages. From this point of view, simple indices of 
variability in relative wages when examined alone may understate
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the actual flexibility in the wage structure with respect to the 
labour market outcomes.
To summarise the analysis of variability indicators, both at the 
aggregate and the disaggregated level, suggests that there is 
some flexibility in the inter-industry wage structure which 
should be examined. Moreover, the sub-period 1975-81 seems to 
hold a pivotal position as far as disturbances in the 
manufacturing wage structure are concerned. This seems consistent 
with the norm-based wage policy followed in 1975-81, which 
incorporated relatively less compulsion, as well as with the rise 
of the informal system of collective bargaining which took place 
then.
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4.4. EMPLOYMENT REGULATION AND TRENDS IN EMPLOYMENT IN GREEK 
MANUFACTURING.
4.4.1. Employment Regulation and the Legislation on Collective 
Dismissals.
Employment protection and growth has been one of the main policy 
concerns in Greece during the post-war period. In the mid-1950s, 
in conditions which were considered as conditions of surplus 
labour in the primary sector of the economy, wage controls were 
aimed at securing employment growth in the manufacturing sector. 
Indeed, over the post-war period, while wage and employment 
policies were aimed at employment growth, stability in employment 
was considered as a principle which had to be met at any price 
and against any macro- or micro-economic rationale. The 
recurrence of the phenomenon of ailing industries nearly after 
every wave of important disturbances in the internal and external 
balance of the economy, and the governmental treatment of the 
recurring redundancies problem, have made clear that politicians, 
across the board, have been at odds with any alternative policy 
to subsidising ailing businesses, inefficient managements and 
insecure jobs -insecure in terms of market conditions.
Nowadays the question of flexibility with regard to employment 
regulation in the Greek labour market is mainly raised concerning 
the existing legislation on collective dismissals, on the basis 
of which labour adjustments have been taking place. The relevant
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legislation was updated in 1983 to become in accordance with the 
EEC directive, adopted in 1975, on collective dismissals. In Law 
1387/1983 strict limits are set for the maximum number of 
employees who could be dismissed per calendar month. According to 
it the collective dismissal of employees is permitted, for 
reasons not related to their individual contract, for a maximum 
of five employees in companies with between 20 and 50 employees, 
or for a maximum percentage of the employees in companies with 
more than 50 employees. For a dismissal to be considered as 
collective this percentage must be at least 2 per cent. The upper 
limit of permitted dismissals should not exceed the 10 per cent 
of the total number of employees, and it is subject to a maximum 
of 30 workers. The percentage of permitted dismissals is revised, 
after taking into account the situation of the labour market, at 
six-monthly intervals by Ministerial decision. For a long period 
stood in the range from 2 to 3 per cent.
Dismissals exceeding the afore-mentioned limits are deemed 
invalid and termination of the relevant labour contracts is 
considered as non-existent if, one month after their notification 
to the Manpower Employment Office, they have not been approved by 
the Minister of labour. Such approval is granted following an 
application by the employer which must submitted within 8 days of 
the notification of dismissals.
The main important change brought about by the updated 
legislation refers to requirements to inform and consult employee 
representatives and to tightened up provisions on notification 
and authorisation of collective dismissals. Authorisation of the
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collective dismissal by the Ministry of Labour is essential for 
it to be lawful allowed and not revoked. According to the earlier 
legislation, before the introduction of Law 1387/1983, it was 
permitted, per calendar month and for economic reasons, the 
collective dismissal of 2 to 10 per cent of the workforce in 
firms normally employing at least 50 employees. The exact 
percentage was also determined and revised every six months (on 1 
January and 1 July each year) by the Ministry of Labour. But, 
regardless of changes in legislation, for a long period stood, as 
already mentioned, between 2 and 3 per cent. This percentage has 
represented the maximum permitted level by which employers may 
reduce the size of their workforce, although the Ministry can 
waive this rule where firms find themselves in "special 
circumstances".
Nevertheless, for a long period, few permissions for exceeding 
the legislated maximum has been granted by the High Council of 
Labour, the advisory body which examines applications for 
exemption from the legislated limits and proposes to the 
Minister of Labour whether these applications should be accepted 
or not. Tables 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 provide information on cases of 
collective dismissals under the Minister of Labour's and the 
Perfect's jurisdiction respectively over the period 1983-86. In 
seven cases, out of the 29 reported, authorisation for exceeding 
the legislated limits was granted. Three of them, in 1986, 
involved the complete shut down of companies or plants. But this 
type of treatment was exceptional.
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Indeed, this type of corporate economic adjustment was 
exceptional either. Ailing firms in need, inter alia, for labour 
adjustment became under the control of the state-owned and run 
"Organisation for Companies Rehabilitation" (CAE) set up in 
1983, which since then controls firms employing more than 30000 
salary and wage earners, i.e. nearly 10 per cent of the total 
employment of salary and wage earners in large-scale 
manufacturing industries. Natural wastage has been the only 
manpower policy used to minimise the excessive labour hoarding in 
the "problematic" firms.
The legislation on collective dismissals may have caused some 
kind of rigidity as far as the adjustment of employment at the 
firm level is concerned. Certainly, firms wanting to adjust 
employment downwards and cut the size of their workforce may rely 
on natural wastage. But the legislated limits may have also 
affected the way via which firms adjust employment upwards, in 
cases of short-term increases in demand for their products. The 
restrictive legislation on collective dismissals may have caused 
firms to channel their higher demand for labour towards higher 
overtime work rather than towards hiring more employees. It may 
also have worked in favour of more flexible forms of contracts 
such as subcontracting, short-term or fixed-term contracts etc. 
Therefore, the issue of labour adjustment consists the second 
half of the scissors by which firms adjust their workforce to 
short-term and fong-term changes in the market. Indeed, it seems 
that in the Greek labour market, employment regulation has been 
stricter than wage regulation.
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4.4.2. Manufacturing Employment; Change. Characteristics and 
Distribution.
The examination of changes in aggregate manufacturing employment 
as well as at a disaggregated level of industrial branches 
provides information about the conditions prevailing in the 
manufacturing labour market over the period under consideration.
Since the mid-1960s, aggregate employment in the Greek 
manufacturing sector increased in both absolute and relative 
terms. From this point of view, Greece, compared to the majority 
of OECD and EEC countries, is not a typical case as in those 
countries since the mid 1970s manufacturing employment has been 
falling. In Tables 4.4.3 and 4.4.4 we observe that since 1973 in 
the majority of OECD countries the average annual rate of change 
in manufacturing employment has been negative, and that the share 
of manufacturing employment in civilian employment has been 
decreasing. In both cases Greece has been exceptional. The 
average annual change slowed down but remained positive and the 
share of manufacturing continued increasing.
A recent OECD (1989:163) study pointed out that the historical 
experience suggests that, throughout the process of economic 
development, the share of industry in total employment follows an 
inverse U pattern. This pattern has been followed by most of the 
OECD countries as in the 1960s the share of industry employment 
rose, in the late 1960s peaked, and started declining after the 
first oil-shock in 1973. As Greece and Turkey experienced
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increases in industry* s share in total employment, the study 
argued that this is compatible with the inverse U pattern as 
Greece and Turkey, countries with relatively lower levels of 
economic development, they have been, over the 1970s and the 
1980s, in the upward side of the inverse U pattern.
The overall increases in manufacturing employment are not to say 
that employment was constantly expanding throughout the period 
1965-88. Behind this increase, distinct periods can be discerned. 
Table 4.4.5 indicates that high rates of growth in manufacturing 
employment were observed from 1969 till 1974, in the aftermath of 
the first oil-shock. Then, till the second oil-shock in 1979, 
employment growth in manufacturing slowed down. A third phase of 
falling manufacturing employment followed. This fall was 
controlled, to a certain extent, by the stabilisation measures 
adopted in 1983 and in 1985-87.
When three different sub-periods, selected according to the wage 
policy in force, are examined, it appears that the sub-period 
1967-74 was one of strong expansion in employment across the 
Greek manufacturing sector, clearly distinguished from the rest. 
After 1969 and till 1974, aggregate manufacturing employment was 
persistently increasing at the highest rates of the whole period 
1965-88. In 1975-81, the increasing trend in aggregate 
manufacturing employment became weaker. Employment growth in 
manufacturing gave way to a fragile stability.
To discern whether the impressive increases in manufacturing 
employment in 1970, 1974 and 1983, came from expanding
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establishments or new ones we examined the information provided 
by the Annual Industrial Surveys with regard to establishments 
and employment in large-scale manufacturing. Unfortunately the 
last one published and available refers to the year 1981. 
Therefore we can only discuss the impressive increases, exceeding 
10 per cent, in 1970 and 1974. From 1969 to 1970 the number of 
large-scale manufacturing establishments (i.e. those employing 
more than 10 employees) decreased from 6356 to 6039. By contrast, 
from 1973 to 1974 the number of establishments increased from 
6529 to 7767. It appears that while the 1969/70 increases came 
from existing establishments which expanded, the 1973/74 
increases were caused by new establishments.
To trace further the sources of those increases in manufacturing 
employment, we examined the relevant information at the 
disaggregated level of two-digit branches. In 1969/70 in ten 
industrial branches employment increases exceeded the all­
branches average increase of 10.76 per cent. In half of them the 
number of establishments increased either, while in the rest 
fewer establishments were recorded in 1970 compared to 1969. In 
1973/74 in five manufacturing branches employment increases were 
above the all-branches average increase of 10.44 per cent, and in 
all of them the number of establishments increased too. Therefore 
it appears that the impressive expansion in manufacturing 
employment in 1970 and 1974 was largely due to the creation of 
new manufacturing establishments rather than to expanding old 
ones. This indicates that the workforce in those green-field 
sites was presumably involved in setting up from the very
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beginning new industrial relations as neither had a labour 
tradition and culture, nor was incorporated in already existing 
bargaining and trade-union structures, and, indeed, this happened 
in the context of the military regime.
As far as the composition of the manufacturing employment is 
concerned. Tables 4.4.6 and 4.4.7 suggest that over the period 
1965-88 the percentage of salaried employment in the total number 
of manufacturing employees was steadily increasing. In fact, from 
1965 to 1988, it was doubled. It was 17.1 per cent in 1965 and 
became 34.9 per cent in 1988. However, over the period 1976-88 
the share of female labour in total manufacturing employment of 
salary and wage earners was rather stable around the level of 36 
per cent.
At a disaggregated level, from 1965 to 1988, as Table 4.4.8 
indicates, 15 out of 20 industrial branches increased their 
employment of wage earners. However, rates of expansion varied 
considerably over time and across the twenty two-digit industrial 
branches. From 1967 to 1974 employment of wage earners increased 
in 18 industrial branches. As Tables 4.4.5 and 4.4.11 indicate, 
for every single year during the 1967-74 period, on average, 14 
industrial branches were increasing their employment of wage 
earners.
A different pattern characterises the sub-period 1975-81. From 
1975 to 1981 6 industrial branches increased the employment of
wage earners. Over the same sub-period and for every single year, 
on average, 7 industrial branches were expanding employment of
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wage earners. As the increasing trend in aggregate manufacturing 
employment became weaker it seems that, in 1975-81 , employment 
growth in certain industries was counter-balanced by job losses 
in others.
During 1982-88, employment performance of manufacturing was 
rather contradictory. From 1982 to 1988 11 industrial branches 
increased the number of wage earners employed by them. For each 
single year, on average, 8 industrial branches were expanding 
their employment of wage earners. However, as negative 
developments dominated at the level of aggregate manufacturing 
employment this sub-period, it seems that employment growth in 
certain expanding industrial branches was outnumbered by job 
losses in contracting branches.
The distribution of employment in Greek manufacturing 
throughout the period 1965-88 is highlighted by Tables 4.4.6- 
4.4.11. Overall, the distribution of manufacturing employment 
across industrial branches is shaped by the increasing dominance 
of four industrial branches. From Tables 4.4.9 and 4.4.10 becomes 
clear that, on average, four industrial branches, namely 20:Food 
Industry, 23:Textiles, 24:Footwear and Clothing and 38:Transport 
Equipment, account for more than 50 per cent of wage earners in 
manufacturing employment. The stability of their share above 50 
per cent and its slight increase over time indicate concentration 
rather than dispersion of employment across the twenty two-digit 
manufacturing branches.
The common characteristic in these four industrial branches is
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that, apart from being leaders in terms of employment shares, the 
hierarchy among them in terms of ranking in the distribution of 
employment is stable. Branch 23: Textiles employs the higher 
percentage of wage earners in manufacturing employment, on 
average, 19.7 per cent. Branch 20: Food industry employs, on 
average 12.8 per cent. Branch 24: Footwear and Clothing employs 
11.8 per cent. And branch 38: Transport Equipment employs 7.8 
per cent of wage earners in manufacturing employment.
Given the lack of statistical information on the occupational 
composition of employment in the Greek manufacturing sector, the 
male/female as well as the salary/wage earners composition of 
employment can be used as a rough indication of the skill mix. 
While female employment is usually associated with relatively 
lower skills, the employment of salary earners is associated with 
relatively higher skills. From this point of view. Table 4.4.7 
suggests that in three of the four above mentioned branches, 
namely in 23: Textiles, 20: Food and 24: Footwear and Clothing, 
the labour force is composed by relatively high percentages of 
female wage earners. Only in branch 38: Transport Equipment the 
labour force is strongly dominated by male wage earners. 
Furthermore, as Table 4.4.6 suggests, the labour force in the 
branch 38 is also characterised by above-average employment of 
salary earners, while in the three other branches of high shares 
in manufacturing employment, the labour force is characterised by 
below-average employment of salary earners.
To summarise, the analysis on the evolution of manufacturing
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employment at the aggregate and the disaggregated level suggests 
that, in spite of the overall expansion of manufacturing 
employment from 1965 to 1988, only the sub-period 1967-74 was one 
of very strong demand for labour in the manufacturing sector. In 
1967-74 along with the rapid expansion in manufacturing 
employment a new generation of employees who had no labour 
tradition regarding collective bargaining and trade-unions was 
brought in largely new manufacturing establishments. Furthermore, 
the analysis of distribution of manufacturing employment across 
industrial branches suggests that manufacturing employment has 
been increasingly concentrated in a small number of industrial 
branches, actually four out of twenty. It is noteworthy that, as 
the information provided in Appendix 2 indicates, these 
observations, which refer to employment of wage earners, are 
also valid for employment of both salary and wage earners in 
manufacturing.
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4.5. CONCLUSIONS.
In addition to the extensive procedural regulation of collective 
bargaining, analysed in Chapters 2 and 3, extensive regulation is 
also observed as far as substantial aspects, namely wages and 
employment, are concerned. Formal incomes policies were 
introduced after 1975. In 1975-81 norm-based incomes policies 
were in use. In 1982-88 indexation policies were adopted. In this 
context the accelerated growth of real wages observed in 1975-81 
slowed down in 1982-88 and became negative during the 
1985-87 stabilisation programme.
While the distinction between high-wage and low-wage industrial 
branches remained very stable throughout the period 1965-88, the 
wage structure became, compared to 1967-74, wider in 1975-81, to 
narrow again in 1982-88. The variability in the manufacturing 
wage structure did not undermine the ranking of industries in the 
wage structure. However, major disturbances in the manufacturing 
wage structure are observed in 1975-81, i.e. the period of norm- 
based incomes policy during which strike activity soared and 
informal collective bargaining procedures at the company and 
plant level were set up. The observed inter-branch and over 
time variability in relative wages indicates the existence of 
some flexibility which must be examined in conjunction with 
employment developments.
Employment adjustment has been under strict regulation too. The
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Ministry of Labour maintained all over the period the right to 
regulate employment adjustments by setting limits on collective 
dismissals. In the context of this regulation, over the period 
1965-88, contrary to what happened in other industrialised market 
economies, in Greece manufacturing employment was expanding. The 
period 1967-74 was the main period of rapid expansion in 
manufacturing employment, expansion largely associated with the 
creation of new establishments. In later periods the expansion of 
manufacturing employment was slower. Throughout the period 1965- 
88 manufacturing employment was rather concentrated to low-wage 
industries where relatively higher proportions of female labour 
are employed.
Overall, in the context of extensive regulation of the labour 
market via incomes policy and legislation on collective 
dismissals, the observed variability in the wage structure along 
with the employment growth and restructuring in the Greek 
manufacturing sector set a scene which prima facie is dominated 
by rigidities. However a certain variability in wages and 
employment is observed. In other words it seems that 
contradictory forces conducive to both rigidities and 
flexibilities operate in the labour market of the Greek 
manufacturing.
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Table 4.3.1
NOMINAL. REAL. RELATIVE WAGES. PRODUCTIVITY. UNIT LABOUR COSTS. 
MINIMUM WAGE AS PERCENTAGE OF AVERAGE AND FEMALE AS PERCENTAGE OF 
MALE WAGE IN GREEK MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
Industrial and Handicraft Establishments (>10)
1965-1988
Nominal
Year
Real
Wages
Relative Producti 
vity
Unit
Labour
Minimum Female 
Costs Wage
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
change % % change % % %
1965 8.26 5.16 18.06 2.03 3.21 67.80 61.86
1966 12.96 7.96 16.21 10.48 0.82 70.49 62.41
1967 9.47 7.77 12.77 4.09 9.97 74.74 67.59
1968 6.46 6.16 12.32 9.43 -0.19 74.35 68.83
1969 8.13 5.73 12.73 9.07 2.88 74.78 69.23
1970 6.49 3.29 14.12 -0.18 0.68 72.28 68.16
1971 8.85 5.85 13.83 3.04 3.81 66.69 65.99
1972 8.84 4.54 13.77 9.85 -0.55 65.71 67.29
1973 17.67 2.17 14.88 7.62 2.45 59.06 64.96
1974 24.73 -2.17 14.25 -11.35 32.17 71.62 66.98
1975 21.35 7.95 14.49 3.29 18.70 69.66 69.47
1976 31.29 17.99 16.63 5.21 21.32 63.37 70.30
1977 22.34 10.24 17.94 -1.06 22.15 59.76 68.72
1978 23.56 10.96 18.95 6.97 19.73 58.90 69.11
1979 21.85 2.85 17.52 5.88 16.22 55.59 67.99
1980 26.13 1.23 18.67 2.34 25.50 50.31 67.79
1981 26.54 2.04 18.56 —0.05 26.30 49.83 67.18
1982 30.37 9.37 15.58 -3.03 37.78 57.86 73.12
1983 20.49 0.29 14.21 -8.94 18.68 58.18 74.65
1984 25.70 7.20 14.49 2.34 22.24 56.13 76.18
1985 18.56 -0.74 13.59 -1.75 17.50 55.73 77.62
1986 12.64 -10.36 14.63 -0.79 12.50 53.24 76.89
1987 9.93 -6.47 14.04 -0.70 10.75 53.39 77.57
1988 15.29 1.79 13.94 4.09 20.50 56.82 77.71
Average
1967-74 11.33 4.17 13.59 3.95 5.68 69.90 67.38
1975-81 24.72 7.61 17.54 3.23 21.41 58.20 68.65
1982-88 19.00 0.15 14.36 -1.26 19.99 55.91 76.25
Notes:
a. Hourly wage for male workers.
b. Change in nominal hourly wage minus change in consumer prices 
index.
c. Coefficient of variation in hourly wages for male workers 
across twenty two-digit industrial branches.
f. National minimum wage as percentage of average daily earnings.
g. Female hourly earnings as percentage of male earnings.
Sources:
a. NSSG, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Table 11, Various Issues, 
f. Minimum Wages determined by the National General Collective 
Agreements.
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Table 4.3.2
INFLATION AND LABOUR MARKET CONDITIONS IN GREECE
1965-1988
Year Inflation®
Registered Manufacturing 
Unemployment" Employment^ Unemployment"
Year to Year Change (%) Level
1965 3.1 - 1.50 3.56 4.82
1966 5.0 1.52 3.05 5.01
1967 1.7 29.20 -0.67 5.40
1968 0.3 -11.92 -0.67 5.57
1969 2.4 - 9.84 3.77 5.25
1970 3.2 -26.80 4.66 4.16
1971 3.0 —37.68 6.14 3.14
1972 4.3 -21.37 3.78 2.11
1973 15.5 —10.05 6.22 1.97
1974 26.9 26.28 1.07 2.05
1975 13.4 29.19 0.83 2.29
1976 13.3 -27.04 6.12 1.91
1977 12.1 8.38 4.64 1.69
1978 12.6 11.71 3.09 1.83
1979 19.0 2.10 2.74 1.89
1980 24.9 17.86 1.14 2.75
1981 24.5 14.29 1.13 4.05
1982 21.0 19.05 0.12 5.83
1983 20.2 21.77 -1.18 7.86
1984 18.5 15.56 0.38 8.14
1985 19.3 24.93 -1.19 7.81
1986 23.0 19.47 0.06 7.38
1987 16.4 6.74 -1.26 7.40
1988 13.5 -4.51 1.02 7.74
Average
1967-74 7.2 -7.77 3.04 3.71
1975-81 14.7 8.07 2.81 2.34
1982-88 18.8 14.72 -0.03 7.45
Notes:
a. January to January percent change in consumer prices index.
b. Change in the annual average index for registered unemployment
c. Change in the annual average employment of salary and wage 
earners in manufacturing.
d. Number of unemployed as percentage of the total labour force.
Sources:
a. OECD, Historical Statistics, 1960-1988, Table 8.11, page 83.
b. NSSG, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Table 9, page 13, various 
issues.
c. NSSG, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Table 8, page 13, various 
issues.
d. OECD, Historical Statistics, 1960-1986, Table 2.15, page 39, 
and OECD, Economic Outlook, November 1989, Table D4, page 67.
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Table 4.3.3
KEYS FOR INDUSTRIAL BRANCHES IN MANUFACTURING SECTOR
Branch Code Manufacturing Industry Description
20 Food Manufacturing
21 Beverage Industries
22 Tobacco manufactures
23 Manufacture of Textiles
24 Footwear and Clothing
25 Wood and Cork
26 Furniture
27 Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products
28 Printing and Publishing
29 Manufacture of Leather
30 Manufacture of Rubber and Plastic
31 Manufacture of Chemicals and Chemical Products
32 Manufacture of Products of Petroleum and Coal
3 3 Manufacture of non-metallic Mineral Products
34 Basic Metal Industries
35 Manufacture of Metal Products
36 Machinery and Appliances (non-electrical)
37 Manufacture of Electrical Machinery, Apparatus, 
Appliances and Supplies
38 Manufacture of Transport Equipment
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries
Note: Classification of branches in the Greek Standard Industrial 
Classification, according to which data and indices are compiled 
and published by the National Statistical Service in Greece 
(NSSG) is based upon and corresponds to the "International 
Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities" 
(ISIC-United Nations, Statistical Papers, Ser. M, No 4, Rev. 2).
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Table 4.3.4
RANKING OF INDUSTRIAL BRANCHES IN THE WAGE STRUCTURE
(descending order)
1965-1988
Coefficient of Concordance^ = 0.82
Industrial
Branch
Year 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
1965 10.5 9.0 7.5 10.5 14 20.0 19.0 16.5 1 12.0
1966 14.5 8.5 4.5 10.0 16 20.0 19.0 14.5 1 12.0
1967 12.5 14.0 8.0 6.0 11 19.0 20.0 17.0 2 10.0
1968 11.0 17.0 8.0 6.0 14 19.5 19.5 12.0 1 9.0
1969 10.0 17.0 14.0 5.5 10 20.0 19.0 13.0 2 8.0
1970 13.0 17.0 15.0 7.5 10 20.0 16.0 11.0 2 7.5
1971 15.0 17.0 15.0 5.0 4 19.0 13.0 12.0 2 11.0
1972 14.0 17.5 17.5 7.0 6 19.0 15.0 9.0 2 12.0
1973 16.0 10.5 10.5 9.0 18 20.0 19.0 17.0 2 14.0
1974 14.0 12.5 16.0 7.0 17 19.0 20.0 9.5 2 15.0
1975 13.0 17.0 11.5 7.0 16 15.0 19.0 9.0 2 11.5
1976 15.0 17.0 10.0 7.5 9 16.0 20.0 7.5 2 13.0
1977 15.0 14.0 9.0 11.0 17 16.0 20.0 7.5 2 12.0
1978 15.0 14.0 8.0 11.0 16 18.0 19.0 10.0 2 13.0
1979 15.0 14.0 13.0 10.0 17 18.0 20.0 8.0 2 12.0
1980 18.0 15.0 13.0 10.0 14 16.0 19.0 8.0 2 12.0
1981 17.0 12.0 11.0 10.0 15 18.0 19.0 9.0 2 14.0
1982 15.0 12.0 8.5 8.5 16 14.0 19.0 10.0 4 17.0
1983 14.0 11.0 7.0 9.0 17 16.0 19.0 8.0 6 18.0
1984 14.0 9.0 6.0 11.0 18 15.0 20.0 8.0 7 17.0
1985 16.0 10.0 9.0 7.0 18 19.0 20.0 8.0 5 13.5
1986 15.0 10.0 7.0 8.0 19 18.0 20.0 9.0 6 14.0
1987 15.0 12.0 7.0 8.0 17 19.0 20.0 11.0 6 14.0
1988 16.0 11.0 8.0 7.0 17 18.0 20.0 12.0 6 15.0
(continued)
Notes:
a. Coefficient of Concordance = Variance of rank sums / 
maximum possible variance of rank sums. Called also 
Kendall*s W statistic. By definition cannot be negative 
and its maximum value is 1. For further information see 
Hays, W. L. 1973 : Statistics for Social Sciences. Holt,
Rinehart and Winston Inc., New York, pp. 801-803.
b. For keys see Table 4.3.3.
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Table 4.3.4 (continued)
RANKING OF INDUSTRIAL BRANCHES IN THE WAGE STRUCTURE
(descending order)
1965-1988
Industrial
BranchP
Year 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39
1965 15.0 4.0 3 5.5 2 13.0 18.0 16.5 5.5 7.5
1966 11.0 6.5 3 4.5 2 13.0 18.0 17.0 6.5 8.5
1967 9.0 4.0 3 5.0 1 15.5 18.0 15.5 12.5 7.0
1968 7.0 4.0 3 5.0 2 14.0 18.0 16.0 14.0 10.0
1969 7.0 5.5 3 4.0 1 10.0 18.0 16.0 12.0 15.0
1970 5.0 6.0 3 4.0 1 12.0 19.0 14.0 9.0 18.0
1971 7.0 9.0 3 8.0 1 10.0 18.0 15.0 6.0 20.0
1972 4.0 5.0 3 8.0 1 11.0 16.0 13.0 10.0 20.0
1973 7.5 5.0 4 7.5 1 6.0 12.0 13.0 3.0 15.0
1974 6.0 5.0 4 9.5 1 8.0 11.0 12.5 3.0 18.0
1975 10.0 5.0 3 6.0 1 8.0 20.0 14.0 4.0 18.0
1976 11.0 4.5 3 6.0 1 12.0 18.0 14.0 4.5 19.0
1977 7.5 5.0 3 6.0 1 10.0 18.0 13.0 4.0 19.0
1978 9.0 5.0 3 6.0 1 7.0 17.0 12.0 4.0 20.0
1979 9.0 5.0 3 6.0 1 7.0 16.0 11.0 4.0 19.0
1980 9.0 5.0 3 6.0 1 7.0 17.0 11.0 4.0 20.0
1981 8.0 5.0 3 6.0 1 7.0 16.0 13.0 4.0 20.0
1982 7.0 2.0 3 6.0 1 11.0 18.0 13.0 5.0 20.0
1983 10.0 4.0 2 5.0 1 12.0 15.0 13.0 3.0 20.0
1984 10.0 3.0 2 5.0 1 12.0 16.0 13.0 4.0 19.0
1985 12.0 4.0 2 6.0 1 11.0 13.5 15.0 3.0 17.0
1986 12.0 5.0 2 4.0 1 11.0 13.0 16.0 3.0 17.0
1987 10.0 5.0 2 4.0 1 9.0 13.0 16.0 3.0 18.0
1988 9.0 4.0 2 5.0 1 10.0 13.0 14.0 3.0 19.0
Note: b. For keys see Table 4.3.3.
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Table 4.3.5
DETERMINANTS OF THE WAGE STRUCTURE IN GREEK MANUFACTURING
1976, 1981
Dependent variable; Manufacturing Wages.
Number of observations = 20 (two-digit industrial branches).
Year 1976 1981
Constant 41.21 [0.00] 125.05 [0.00]
(11.72) (8.61)
Productivity 0.01 [0.20] -0.03 [-0.34]
(0.73) (-1.10)
Size 0.11*** 0.50***** [0.73]
(2.66) (3.40)
Skill -0.002 [-0.003] 0.76* [0.45]
(-0.02) (1.86)
Female -0.16****[-0.36] -0.55**** [-0.39]
(-2.96) (-2.74)
.83 .77
R -adjusted .79 .71
F-value 18.42 12.68
Notes:
Wages = Hourly wage of workers of both sexes in branch i. 
Productivity = Value added per employee in branch i.
Size = Number of employees per establishment in branch i.
Skill = Because of data unavailability we use as a proxy the 
share of salary earners in employment of salary and wage 
earners in branch i.
Female = Share of female wage earners in wage earners of both sexes 
in branch i.
Levels of significance: *=0,10, ***=0.025, ****=0.01, *****=0.005. 
t-statistics in parentheses.
Standardised estimates in brackets.
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Table 4.3.6
INTER-BRANCH VARIABILITY IN THE GREEK MANUFACTURING WAGE STRUCTURE
1965-1988
Index Coefficient of Variation^ R-square'
Year
Both Sexes Male Female Both Sexes Male Female
1965 21.29 18.06 11.47 1.00 1.00 1.00
1966 19.35 16.23 7.10 .97 .95 .58
1967 15.47 12.77 6.48 .89 .86 .56
1968 14.43 12.34 5.75 .86 .82 .32
1969 14.90 12.74 4.68 .82 .78 -.07
1970 16.99 14.08 5.39 .81 .74 .15
1971 16.72 13.86 6.44 .78 .70 .21
1972 16.38 13.77 8.13 .74 .67 .25
1973 18.47 14.88 8.42 .85 .85 -.19
1974 17.04 14.25 5.67 .78 .71 -.14
1975 17.13 14.49 5.97 .83 .81 .35
1976 19.60 16.63 7.88 .79 .75 .17
1977 20.80 17.95 8.51 .84 .79 .19
1978 21.36 18.95 8.72 .86 .81 .03
1979 20.49 17.52 8.38 .87 .84 .19
1980 21.14 18.67 10.23 .84 .81 — .04
1981 20.58 18.56 12.41 .82 .79 -.49
1982 17.23 15.59 9.13 .71 .62 -.11
1983 16.32 14.21 8.84 .68 .58 -.02
1984 16.47 14.49 8.47 .67 .57 .29
1985 15.40 13.59 7.50 .71 . 66 .48
1986 16.72 14.63 8.40 .70 .61 .51
1987 15.82 14.04 8.02 .68 .60 .51
1988 15.68 13.94 7.76 .67 .60 .36
Average
1965- 66 20.32 17.15 9.29
1967-74 16.30 13.59 6.37
1975- 81 20.16 17.54 8.87
1982- 88 16.23 14.36 8.30
Notes: a. Coefficient of Variation= Standard Deviation/Mean, 
n=20 (two-digit industrial branches).
b. R-square is used as indicator of stability in the
wage structure by correlating relative wages of 
industries among pairs of years, one of which is the 
base year. In this case 1965 is used as the base year.
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Table 4.3.7
OVER TIME VARIABILITY OF BRANCH RELATIVE WAGES 
IN GREEK MANUFACTURING
Selected Periods
Coefficient of Variation in Period
1966-88 1968-74 1975-81 1982-88
Branch
20 3.2 3.2 2.0 1.1
21 4.9 4.1 3.2 2.7
22 8.0 2.6 3.5 1.6
23 4.0 1.4 0.8 1.9
24 7.6 7.1 3.9 2.1
25 3.2 3.8 1.5 1.7
26 6.0 4.2 1.9 2.6
27 4.4 3.7 1.5 2.4
28 10.5 2.4 5.5 2.6
29 4.6 3.6 2.0 2.4
30 3.7 2.6 1.9 1.5
31 3.6 3.4 2.1 2.7
32 5.7 3.1 4.6 3.9
33 3.6 4.3 1.6 2.0
34 4.7 3.4 3.6 3.0
35 1.6 1.3 1.8 1.1
36 3.3 4.0 2.4 1.9
37 2.4 2.5 2.8 2.0
38 6.0 7.9 2.1 2.4
39 7.9 5.9 4.0 4.7
Note:
Wages refer to hourly wage of workers of both sexes. Relative 
wage in branch i is compiled by dividing the wage in branch i by 
the average wage of all branches. Variability is calculated by 
estimating the coefficient of variation (standard deviation / 
mean) in each branch relative wage over the selected periods. The 
number of observations in each period is 1966-88:23, 1968-74:7,
1975-81:7, 1982-88:7. For keys see Table 4.3.3.
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Table 4.4.1
CASES OF COLLECTIVE DISMISSALS UNDER MINISTER OF LABOUR JURISDICTION
1983-1986
Period
Total
Number
of
Employees
Number of 
Employees 
Planned to 
Be Dismissed
Ministerial
Decision
1983&
Firm 1 230 96 Authorisation Denied
Firm 2 3000 96 Agreement after Consultation
Firm 3 80 29 Authorisation Denied
Firm 4 100 49 Agreement after Consultation
1984
Firm 5 153 12 Authorisation Granted
Firm 6 183 49 Authorisation Denied
Firm 7 67 7 Authorisation Denied
Firm 8 335 100 Authorisation Denied
Firm 9 228 75 Authorisation Denied
Firm 10 140 75 Authorisation Denied
1985
No Cases — —
1986^
Firm 11 , , 10 Agreement after Consultation
Firm 12 61 31 Authorisation Granted
Firm 13 297 297 Authorisation Granted
Firm 14 142 39 Authorisation Denied
Firm 15 289 109 Authorisation Denied
Firm 16 906 225 Authorisation Granted
Firm 17 2350 200 Authorisation Granted
Notes : a. September- December.
b. January-October. 
Source: Sabethai (1986:40).
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CASES OF COLLECTIVE
Table 4.4.2
DISMISSALS UNDER PREFECTS' JURISDICTION 
1983-1986
Period
Total
Number
of
Employees
Number of 
Employees 
Planned to 
Be Dismissed
Ministerial
Decision
1983&
Firm 1 28 Authorisation Denied
Firm 2 Authorisation Denied
1984
Firm 3 179 179 Authorisation Denied
Firm 4 185 51 Authorisation Denied
Firm 5 140 26 Authorisation Granted
Firm 6 , , 5% Authorisation Denied
Firm 7 30 Authorisation Denied
1985
Firm 8 • • • • Authorisation Denied
1986^
Firm 9 . . , , Authorisation Denied
Firm 10 , , Authorisation Denied
Firm 11 40 15 Authorisation Granted
Firm 12 150 75 Authorisation Denied
Notes : a. September- December.
b. January-October. 
Source: Sabethai (1986:40).
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Table 4.4.3
RATE OF CHANGE IN MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT IN OECD COUNTRIES
Selected Periods
Period 1960-68
Country
1968-73 1973-79 1979-87 1960-87
U.S. 2.3 0.2 1.1 -0.9 0.7
Japan 4.1 2.0 -1.3 0.8 1.5
Germany 0.3 0.9 -1.4 -1.0 -0.3
France 0.5 2.1 -0.9 -2.3 -0.3
U.K. -0.3 -1.0 -1.3 -4.2 -1.8
Italy 0.8 0.4 0.2 -1.8 -0.2
Canada 2.8 2.1 1.5 -0.1 1.5
Austria -0.7 1.8 -0.7 -1.5 -0.5
Belgium 0.6 0.2 —3.3 -2.5 1.3
Denmark 0.1 1.5 -1.5 0.5 0.1
Finland 1.0 4.8 -0.1 -1.0 0.8
Greece 1.9 5.0 1.6 1.4 2.2
Iceland —0.5 5.1 3.3 1.4 1.9
Ireland 1.6 1.8 1.2 -2.0 0.5
Luxemburg 0.7 —2.2 -1.5
Netherlands 0.3 -0.9 -1.9 -0.7 -0.7
Norway 1.0 -0.2 -1.1
Portugal 0.6 0.9
Spain 2.5 -2.0
Sweden 0.1 -1.3 —0.6
Switzerland 1.4 0.1 -2.6 —0.4 -0.3
Turkey 3.6 3.4 1.7 3.1 3.0
Australia 1.1 1.6 -1.7 —0.6 0.0
New Zealand 2.7 0.8 0.7
Total EEC 0.5 0.6 -0.9 -1.9 —0.5
Total OECD 1.6 0.8 -0.4 -0.9 0.3
Note: Average annual percentage1 rates of change between
periods indicated.
Source: OECD 1988, Labour Force Statistics , Table 1.10, page 28.
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SHARE OF
Table 4.4.4
MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT IN OECD COUNTRIES
Selected Periods
Period
Country
1960-67 1968-73 1974-79 1980-87 1960-87
U.S. 26.8 25.8 23.0 20.2 23.9
Japan 23.7 26.9 25.4 24.7 25.0
Germany 35.3 36.6 35.1 32.7 34.8
France 27.6 27.6 27.2 23.9 26.4
U.K. 37.4 36.1 32.6 26.3 32.9
Italy 26.0 27.9 27.5 24.5 26.3
Canada 25.0 23.8 21.7 19.7 22.5
Austria 31.7 32.1 31.2 28.7 30.8
Belgium 39.1 36.5 31.5 26.0 33.2
Denmark 24.6 17.9
Finland 26.8 28.5 28.0 25.2 26.9
Greece 13.1 16.5 19.1 19.4 16.9
Iceland 24.0 22.4 23.0 23.0 23.2
Ireland 18.3 20.3 21.2 19.9 19.8
Luxemburg 33.5 30.4 24.8
Netherlands 29.4 27.0 23.8 20.0 25.0
Norway 26.1 22.6 18.3
Portugal 23.3 24.1 25.1 25.5
Spain 25.1 26.8 26.2 23.8 25.3
Sweden 31.4 28.3 26.4 22.8 27.2
Switzerland 38.5 36.5 33.0 30.3 34.6
Turkey 8.3 10.1 10.9 11.5 10.2
Australia 29.2 26.4 23.1 19.9 24.6
New Zealand 27.4 26.9 24.9
Total EEC 29.7 30.1 28.7 25.2 28.3
Total OECD 26.9 27.2 25.3 22.6 25.4
Note: Employment in manufacturing as percentage of
civilian employment.
Source: OECD 1988, Labour Force Statistics, Table 2.11, page 37.
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Table 4.4.5
SHARE OF AND CHANGE IN MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT IN GREECE
1965-1988
Manufacturing Share Aggregate Branches
in Total Employment Manufacturing Expanding
Employment Employment
Year All Employees" SWE" WE" SWE WE
(share %) (annual change %) (out of 20)
1965 5.93 5.18 19 18
1966 3.77 2.26 17 16
1967 -1.45 -2.88 12 8
1968 -1.96 -3.82 10 9
1969 2.10 1.51 12 11
1970 11.06 10.76 19 17
1971 17.14® 27.35® 6.56 6.42 17 15
1972 5.21 4.70 18 17
1973 7.64 6.41 19 17
1974 10.50 10.44 20 18
1975 26.68 29.03 1.19 0.64 9 8
1976 27.59 29.83 5.09 0.50 14 11
1977 27.66 29.84 2.58 1.84 14 11
1978 27.28 29.35 0.57 -0.56 8 5
1979 27.11 29.30 0.22 -0.41 12 9
1980 26.43 29.27 -1.27 -2.54 6 5
1981 19.29 28.52 -1.23 -2.84 4 2
1982 19.26 27.56 -2.18 -3.90 4 1
1983 19.19 27.47 9.27 12.48 15 16
1984 19.11 27.21 -0.07 -0.51 9 6
1985 18.91 26.59 3.10 0.07 13 11
1986 19.93 28.20 0.10 —0.62 7 7
1987 19.90 27.44 -1.30 -2.77 7 6
1988 1.03 —0.68 9 7
Average
1967-74 - - 6.03 5.20 16 14
1975-81 26.01 29.31 0.85 -0.57 10 7
1982-88 19.38 27.41 1.77 1.07 9 8
Notes: a. All types of (employment included. i.e. employers.
employees, self-employed and unpaid family workers.
b. Only salary and wage earners included.
c. Salary and Wage Earners.
d.
Sources;a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
Wage Earners.
NSSG, Annual Labour Force Survey, Table 7 
1985-88) and Table 8 (for 1984).
As for a.
Table A4.4.11.
Table 4.4.11.
Census 1971, Vol. 3, Table 8, page 225.
(for 1975-83
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Table 4.4.6
SHARE OF SALARY EARNERS IN MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT BY BRANCH
1965-1988
Year 1965 
Branch
1970 1975
share
1980 
per cent
1985 1988
20 23.78 24.88 23.99 26.21 31.25 32.85
21 37.41 40.34 41.86 42.68 52.73 58.54
22 7.67 13.01 13.49 18.53 21.94 24.67
23 10.63 13.50 14.60 20.13 18.49 20.98
24 8.61 9.74 8.47 8.00 11.77 12.33
25 8.16 11.19 15.90 19.40 30.40 33.65
26 12.08 10.63 11.47 18.52 17.84 17.53
27 15.16 25.78 27.70 32.97 38.04 50.42
28 36.92 33.55 36.36 39.98 54.56 54.69
29 6.93 9.51 9.01 14.82 16.77 16.65
30 17.45 20.97 22.55 20.99 27.50 29.87
31 32.71 44.76 50.10 60.47 56.76 59.15
32 58.33 64.13 73.00 73.79 81.08 82.56
33 14.98 23.09 29.97 32.57 39.34 42.38
34 16.92 31.63 30.64 34.37 41.62 43.56
35 12.21 16.39 20.16 26.88 27.94 31.92
36 11.70 15.87 20.78 27.21 33.05 37.99
37 23.87 27.46 32.03 36.80 45.98 47.78
38 22.20 23.08 26.24 45.63 45.38 48.37
39 12.19 13.68 14.16 19.23 28.68 30.66
All 17.13 21.71 23.55 29.61 32.32 34.93
Note: For keys see Table 4.3.3.
Sources: 1965-1975, NSSG, Annual Industrial Survey, Table 6.
1976-1988, NSSG, Labour Force Statistics, Table 3.
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Table 4.4.7
SHARE OF FEMALE EMPLOYEES IN MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT BY BRANCH
1976-1988
Year 1976 1980 1984 1988
Branch share per cent
20 43.65 44.59 43.04 42.47
21 25.31 25.23 23.13 23.71
22 57.30 55.76 56.81 50.39
23 58.66 57.18 55.41 53.14
24 76.57 81.40 74.93 76.01
25 22.36 23.83 28.80 19.76
26 8.65 10.83 13.89 11.11
27 27.96 26.68 23.26 23.75
28 27.97 27.43 34.56 31.23
29 30.70 34.80 39.66 39.48
30 38.75 40.99 31.51 26.89
31 35.41 36.12 33.86 33.93
32 10.82 12.53 10.34 9.75
33 17.16 14.06 12.40 16.50
34 4.21 4.97 6.50 5.36
35 21.22 22.30 17.39 18.47
36 7.10 7.03 7.82 9.10
37 25.22 30.48 26.34 22.62
38 6.11 6.25 7.28 6.47
39 51.39 50.56 39.68 38.75
All 35.26 36.48 36.83 35.62
Note: Share of female employees in total employment of
salary and wage earners.
Source: NSSG, Labour Force Statistics, Table 3.
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Table 4.4.8
CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT OF WAGE EARNERS IN MANUFACTURING BY BRANCH
Selected Periods
Period
Branch
1967/74 1975/81 1982/88 
change per cent
1965/88
20 38.12 —14.62 42.63 75.52
21 47.90 —16.33 14.48 69.41
22 -31.21 8.36 -15.63 —54.65
23 26.08 -5.18 6.93 25.54
24 131.44 9.54 29.91 282.65
25 52.57 —16.66 —9.04 1.54
26 59.78 -19.70 4.19 19.33
27 —0 .86 -8.64 11.35 -1.24
28 18.93 -16.37 -11.13 -19.48
29 2.34 -12.82 33.50 -0.20
30 39.61 24.31 -19.41 76.55
31 28.99 -13.31 31.76 23.12
32 102.25 20.46 -13.02 82.03
33 11.20 -14.01 21.24 1.86
34 83.58 -22.41 23.57 113.31
35 45.50 1.23 -7.85 20.33
36 33.52 -12.83 -28.46 -21.31
37 79.05 —16.96 —4 .44 28.26
38 122.04 24.69 -28.38 70.79
39 80.83 -34.01 35.73 70.01
All 41.58 -4.02 7.47 40.28
Number of 
Branches with 
Expanding 
Employment 18 6 11 15
Sources: 1967-1975, NSSG, Annual Industrial Survey, Table 6.
1976-1988, NSSG, Labour Force Statistics, Table 3.
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Table 4.4.9
DISTRIBUTION OF WAGE EARNERS ACROSS MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
1965-1988
Year
Branch
1965 1970 1975 
per cent
1980 1985 1988
20 12.04 13.73 12.94 11.56 13.76 15.07
21 1.52 2.05 2.03 1.91 2.12 1.83
22 7.48 4.38 2.71 3.08 2.50 2.42
23 21.85 19.31 19.84 20.17 19.43 19.55
24 5.92 7.28 11.26 12.52 15.58 16.14
25 2.77 3.10 2.83 2.59 2.15 2.00
26 2.17 2.47 2.37 1.97 1.82 1.84
27 2.83 2.50 2.06 1.99 2.25 1.99
28 2.55 2.69 2.19 2.16 1.49 1.46
29 2.03 1.65 1.29 1.20 1.64 1.45
30 2.99 3.30 3.69 4.65 4.01 3.76
31 4.60 4.04 3.67 3.24 4.12 4.03
32 0.31 0.38 0.38 0.54 0.36 0.40
33 8.08 7.28 5.97 5.60 6.11 5.87
34 1.50 2.31 2.56 2.24 2.63 2.28
35 7.06 6.91 6.83 6.79 6.21 6.06
36 3.58 3.67 3.27 2.99 2.27 2.01
37 4.06 5.15 4.69 4.19 3.83 3.71
38 5.85 6.67 8.22 9.60 6.80 7.12
39 0.82 1.14 1.20 0.98 0.91 1.00
All 100 100 100 100 100 100
(20, 23,
24, 38) 45.66 46.99 52.26 53.85 55.57 57.88
Total 181430 194846 256752 253616 265184 254502
Sources: 1965-1975, NSSG, Annual Industrial Survey, Table 6.
1976-1988, NSSG, Labour Force Statistics, Table 3.
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Table 4.4.10
AVERAGE EMPLOYMENT OF WAGE EARNERS IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
Selected Periods
Average
1967-74
Branch
Average
1975-81
Share
%
Share
%
Average
1982-88
Share
%
Average
1966-88
Share
%
20 26603 13.02 29953 11.65 34549 13.38 29895 12.67
21 4232 2.07 4965 1.93 5054 1.96 4663 1.98
22 8561 4.19 7840 3.05 6589 2.55 7926 3.36
23 40390 19.76 50331 19.58 50291 19.47 46426 19.68
24 15982 7.82 31277 12.17 40567 15.71 27908 11.83
25 6339 3.10 6534 2.54 5687 2.20 6150 2.61
26 4734 2.32 5801 2.26 4987 1.93 5103 2.16
27 5113 2.50 5255 2.04 5713 2.21 5352 2.27
28 5135 2.51 5726 2.23 4244 1.64 5029 2.13
29 3172 1.55 3217 1.25 3866 1.50 3410 1.45
30 7110 3.48 11271 4.39 10846 4.20 9463 4.01
31 8333 4.08 8487 3.30 10844 4.20 9150 3.88
32 635 0.31 1476 0.57 1031 0.40 1002 0.42
33 14538 7.11 14987 5.83 15156 5.87 14880 6.31
34 4730 2.31 5761 2.24 6057 2.35 5388 2.28
35 14023 6.86 17385 6.76 16470 6.38 15737 6.67
36 7290 3.57 8770 3.41 5880 2.28 7283 3.09
37 10967 5.37 11235 4.37 9708 3.76 10499 4.45
38 14254 6.98 23860 9.28 18424 7.13 18288 7.75
39 2213 1.08 2890 1.12 2269 0.88 2409 1.02
All 204353 100 257021 100 258232 100 235962 100
(20 23
24 38) 47.85 55.16 57.58 53.53
Sources; 1967-1975, NSSG, Annual Industrial Survey, Table 6.
1976-1988, NSSG, Labour Force Statistics, Table 3.
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Table 4.4.11
ANNUAL CHANGES IN MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT OF WAGE EARNERS BY BRANCH
1965-1988
Year 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Branch
20 1.59 6.47 -0.56 -3.13 3.76 15.06
21 9.63 18.62 12.06 -7.95 -2.88 21.72
22 7.68 -5.66 -15.10 -8.91 -13.84 0.02
23 0.80 1.72 -4.68 -7.22 -2.51 8.25
24 4.51 3.60 3.94 0.10 -0.43 23.16
25 15.35 3.37 1.75 -4.28 5.93 12.66
26 1.95 1.07 -0.18 0.50 -3.96 25.57
27 15.75 5.45 -1.26 -1.80 -3.90 -3.39
28 -0.79 3.78 0.21 -4.51 0.28 13.84
29 -2.12 -5.74 -0.37 -6.17 -2.34 0.94
30 2.92 9.61 2.88 2.55 13.21 -9.43
31 19.46 1.45 -10.26 2.66 3.59 -2.44
32 2.97 -23.78 5.20 6.29 -0.42 59.02
33 14.76 1.78 -3.21 -6.94 -2.04 7.68
34 24.20 23.49 -0.30 0.98 20.60 10.18
35 1.89 -0.15 -6.35 0.44 1.70 10.01
36 4.74 2.46 -0.26 -6.18 7.02 7.31
37 1.32 -3.22 9.84 0.18 10.05 16.19
38 5.27 0.08 -9.27 -5.05 14.73 23.86
39 13.47 6.84 2.51 0.55 0.37 34.34
All 5.18 2.26 -2.88 -3.82 1.51 10.76
Year
Branch
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
20 5.01 0.47 2.89 10.01 3.99 -8.01
21 12.62 5.55 3.84 10.10 -3.77 —5.31
22 -2.74 -10.04 -1.38 1.55 -6.91 14.87
23 6.41 6.03 7.66 6.01 5.15 -0.62
24 9.80 11.01 12.09 38.02 8.04 -4.33
25 5.45 9.59 8.94 6.08 -9.78 -9.93
26 0.10 4.22 2.09 23.77 -4.02 10.21
27 2.40 1.24 -0.42 5.32 -0.32 5.71
28 -0.04 1.94 2.86 4.07 -1.73 12.24
29 -0.65 -13.34 0.54 27.81 -6.31 -1.77
30 6.94 9.53 6.64 6.30 10.92 13.62
31 -0.75 9.29 7.48 6.64 -3.76 -4.63
32 -10.81 3.89 -2.59 33.14 9.78 73.18
33 5.54 -0.79 2.42 5.62 -4.57 3.28
34 7.04 11.08 15.36 —0.26 6.64 -9.94
35 3.78 8.07 5.96 8.95 0.58 -5.78
36 1.66 1.18 11.19 8.34 -5.31 12.80
37 18.15 10.16 10.54 -2.85 -14.21 4.20
38 20.57 7.11 6.71 19.40 -1.34 7.87
39 5.78 6.53 11.30 6.34 4.67 8.83
All 6.42 4.70 6.41 10.44 0.64 0.50
(continued)
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Table 4.3.11 (continued)
ANNUAL CHANGES IN MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT OF WAGE EARNERS BY BRANCH
1965-1988
Year 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Branch
20 -1.08 -0.99 -6.33 4.61 -3.30 -5.22
21 2.45 3.47 -2.44 -4.91 -10.13 -6.52
22 4.22 -2.84 0.01 -3.46 -3.52 -3.29
23 0.85 -1.56 —0.61 2.37 -5.55 -3.66
24 10.46 7.65 8.06 —10.67 -0.25 -0.13
25 1.27 -4.38 -0.24 3.91 -7.82 -7.48
26 -4.48 -6.41 —7.60 -9.55 -2.47 -7.82
27 -1.54 -3.11 -2.41 -2.84 —4 .46 -5.66
28 -3.05 -3.52 0.55 -7.78 -14.10 -10.87
29 2.78 2.26 -6.59 -5.31 -4.53 -4.77
30 1.54 6.93 6.96 -5.53 -0.28 0.91
31 -7.96 -1.49 0.36 0.61 -0.72 —4.64
32 4.61 -9.07 1.54 -16.79 -13.45 -2.42
33 -0.31 -0.97 -4.26 -4.99 -7.28 -6.54
34 -3.06 -1.98 1.53 -0.32 -10.41 -7.69
35 5.96 0.53 0.01 -2.10 3.02 -5.74
36 4.62 —0.80 -9.09 -15.11 -3.53 -2.36
37 -8.39 -1.77 -5.31 -0.63 -5.89 -1.02
38 9.18 -5.60 3.02 0.77 8.04 -3.85
39 -2.14 -7.74 -3.95 -14.59 -18.13 -8.44
All 1.84 -0.56 —0.41 -2.54 -2.84 -3.90
Year 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Branch
20 19.89 10.50 2.47 -1.74 1.61 5.24
21 28.59 5.67 1.41 -5.76 -6.58 -5.63
22 -4.84 -8.22 3.92 9.71 -25.05 13.05
23 5.85 0.28 4.29 3.48 -2.00 -4.76
24 40.22 -0.37 -6.47 -1.23 -0.48 1.14
25 16.80 -9.28 -3.83 -1.23 -6.70 -3.13
26 32.25 -7.97 -12.03 -3.39 3.21 -2.40
27 27.02 -1.16 4.47 3.85 7.72 -24.10
28 26.86 -9.15 -18.11 -2.56 -0.87 -2.52
29 34.14 11.43 5.46 3.13 -11.94 -6.74
30 1.39 -2.74 -9.16 -2.86 -5.72 -1.77
31 65.72 -4.67 -11.28 0.96 -3.04 -3.97
32 -5.03 -5.51 -8.32 -2.10 7.90 0.09
33 27.44 -0.48 3.73 —0.80 -5.18 -2.03
34 27.51 4.81 11.09 -3.90 -12.07 -1.50
35 3.21 -1.38 -3.28 0.90 -4.89 -2.45
36 -14.66 -0.72 -0.26 -7.61 -7.36 -1.08
37 3.65 -11.76 12.23 -2.49 -6.44 2.05
38 -30.40 -5.70 8.56 -8.09 1.06 8.22
39 10.03 2.31 15.22 0.22 1.73 2.64
All 12.48 -0.51 0.07 -0.62 -2.77 —0.68
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CHAPTER 5: RELATIVE WAGE FLEXIBILITY IN GREEK MANUFACTURING
5.1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.
Given the extent of wage and employment regulation in Greece, as 
analysed in earlier chapters, this chapter examines the formation 
of relative wages at a disaggregated level of analysis. It 
focuses upon flexibility in relative wages at the level of two- 
digit industrial branches. In theory there can be three different 
situations. First, there can be lack of flexibility, second, 
there can be competitive flexibility and third, non-competitive 
flexibility may be observed. While the distinction between 
rigidity and flexibility is rather a matter of degree differences 
with regard to market outcomes, the distinction between 
competitive and non-competitive flexibility is, rather, a matter 
of kind.
This chapter examines the extent to which, the Greek 
manufacturing wage structure was responsive or not either to 
competitive influences or to industry-specific conditions. 
Industry-specific changes in productivity, rates of strike 
activity and changes in employment are examined as potential 
sources of non-competitive flexibility in relative wages. 
Moreover, as the two different types of flexibility may exert 
opposite influence upon labour allocation and employment growth, 
this chapter discusses the extent to which the asymmetric 
response of wages to productivity, if any, was employment
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enhancing or not.
Section 5.2 discusses the theoretical aspects of competitive and 
non-competitive flexibility in industry wages and the relevant 
findings of the empirical research in this area. Section 5.3 
clarifies the hypotheses which are tested in this chapter and 
presents the methodology adopted. Section 5.4 presents and 
discusses the findings of the bivariate correlation analysis for 
testing the competitive hypothesis. Section 5.5 presents and 
discusses the results of the cross-section regression analysis 
for industry-specific determinants of relative wages. Finally, 
Section 5.6 summarises the conclusions on relative wage 
flexibility in Greek manufacturing.
Our analysis suggests that over the period 1966-88 the 
manufacturing labour market operated far from the competitive 
model, with the noticeable exception of the 1967-74 sub-period, 
during which competitive forces were given a chance and showed 
themselves up. But throughout the 1966-88 period non-competitive 
flexibility associated with industry-specific changes in 
productivity in the long-run, and industry-specific rates of 
strike activity in the short-run, characterised relative wages in 
the Greek manufacturing sector. Furthermore, over the period
1977-88, the asymmetric response of industry wages to changes in 
industry productivity hindered employment growth. Overall, the 
analysis suggests that wage and employment regulation disfavoured 
competitive flexibility and provided an environment conducive to 
non-competitive flexibility.
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5.2. RELATIVE WAGE FLEXIBILITY AND RELATIVE EMPLOYMENT.
5.2.1. The Flexibility Debate and Relative Wages.
Most of the theoretical issues underlying the labour market 
flexibility debate are not new. But only since the early 1980s, 
have they become in the centre of the interest of economists, 
industrial relation specialists and politicians. The flexibility 
debate mounted to address the failure of the traditional 
mechanisms of wage and employment regulation to allow for 
necessary adjustments in face of changing international economic 
conditions in the 1970s. Since then the boundaries of the 
flexibility debate, both in theory and in policy making, have not 
been stable.
In a bibliographical essay on the labour market flexibility 
literature Gaudier (1987) aimed to show the state of the 
discussion of labour market flexibility under way in 
industrialised countries. On the central question what is 
flexibility she concluded that "interpretation depends on 
cultural, scientific and organisational factors that broaden the 
range of meanings ascribed to it and of the circumstances it 
covers". However, from the analysis it is made clear that labour 
costs, conditions of employment and hours of work are the mostly 
discussed issues. Moreover, Gaudier (1987:44) pointed that 
"wages are in the forefront of the battle" as the most frequent 
criticisms are of wage determination and indexing systems.
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centralised wage bargaining, rigid opposition to reduction of 
wages and increase of wages without any counterpart in increased 
productivity.
Developments in labour markets with regard to flexibility lead to 
similarly varied conclusions. The comparative anthology by 
Sarfati and Cobrin (1988) illustrated some of the fundamental 
developments in labour market flexibility and summarised the 
evidence on different forms of flexibility. On the latter issue, 
Sarfati and Cobrin argued that "there are as many forms of 
flexibility as there are components in the employment 
relationship" and that "they all form the subject of compromises 
which reflect a number of parameters specific to the country, the 
sector or the enterprise in question". In the same line of 
argument Sarfati and Cobrin (1988:39) stress that "there is a 
general move towards greater flexibility, but ... the methods of 
achieving it vary according to the economic, social and 
institutional context in each country".
However, despite of the wide variety of approaches and issues 
raised in the flexibility debate, the review of the literature as 
well as of policy developments suggests that in several countries 
and in particular those with more centralised bargaining systems 
and indexation policies, such as Italy, Spain, Belgium, Denmark 
and Australia, the flexibility debate is mainly focused upon 
policies for wage moderation and de-indexation. Furthermore, 
from the technical report of OECD (1986) and Metcalf s (1987) 
survey of evidence on labour market flexibility , we can infer 
that, in the broad area of issues raised by the flexibility
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debate, the issue of wages remains central. Indeed, the issue of 
relative wages can be considered as one key issue of wage 
flexibility.
With regard to relative wage flexibility three situations can be 
defined. In theory, these three situations may imply varying 
consequences as far as labour allocation and employment growth 
are concerned. First, the situation of wage rigidity refers to 
wages lacking responsiveness to either unfavourable macro- or 
micro-economic changes. In such a situation, the labour market 
adjusts through quantities, that is employment and unemployment. 
Second, the competitive flexibility situation in which wage 
flexibility, by definition, allocates employment efficiently and, 
thus, enhances employment growth. Third, the non-competitive 
flexibility situation when the causes of and gains from 
flexibility are related to industry-specific factors such as 
productivity and unionisation. In such a case, the employment 
consequences of wage flexibility may be either positive or 
negative.
5.2.2. Competitive Flexibility in Relative Wages.
In the ideal world of competitive and clearing labour markets 
there is not much room for unemployment and inefficient 
allocation of labour. Relative wages adjust any imbalances and, 
thus, after all, they only reflect skill differences. Competitive 
flexibility in relative wages delivers, by definition, efficient 
allocation of labour and employment growth.
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According to the competitive model, given the short-run 
inelasticity in labour supply, relative wages play an essential 
allocative role. They are used to attract workers in expanding 
sectors. Therefore, there should be a positive relation between 
wage and employment changes. In the context of either structural 
changes or business cycle fluctuations, greater wage growth will 
be observed in expanding compared to contracting sectors. As 
already mentioned, according to the competitive model the 
relationship of greater wage growth in expanding sectors should 
be observed only in the short-run, because, only then is labour 
supply considered to be relatively inelastic. Overall, recent 
and past evidence, summarised in OECD (1985:93-94) and Metcalf 
(1987:62-63), shows that there is no strong, and sometimes not 
even positive, significant correlation between employment and 
wage changes in the short-run.
But the lack of strong evidence supporting the competitive model 
with regard to the positive relationship between changes in 
employment and changes in wages is not considered as invalidating 
the competitive theory itself. In the literature two types of 
explanation have been offered. They both call for more 
sophisticated technical elaboration of the prevailing labour 
market conditions and focus on the conditions required for a 
positive correlation between changes in wages and employment to 
be observed.
In the first type of explanation is stressed that the short-run 
elasticity of labour supply is also affected by the state of the
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labour market. If there is high unemployment then the short-run 
labour supply may be relatively more elastic than in a tight 
labour market. This implies that in periods of either loose or 
tight labour market the role of wage differentials may vary 
considerably. From the existing evidence, which overall does not 
strongly support the competitive model, and in particular that 
summarised by Reder (1962:290) and OECD (1985:94), it can be 
inferred that the little evidence which supports the competitive 
hypothesis refers mainly to periods of low unemployment and tight 
labour markets, where the short-run supply of labour is more 
inelastic.
In the second type of explanation belongs the methodological 
criticism, developed by Keating (1983) and Withers et al (1983), 
of the bivariate correlation analysis as inappropriate for 
testing the competitive model. Both emphasise that the influence 
of relative wages changes on the distribution of employment can 
only be adequately assessed if supply effects are distinguished 
and there is a separate consideration of shifts in the supply of 
labour from shifts in demand. Though, both authors point out the 
difficulties, mainly arising from data unavailability, for 
applying this type of analysis.
If relative wages are not sensitive to increasing employment ' in 
the short-run, then what is the alternative method through which 
firms attempt to attract or retain their labour force? Metcalf 
(1987:61-62), reiterated Reddaway* s institutional approach to 
the wage-employment relationship. This approach by Reddaway
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(1959) was emphasised as the alternative to the competitive 
model. While in the competitive model labour allocation works 
through price signals, in the institutional approach labour 
allocation works through quantity signals for vacancies. In the 
institutional approach "the essential characteristic is that the 
main way in which employment will either be increased or reduced 
is through direct action by the employers and that only 
exceptionally will they have to include a change in the relative 
wage offered in order to secure the desired number of 
workers". (Reddaway, 1959:33).
Thus, relative wage flexibility is not considered as the only way 
for efficient allocation of labour. Indeed, as Pissarides and 
McMaster (1984:1-2) pointed out "quantity signals could also 
signal relative labour requirements and the reallocation of 
labour could take place regardless of relative wages". This could 
happen through the higher vacancy rate in the expanding sectors. 
"Generally a higher vacancy rate implies a lower incidence of 
unemployment in the sector. Workers interested in maximising 
incomes over a long horizon would respond positively to such 
change ... they would move to the expanding sector to take 
advantage of the improved employment prospects. In this way 
labour could be reallocated between sectors and so some kind of 
market mechanism would work, without changes in relative wages".
5.2.3. Non-Competitive Flexibilitv in Relative Wages.
In a competitive labour market relative wages are not influenced 
by different rates of productivity growth unless the latter
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reflects changes in occupational composition of the labour force. 
Supply and demand adjust in terms of wages and employment so that 
the gains from different rates of productivity are equally 
distributed across the board via employment and wage growth. 
While relative wage flexibility is not the only way for efficient 
labour allocation, relative wage flexibility, when observed, does 
not imply that wages are responsive to competitive forces. 
Reddaway in his analysis of the institutional approach, where 
employers do not use the wage (price) signals as the main 
mechanism for increasing or decreasing employment, discussed 
also the case of non-competitive flexibility in relative wages. 
The same case has been recently analysed by Freeman and Bell
(1985).
Even when a positive association between change in wages and 
employment had been observed, Reddaway noticed the possibility 
that institutional industry-specific factors, unions for 
instance, might had caused that association. For instance, when 
demand for labour increases, unions may capture this opportunity 
and capitalise upon it by increasing their wage premium. In 
Reddaway* s (1959:44) own words, **a higher wage might be 
necessary to attract workers to an expanding industry, or it 
might simply reflect the fact that the union concerned has taken 
advantage of the increasing level of demand to negotiate a higher 
wage, even though enough workers would in fact have been 
forthcoming at the old wage in response to offers of employment. 
We cannot hope to establish that the wage increase was necessary 
to attract workers, we can only see what in fact happened".
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In fact, the rationale described by Reddaway reappears in Bell 
and Freeman* s definition of non-competitive flexibility. 
According to Freeman (1987:2) non-competitive flexibility refers 
to the situation "in which changes in wages respond to conditions 
that are not associated with supply and demand factors and thus 
do not facilitate employment changes. Our example of non­
competitive flexibility would be wage increases in a highly 
profitable high-wage firm that is not necessary to attract or 
retain labour. Another would be union-induced increases for 
workers already paid above-market rates." The slight difference 
between Reddaway*s and Freeman * s definition is that Reddaway put 
the emphasis upon union influence which, in turn, might have been 
strengthened in conditions of expanding employment. Bell and 
Freeman, as they sought a basis for comparisons to the findings 
of the study by Salter (1960) as well as to past work on the 
U.S. wage structure, emphasised productivity as the key 
industry-specific factor in shaping relative wages, without 
dealing with either other conditions or the processes which allow 
relative wages to follow changes in productivity.
The recent evidence on the existence of industry-specific non­
competitive flexibility stresses the importance of this type of 
flexibility. Salter (1960) in his analysis of inter-industry wage 
structure in the U.K., found that changes in wages among 
industries were unrelated to industry conditions, and in 
particular were not related to changes in productivity. He 
interpreted this as indicating the operation of a competitive
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labour market. Bell and Freeman (1985) reported a different 
result. They found the U.S. wages rising most rapidly in sectors 
having rapid increases in productivity and/or product prices. An 
OECD (1985) study found weaker tendencies of industry-specific 
factors which influence wage changes. For the 1979-84 period in 
U.K. manufacturing. Freeman (1987) found relations between 
industry-specific productivity growth and wage growth that were 
quite strong and in contrast to the earlier findings by Salter. 
In other words, the evidence suggest that, even if this is not 
consistent with the competitive hypothesis, changes in wages 
which reflect industry level conditions consist a form of wage 
flexibility which sometimes may be found rather important.
5.2.4. Non-Comoetitive Flexibilitv and Employment Growth.
As already mentioned, recent evidence suggests that in many cases 
the existing flexibility is related to industry-specific factors 
rather than to the competitive working of the labour market. In 
theory the non-competitive flexibility can boost or lower 
aggregate employment. Therefore when changes in productivity are 
the key industry-specific factor influencing relative wages, the 
question is whether the positive relation between changes in 
wages and changes in productivity is employment enhancing or 
employment hindering. Freeman and Bell (1985) analysed this issue 
on theoretical grounds and tested for the employment consequences 
of industry wage flexibility in the U.S. According to this 
analysis the positive relation between growth of industry 
productivity and growth of industry wages may boost employment if
219
wages respond more to relative declines in productivity than to 
relative increases in productivity. Only such an asymmetry in the 
response of wages to changes in industry productivity may result 
to a net positive outcome in terms of employment growth. Because 
more jobs may be "saved" in industries where wages are more 
responsive to relative declines in productivity, and less jobs 
may be "forgone" in industries where wages are less responsive to 
relative increase in productivity.
In practical terms ,the required asymmetry should exist between 
two broad sectors which are defined in terms of above-average and 
below-average changes in productivity. As the OECD (1986:31) 
study summarised the rationale on the asymmetric response "if 
these two "sectors" are of equal size, have equal elasticities of 
labour demand, then greater employment than otherwise would have 
occurred will be observed only if there is significant asymmetry 
in the wage response. If the asymmetry hypothesis has any 
explanatory power, the coefficient [for sectors] of below-average 
changes in productivity should be positive significant and 
greater than that [for sectors] of above-average changes in 
productivity."
The evidence on the employment consequences of productivity- 
related flexibility in relative wages is contradictory. Freeman 
and Bell (1985) found that among U.S. industries in the 1970s, 
industries with rapid productivity growth tended to have lower 
rather than higher employment growth. This implies that, in that 
case, flexibility in relative wages was employment hindering. In
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other words, they found that kind of wage flexibility 
inconsistent with the competitive hypothesis as far as 
employment growth is concerned. Salter had addressed the same 
issue and had found a strong positive correlation between 
productivity growth and employment growth in the U.K. An OECD 
(1986) study found the opposite results for the U.S. than those 
presented by Bell and Freeman, and argued that the industry wage- 
productivity system in the U.S. was not employment hindering. It 
also found results supporting the asymmetrical wage response for 
Canada and Sweden as well.
These contradictory findings with regard to the employment 
consequences of industry-specific wage flexibility in the U.S. 
are mainly due to methodological differences in testing for the 
existence of asymmetry in the wage response to changes in 
productivity. Bell and Freeman (1985) in testing if such 
asymmetry holds for the U.S. allowed for asymmetric responses of 
wages to above- and below-average productivity increases. As the 
coefficient for sectors of above-average changes in productivity 
was found significant and greater than the coefficient for 
sectors of below-average changes in productivity, wages were 
found more flexible upward than downward. The OECD study 
reported, contrary to Bell and Freeman, that the U.S. wage 
structure did exhibit the required asymmetry. According to the 
OECD (1986:44) study the reason for these different results is 
caused by the specification of productivity changes as 
independent variable in the regression analysis. Bell and Freeman 
used as independent variable the actual industry wage changes.
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while the OECD study used the actual difference between each 
industry wage change and the average wage change across all 
industries, which stands for the industry relative wage change.
5.2.5. Summarv.
To summarise the analysis of this section, flexibility in 
relative wages can be either competitive or non-competitive. But 
even when the positive association between changes in employment 
and changes in wages is observed, it may be not evidence of 
competitive flexibility and, indeed, it may be due to industry- 
specific factors. Non-competitive flexibility may be caused by 
industry-specific factors such as productivity changes, union 
bargaining power, high profitability etc. In the relevant 
literature, productivity changes are considered as the key 
industry-specific factor influencing relative wages. The 
consequences of productivity-related wage flexibility on 
employment growth, given a positive association between changes 
in industry wages and industry productivity, depend upon the 
asymmetry of industry-specific wage flexibility with regard to 
productivity changes. When wages are more flexible upward 
(downward) than downward (upward), they may cause relative job 
losses (gains) and, thus, contribute to employment decline 
(growth).
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5.3. HYPOTHESES TO TEST AND THEIR RATIONALES.
5.3.1. Relative Wage Flexibilitv in the Context of Greek 
Industrial Relations?
Did any relative wage flexibility, competitive or non­
competitive, exist over the period 1966-88? The overall context 
of wage and employment regulation in the Greek manufacturing 
sector suggests that, prima facie, there was not much room for 
such flexibility. However, as Tables 4.3.6 and 4.3.7 indicate 
there was some variability in the wage structure. This 
variability should be explained. It seems reasonable to 
attribute part of the observed variability to incomes policies 
themselves, and to consider it as a by-product of them, to the 
extent that, during the period under consideration, they treated 
relative wages in varying ways.
Even if the regulation of wages and employment by successive 
governments have been conducive to rigidities in the labour 
market, this does not imply that, at the end of the day, the 
labour market outcomes should be considered as unilaterally 
determined by governmental policies. Governmental policies should 
rather be perceived as one source of influence among others. The 
extent of the influence exerted by market and institutional 
forces is a matter of evidence. Econometric tests can provide the 
basis for attributing the observed variability in relative wages 
either to incomes policies themselves, or to competitive and non­
competitive industry-specific factors lying beyond incomes policy
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and out of the range of governmental controls.
Wage regulation either by governmental policies or under 
collective bargaining between employers and trade-unions is 
neither a new phenomenon nor a Greek specific characteristic. It 
has been observed in the labour markets of Western developed 
economies since the early decades of the century. As Hicks 
(1932 ;vi) put it in the introduction of "The Theory of Wages" 
"the historical fact which dominates the wage history of the 
present century -both in Britain and in other countries- is the 
growth of Trade Unions power and the development of state 
regulation of wages...". But, according to Hicks " ... the same 
forces which determine wages in a free market are still present 
under regulation; they only work rather differently." Or, as he 
put it when dealing with the working of competition and the 
conception of the wages of labour as a "system", following Clay* 
s approach, "the forces elucidated by equilibrium analysis are 
the forces which, in nearly every case, cause wages to change." 
(Hicks, 1932:86).
This theoretical argument, according to which even in regulated 
labour markets, that is markets under conditions of state 
intervention and trade unions, the main forces of the competitive 
model should be considered as if they are still at work, 
provides the basis upon which our own hypotheses are built.
In the context of the U.K. economy, from which Hicks drew 
empirical observations for theorising, it may be true that 
competitive forces have been working even under governmental
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regulation and widespread collective bargaining. Indeed, what 
Hicks suggested may be true in the case of most industrialised 
market economies. The evidence discussed in Section 5.2 indicates 
that, to a certain extent, competitive forces have been at work 
regardless of institutional conditions. But whether or not this 
has happened in the case of Greece is a more open question, 
because Greece has followed a dissimilar trajectory in economic 
development as well as in the evolution of industrial relations. 
In Western developed economies there has been a sequence of 
developments which occurred during nearly a full century. This 
sequence is not observed in the case of Greece where developments 
such as industrialisation, governmental intervention and 
formation of trade-unionism occurred in a period of less than 
three decades.
In Western developed economies the industrialisation process was 
followed by the rise of trade-unionism and, then, its 
establishment as a functional part of the economy through 
institutions and processes for collective bargaining. Governments 
intervened in wage determination to control the bargaining power 
of trade-unions by adopting incomes policies. Recently, the 
flexibility drive was adopted in order to modify long-lasting 
characteristics in the workings of institutionalised labour 
markets.
In the case of Greece, similar phenomena were developed in a 
shorter period of time and without following the historical 
sequence of the Western developed economies. Industrialisation 
took place during the post-war period and mainly in the 1960s.
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Governments have been intervening in wage determination from the 
very beginning of the post-war industrialisation process. There 
has been no long tradition of trade-unionism and in manufacturing 
trade-unions have flourished since 1975, after a seven year 
period during which free trade-unionism, collective bargaining 
and strike activity were essentially banned.
In this context, it seems reasonable to assume that there have 
been important differences with regard to flexibility in relative 
wages between those national labour markets extensively studied 
in the flexibility literature, mainly those of the U.S. and the 
U.K., and the Greek labour market. Such differences may have been 
caused, first, by the degree of wage and employment regulation 
and its dominance in the working of the Greek manufacturing 
labour market, and second, by the incidence of major disturbances 
in the system of industrial relations in a short period of time. 
This is not to say that in the case of Greece "economic laws" 
have not been at work. It rather means that, presumably, they 
have not been allowed to work properly, or to the extent they 
have done in the context of other industrialised market 
economies.
Similar phenomena can probably be observed in other national 
labour markets and the relevant question about flexibility can be 
raised concerning every national labour market and its relative 
position in an international context. Up to the present it 
appears that there has been a gap in the OECD and EEC literature 
on labour market flexibility in countries such as Greece, Spain
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and Portugal which share some common characteristics as far as 
economic, political and industrial relations developments are 
concerned.
The Greek-specific characteristics which may have influenced 
flexibility in manufacturing relative wages have been discussed 
in earlier chapters, and include first, the incomes policies and 
the extensive use of compulsory arbitration, second, the 
legislation on collective dismissals, third, the conditions of 
rising manufacturing employment along with waves of migration of 
Greek labour abroad, fourth, the ban of the right to strike in 
1967-74 and the radical changes in manufacturing industrial 
relations initiated by the rise of strike activity and the 
creation the informal system of collective bargaining after 1975. 
This rich combination of factors, in the context of extensive and 
permanent regulation of wages and employment, may have created 
both rigidities and flexibilities depending on the exact blend of 
factors prevailing in distinct periods.
From this point of view, we address the questions whether the 
wage and employment regulation has buttressed wage rigidity and 
whether manufacturing wages have been flexible and to what 
extent. More specifically, we attempt to clarify whether or not 
forces which work in conditions of competitive labour markets, or 
forces related to industry-specific conditions have been 
present in the labour market of the Greek manufacturing sector 
and, thus, the extent to which there has been any scope for 
either competitive or non-competitive wage flexibility.
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Both types of flexibility are related to the firms and employees 
behaviour in the context of governmental, procedural and 
substantial, regulation. Therefore the underlying questions are; 
Given the governmental wage policies, what has been the role of 
firms and trade unions in the regulated labour market? Have they 
acted in line with forces that the competitive theory considers 
as present even under regulation? Have employers raised the wage 
rate to attract labour in expanding sectors, enhancing, thus, a 
better allocation of labour? Have employees shared any industry- 
specific gains such as rises in productivity? With what 
consequences upon employment allocation and growth? Have 
industry-specific factors been related to industrial relations 
such as high bargaining power or strike activity?
Finally, if any of the above phenomena are observed, do they 
refer to the full period under examination or they are associated 
with distinct sub-periods? In testing for the presence of 
competitive and non-competitive flexibility during four 
distinguishable periods, namely 1966-88, and the sub-periods 
1967-74, 1975-81 and 1982-88, the issue under investigation is
also whether there were period differences in the way that 
relative wages responded to competitive or industry-specific 
factors. This investigation may shed some light on the 
flexibility performance during each separate period and, through 
it, to the flexibility performance of distinct types of wage 
policy.
To address these questions on competitive and non-competitive 
flexibility in relative wages bivariate correlation analysis and
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cross-section regression analysis are combined. Both types of 
analysis can provide evidence on the function of relative wages 
over the period 1966-88 and its distinct sub-periods.
5.3.2. Competitive Flexibilitv in Relative Wages.
Overall, the long-lasting conditions of wage and employment 
regulations lead us to the hypothesis that there has been not 
much room for competitive forces to exert themselves in the
context of the Greek manufacturing sector. In other words, the
extensive regulation of the labour market may have not been in 
favour of the use of relative wages as a mean for labour
allocation.
Incomes policies, by restraining wage determination processes, 
presumably do not favour competitive flexibility in relative 
wages. Labour market conditions of relatively high urban
unemployment and the existence of the pool for unskilled labour 
in the primary sector do not exert pressures upon firms and 
employers to use higher relative wages as a means for attracting 
or retaining labour. The legislation on collective dismissals may 
have caused the firms to expand gradually their employment, at 
first through increased overtime work and then, when the need for 
expansion was not seasonal, through hiring new workers in a loose 
labour market.
However, we may expect episodes during which competitive forces 
were given a chance and showed themselves up, as there were
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important changes in the labour market conditions. The 
coexistence of high urban unemployment along with concealed 
unemployment and under-employment in the rural sector had created 
loose labour market conditions. Unskilled labour has never been 
in short supply. But in the late 1960s-early 1970s exceptional 
conditions were created in the labour market, especially in the 
manufacturing sector. Labour, mainly the skilled and semi­
skilled, became, partially due to massive migration abroad, in 
short supply. At the same time, as indicated in Table 4.3.2, the 
level of unemployment reached its lowest levels ever recorded in 
post-war Greece.
With regard to competitive flexibility in relative wages, we 
postulate that during the period 1967-74 were the prevailing 
conditions favourable for competitive forces to work in the 
manufacturing labour market, for four reasons. First, it was a 
period of low unemployment. Second, it was a period during which 
manufacturing employment was rapidly expanding across the board. 
Third, there were not trade-union activities and strikes. And 
fourth, for most of that period, changes in manufacturing wages 
imposed by the government in office were falling behind average 
productivity increases, creating thus, a space for manoeuvre
I
concerning industry wage setting for manufacturing employers.
Such preconditions were not observed in the following periods. 
First, the growth of manufacturing employment slowed down. 
Second, unemployment soared. Third, collective bargaining came 
back in the manufacturing sector via waves of wildcat strikes at 
the plant level. And, fourth, formal incomes policies limited
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the space for manoeuvre available to manufacturing employers. 
Since 1975 the continuous use of formal incomes policy created 
an environment not favourable for competitive relative wage 
flexibility. Of course, after 1975 tendencies towards more 
decentralised wage setting processes developed along with the re­
establishment of collective bargaining and the rise of the 
informal system of collective bargaining in the manufacturing 
sector. But such developments in the manufacturing bargaining 
structure may have been a factor causing industry-specific non­
competitive flexibility rather than competitive flexibility in 
relative wages.
To test for the presence of competitive flexibility in relative 
wages in the Greek manufacturing sector we examine the bivariate 
correlation between changes in wages and changes in employment. A 
positive correlation between changes in employment and changes in 
wages is considered as evidence of competitive flexibility. 
However, as Reddaway (1959:44) put it, "any such relationship 
cannot prove anything but it is worthwhile to see what the data 
suggest". To allow for the case where supply shifts cause a 
negative correlation between wage and employment changes, which 
can be consistent with the competitive model, systematic evidence 
on the bivariate correlation along with factual support 
concerning the institutional and economic state of the labour 
market over the period under examination are considered as 
necessary for evaluating any results indicating competitive 
flexibility in relative wages.
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5.3.3. Non-competitive Flexibilitv in Relative Wages.
While both economic conditions and industrial relations 
prevailing in the Greek manufacturing sector over the period 
1966-88 may have not been very conducive for the development and 
the expression of competitive forces, they may have been 
relatively more favourable for industry-specific factors to 
influence the formation of industry relative wages. Probably, 
regulation does no allow the competitive forces to dominate the 
workings of the labour market. But it seems reasonable to 
hypothesise that in the context of first, continuing 
industrialisation, second, major disturbances in the system of 
industrial relations and third, the continuous use of formal 
incomes policies, regulation "favours" non-competitive 
flexibility in relative wages. Because, in face of successive 
governmental policies, firms and groups of employees who "beat 
the gun" and evade from policy restrictions become more flexible 
as far as wage determination is concerned.
In other words, we presume that under policies of regulation, 
which by being continuously used they create a climate or 
culture of regulation in the labour market, flexibility -if any- 
is probably non-competitive, that is related to industry-specific 
factors and arising from deviant behaviour against the policies 
of regulation. Overall, industry-specific changes in productivity 
and industry-specific bargaining power and strike activity may 
have been sources of industry-specific non-competitive wage
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flexibility in the Greek manufacturing sector. From this point 
of view, non-competitive flexibility may be more a source of 
problems for policy implementation rather than a solution to 
labour market imbalances.
As wage policies were, for the most of the 1966-88 period, mainly 
targeted to control the employees side and to contain wage 
increases in line with average productivity growth, employers may 
have shared with their employees any industry-specific gains 
arising from changes in productivity, or may have had to 
increase wage rates in order to retain or attract the more 
productive skilled labour. Furthermore, the reconstitution of 
manufacturing trade-unionism at the plant level along with the 
rise of the informal system of collective bargaining consist 
another source of potential industry-specific influence upon wage 
formation. Employers may have been under pressure, arising from 
collective bargaining power and/or strike activity, to concede 
above-average increases in nominal wages, justified or not by 
industry-specific changes in productivity.
Of course, such industry-specific influences vary from period to 
period. For the 1967-74 period, with neither formal incomes 
policy in force nor, from April 1967, lawful strike activity and 
essential collective bargaining processes, we hypothesise that 
there was not much room for industry-specific factors, such as 
bargaining power expressed in relatively high unionisation and 
strike activity, to exert any decisive influence upon industry 
wages. However, this does not exclude the possibility that firms 
may had shared industry productivity gains with their employees
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even in the absence of collective bargaining and strike activity 
procedures.
In 1975-81 the economic and industrial relations environment 
changed dramatically and under the norm-based wage policy and the 
rising system of informal collective bargaining in the 
manufacturing sector, industry-specific influences, related to 
strike activity and productivity growth, may have affected 
industry wages. Then, in 1982-88 the wage policy of partial 
indexation, as it was explicitly designed to compress the wage 
structure, imposed stricter controls upon industry wages. Thus, 
while both wage policy and industrial relations became less 
favourable for industry-specific wage flexibility, the lack of 
effective controls regarding compliance with mandatory incomes 
policies as well as the occurrence of waves of strikes indicating 
the presence of industry-specific factors, may have allowed some 
room for non-competitive flexibility in relative wages.
To test for the presence of non-competitive wage flexibility in 
the Greek manufacturing sector we examine the influence of 
industry-specific factors upon changes in industry wages by using 
cross-section regression analysis. We test for the influence 
exerted upon changes in nominal wages by changes in
productivity, levels of industry strike activity and changes in 
employment.
In the literature, productivity is considered as the key 
industry-specific variable. In Bell and Freeman (1985) and OECD
(1986), for instance, the key industry-specific variable is the
234
value productivity per worker. As the change in productivity 
reflects technical change, relative price changes and changes in 
the composition of an industry's employment it is not possible to 
sign it a priori. If changes in wages and changes in productivity 
are not related this result should be considered as consistent 
with the competitive model. A positive relationship indicating 
that employees have shared industry-specific productivity gains 
should be considered as consistent with the non-competitive 
flexibility hypothesis and with the workings of a decentralised 
and informal system of wage determination. A negative correlation 
between productivity and wage changes indicating that wages are 
determined regardless of industry productivity growth, as well as 
against the variability of productivity growth across industrial 
branches should be considered as consistent with the 
implementation of incomes policy via either centralised 
collective bargaining or the machinery of compulsory arbitration.
In the context of informal collective bargaining in the Greek 
manufacturing sector after 1975 the industry-specific level of 
strike activity represents an institutional source of potential 
industry-specific influence upon industry relative wages. Of 
course, a straightforward positive relationship should be 
expected only if strike activity indicates bargaining power. And 
this is not always the case. Strike activity sometimes indicates 
only dissatisfaction and militancy rather than bargaining power. 
Instead of bargaining power can simply reflect failed attempts to 
influence the process of wage determination. Moreover, even when 
strike activity does indicate bargaining power, it is possible
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that this bargaining power is demonstrated once, of course not 
for all, but at least once for a period of time which can vary 
considerably. This demonstrated bargaining power,in turn, may 
have a threat effect during recurring annual bargaining rounds.
From this point of view, the association between changes in wages 
and the rate of strike activity is considered as indicator of 
industry-specific influence upon relative wages exerted by the 
employees collective action. A positive relationship is expected 
to indicate that strike activity, ascertaining bargaining power, 
has led employers to concede further increases in industry wages. 
A negative association may denote the function of strike activity 
as a safety valve or as an expression of inefficient militancy 
and a way of expressing discontent.
Changes in industry employment are usually considered as a source 
of competitive influence upon changes in nominal wages, in the 
short-run. But they may also be associated with industry- 
specific influences as employment growth can affect positively 
the bargaining power of the workforce already inside industries 
expanding employment. Therefore, while a positive association 
between changes in wages and changes in employment in the short- 
run should be considered as evidence in favour of the competitive 
hypothesis, in the long-run this relationship should not be 
observed. If it does then this may indicate an industry-specific 
influence arising from additional, explicit or implicit, 
bargaining power of employees in industrial branches 
characterised by long-run expansion.
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To test for the presence of these industry-specific influences 
upon relative wages we use cross-section regression analysis. As 
Freeman (1987:1) argued, the analysis is better cast in terms of 
cross-sectional changes for three reasons. First, it allows to 
"difference-out” period effects. Second, it permits to by-pass 
the problem of evaluating time-series evidence when all variables 
move, more or less, together. Third, because it provides greater 
number of observations. However, Freeman considered as a 
disadvantage of the cross-section approach that we cannot be 
certain that factors which affect wage structures have similar 
impacts on changes over time. For our analysis in order to 
estimate and evaluate any sub-period effects of industry-specific 
variables, it is important to develop the analysis, not only for 
the full period 1966-88, but for its sub-periods as well. 
Therefore, we also test for the presence of determinants of 
industry-specific wage flexibility during three distinct sub­
periods of wage determination processes and incomes policies.
Finally, in the eventual presence of asymmetries in changes in 
wages and changes in productivity the issue of the employment 
consequences of this hypothesised asymmetry becomes important. 
The question is whether this asymmetric responsiveness of wages 
to productivity at the industry level boosted or lowered 
aggregate employment. Furthermore, the policy issue is whether 
policy for employment growth via employment regulation and 
protection was undermined by industry-specific flexibility in 
relative wages arising from asymmetrical changes in 
productivity, and whether the restrictive legislation has been
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mistakenly considered as the main way for securing jobs. Indeed, 
the question is whether, in some cases, the employment and wage 
regulation measures were contradictory as long as, indexation 
for instance, caused a certain degree of rigidity in relative 
wages especially in low-wage low-productivity change industries, 
which, in turn, caused job losses, both potential and actual.
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5.4. THE COMPETITIVE HYPOTHESIS; ANALYSIS OF BIVARIATE 
CORRELATION BETWEEN WAGE AND EMPLOYMENT CHANGES.
According to the competitive hypothesis there should be a 
positive correlation between changes in wages and changes in 
employment unless supply shifts predominate in labour market 
developments.
To test for the existence of any positive correlation between 
changes in industry nominal wages and changes in industry 
employment across the twenty two-digit industrial branches of 
the Greek manufacturing we use two slightly different approaches. 
First, we estimate the correlation coefficients relating changes 
in nominal wages and changes in employment for the whole period
1966-88, as well as for the sub-periods 1967-74, 1975-81, 1982-
88, which are characterised by different wage policies and 
varying conditions with regard to demand for labour in the 
manufacturing sector. These period correlation coefficients are 
reported in Table 5.4.1. Second, we estimate the correlation 
coefficients for each year from 1966 to 1988 separately. These 
year correlation coefficients are reported in Table 5.4.2. 
Changes in nominal wages refer to average hourly wage of workers 
of both sexes and changes in employment refer to wage earners.
In both cases, correlation coefficients are estimated for changes 
in the short-run and in the long-run. According to the 
competitive theory, because of the short-run inelasticity in 
labour supply, significant and positive correlation should be 
observed only in the short-run. The market mechanism is supposed
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to adjust any imbalances in longer periods of time. Therefore we 
estimate the correlation coefficients for both short- and long- 
run changes in wages and employment in order to detect any 
weakening of their association in relatively longer periods of 
time. For this purpose, a continuum-like set of coefficients, 
ranging from one-year changes to twenty three-year changes, 
including two-year, three-year, five-year and ten-year changes, 
is reported.
Overall, the period correlation coefficients for changes in 
industry wages and employment in the Greek manufacturing sector 
provide no systematic evidence in favour of the competitive 
hypothesis. Correlation between changes in wages and employment 
is found negative when the full period 1966-1988 is examined. It 
seems that in the period 1966-88, the manufacturing labour market 
in Greece was operating far away from the competitive model in 
the sense of the use of relative wages to retain and attract 
labour in expanding industrial branches. This is probably due, 
first, to the extensive regulation in terms of both wage and 
employment determination and, second, to employment developments 
in the manufacturing sector.
When the sub-periods characterised by distinct types of wage 
policy and varying levels of unemployment are examined, the 
estimated correlation coefficients do not provide systematic 
evidence supporting the competitive hypothesis either. However, 
the correlation analysis suggests that competitive flexibility 
existed only during 1967-74. This result is supported by the
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facts concerning the state of the labour market as well as the 
state of industrial relations at the time. In that period there 
was no formal incomes policy in force. There was no collective 
bargaining and strike activity. There was a tight labour market 
(low levels of unemployment). And, after all, that was the main 
period of expanding manufacturing employment in Greece. Such an 
association is observed in the case of one-year changes. 
Coefficients for two-year and three-year changes are also 
positive but not statistically significant. In addition, the 
gradual decrease of the estimated correlation coefficients is 
consistent with the competitive hypothesis, as the supply of 
labour becomes less inelastic and, thus, wages have to be raised 
relatively less than over shorter periods of time.
Correlation coefficients for the sub-period 1975-81 are found 
positive in the case of one-year, two-year and three-year changes 
and negative in the case of five-year and ten-year changes. But 
only the latter are significant. A different pattern of 
coefficients is estimated for 1982-88. They are found negative in 
the case of one-year and five-year changes. For the remaining 
cases, they are positive and, indeed, in the case of two-year and 
ten-year changes are significant as well.
This variety of estimated correlation coefficients hardly denotes 
the presence of competitive flexibility in relative wages. 
Certainly, the important criterion for the validity of the 
competitive hypothesis refers to the association between wages 
and employment in the short-run. And in the short-run, as the 
period correlation coefficients suggest, there was not strong,
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positive and significant correlation between changes in 
employment and changes in nominal wages. The estimated 
coefficients for one-year changes over the period 1966-88 are 
negative and significant. But they are positive and significant 
for 1967-74. In the sub-period 1975-81 the estimated coefficients 
are positive though nearly zero and not significant, while those 
of 1982-88 period are found nearly zero and not significant 
either.
The year correlation coefficients, estimated separately for each 
year from 1966 to 1988, relating changes in industry nominal 
wages and industry employment, for both short-run and long-run 
changes, are reported in Table 5.4.2. They also provide not 
systematic evidence in favour of the competitive hypothesis. 
Coefficients of one-year changes are found either positively or 
negatively signed, but the majority of them are not statistically 
significant. Only the correlation between annual changes in 
nominal hourly wages and changes in employment of wage earners 
for 1965/66 and 1983/84 are positive and statistically 
significant. Thus, two out of three significant coefficients for 
one-year changes are positive. When we examine changes over a 
two-year period, three out of four significant coefficients are 
found positive. For changes over a three-year period two out of 
three significant coefficients are found positive. But the 
majority of the estimated coefficients are neither statistically 
significant nor stable with regard to their sign.
As an OECD (1985:94) study reiterated, it has been frequently
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argued that the expected positive wage and employment change 
association may be obscured by examining the entire range of 
industries and not the range of industries with employment 
increases. To test whether such an asymmetry influences the 
findings of our correlation analysis, we also examine the 
correlation between annual changes in wages and annual changes in 
employment only for the case of industrial branches experiencing 
increases in employment. For this test industrial branches with 
negative changes in employment are assigned a zero value. This 
test, the results of which are reported in Table 5.4.3, apart 
from a slight decrease of the significance levels and the values 
of the correlation coefficients, does not provide any differing 
correlation coefficients as far as their significance, sign and 
level are concerned.
While the lack of systematic evidence of positive correlation 
between wage and employment changes is considered as lack of 
support for the competitive hypothesis, in the sense of the use 
of relative wages to retain and attract labour in expanding 
industrial branches, the occurrence of negative and significant 
correlation raise the question how to interpret it. The negative 
correlation coefficients for the full period 1966-88 seem to be 
rather systematic as they are significant when one-year, two- 
year, three-year, five-year and ten-year changes are examined. 
Indeed, they increase gradually the longer becomes the period of 
change under consideration.
According to Keating (1983:386) and Withers et al (1983:7) a 
negative correlation between wage changes and employment changes
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might be consistent with the competitive model if shifts in the 
supply side of the labour market require lower wages to clear the 
market or lead to reduced demand for labour in the case of 
exogenous increases in wages.
A group of explanations based on supply side factors can be 
considered concerning the causes of the negative correlation 
between changes in wages and changes in employment. First, the 
increase in the supply price of labour above its market clearing 
level, imposed either by trade-unions or by compulsory 
arbitration and governmental wage policies may provide a 
rationale for the negative correlation. Such increases probably 
occurred during the periods of the norm-based and the indexation 
incomes policy. During the norm-based policy such wage increases 
may be due to the militancy of trade-unions at the plant level. 
During the indexation policy such wage increases were probably 
caused by the system of automatic indexation itself. From this 
point of view, the negative correlation implies that jobs were 
being forgone along with the imposed increases in wages. Of 
course, in this explanation we need to take into account the 
role of productivity and product market developments.
Second, higher labour supply, even in conditions of rising 
manufacturing employment, may have required lower wages to clear 
the labour market. As already mentioned, the coexistence of urban 
and concealed unemployment along with the labour pool in the 
primary sector of the economy, remained a permanent 
characteristic of the Greek labour market in the post-war period.
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However, in the 1960s and especially in 1967-74, the immigration 
of labour abroad created unusual tight conditions in the labour 
market of the Greek manufacturing sector. As after 1974 the 
trends of immigration abroad were reversed and expansion in 
manufacturing employment slowed down, it seems reasonable to 
assume that a certain shift in the labour supply took place. 
Moreover, there is evidence (Karantinos, 1989) that since 1975 
the rate of female participation in the labour force increased, 
thus contributing also to a certain shift of labour supply.
Third, the negative correlation between wage changes and 
employment may be explained by introducing in the analysis the 
restructuring process in the manufacturing sector. From this 
point of view, the negative correlation coefficient may reflect 
developments similar to those in the British nationalised 
industries, as steal and coal. Those industries, while undergoing 
a major restructuring process affecting the levels of employment 
continued to pay relatively high wages to the remaining employees 
in order to speed up the restructuring process and to avoid major 
and continuous industrial conflicts.
In 1975-81 the slow down of the manufacturing employment 
expansion coincided with the two oil-shocks which imposed severe 
pressures for restructuring and adjustment in the Greek 
manufacturing industries. These pressures became more severe in 
1982-88. In fact, the restructuring and the rehabilitation of 
wide segments of the Greek manufacturing sector has been a 
priority of Greek governments in power since 1982. Regardless of 
the efficiency and the results of this programme, the indexation
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policy, which was followed firmly by the industries under 
governmental control, insulated wage determination from market 
developments and especially from the market position of ailing 
industries which while in need for shedding out labour continued 
paying relatively high wages.
All the above explanations are to a certain extent plausible and 
relevant to developments in the Greek manufacturing labour market 
and probably capture parts of the reasons which lie behind the 
negative correlation between changes in wages and employment. 
However, even if we can explain the lack of systematic evidence 
supporting the competitive hypothesis in the sense of the use of 
relative wages for attracting and retaining labour in expanding 
industries, the main conclusions of the analysis are two.
First, over the period 1966-88 the Greek manufacturing labour 
market does not appear to be operating in line with the 
competitive hypothesis as far as the use of relative wages as 
means for retaining and attracting labour is concerned. It 
appears that increases in the supply price of labour, caused by 
unions, arbitration awards or incomes policies, resulted at 
systematic negative association between changes in industry wages 
and industry employment.
Second, during the sub-period 1967-74 both the results and the 
prevailing conditions suggest the presence of competitive working 
in the labour market as firms used relative wage increases for 
retaining and attracting labour in the context of rapidly 
expanding manufacturing employment, banned strike activity and
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wage policy allowing much room for firms* manoeuvre in wage 
setting. Finally, it is noteworthy that analysis of correlation 
between changes in wages and changes in employment of both 
salary and wage earners leads to similar conclusions. The 
relevant results are reported in Appendix 3.
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5.5. INDUSTRY SPECIFIC DETERMINANTS OF RELATIVE WAGES : CROSS-
SECTION REGRESSION ANALYSIS.
5.5.1. Methods and Variables.
Our test for the presence of non-competitive flexibility in 
relative wages is undertaken with regard to both short-run and 
long-run industry-specific wage flexibility. Long-run non­
competitive flexibility is captured by focusing upon the base- 
year to end-year changes in nominal wages as dependent variable. 
First, in order to explain changes in industry nominal wages from 
1966 to 1988, the full period 1966-88 is examined. Then three 
sub-periods, namely 1967-74, 1975-81, 1982-88, are examined on
the basis of the base-year to end-year changes in industry 
nominal wages. This analysis also refers to long-run industry- 
specific wage flexibility. Short-run industry wage flexibility is 
examined by using the annual changes in industry nominal wages as 
dependent variable. This analysis is too applied for the full 
period 1966-88 as well as for the sub-periods selected according 
to the type of incomes policy in force.
Three variables are considered as potential sources of industry- 
specific flexibility in manufacturing relative wages. First 
candidate is the rate of change in productivity. We use the 
industry production index to calculate an output per worker index 
for industry productivity. This specification reflects technical 
change and changes in the composition of the industry's
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employment. Second potential source of non-competitive
flexibility is the rate of industry strike activity as expressed 
by the index of hours lost in strike activity per 1000 employees. 
Third potential source of industry-specific flexibility is the 
rate of change in each industry's employment.
In addition to these three variables which are tested as 
potential sources of industry-specific wage flexibility, two more 
variables are included in the regression specifications. First, 
the proportion of female employment in industry employment is 
included, to control for the influence exerted by the fact that, 
as indicated in Table 4.3.1, female workers are on average paid 
less than male workers, namely they get 60 to 70 per cent of the 
average male wage. Second, the initial level of the industry 
nominal wage is included, to capture the influence exerted by 
wage policies upon the manufacturing wage structure. The OECD 
(1986) study included also as an independent variable, the 
absolute change in the percentage of non-production workers to 
total employment. But in that study, the dependent variable was 
the change in (relative) earnings, covering the earnings of both 
salary and wage earners. In this analysis there is no need to 
include a variable for change in non-production workers to total 
employment because dependent variable is the change in hourly 
wages, which refer to wage earners alone, and not to salary 
earners who are usually considered as non-production employees.
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5.5.2. Long-run Industry-specific Flexibility.
The estimates of industry-specific determinants of long-run 
changes in nominal wages across manufacturing industries in 
Greece, are reported in Table 5.5.1. In this specification it is 
not included the strike activity variable as in such long-run 
changes variation in bargaining power may be captured better by 
levels of unionisation rather than by annual rates of strike 
activity. But data on unionisation levels in Greek manufacturing 
are not available.
The estimated coefficient for the productivity variable is found 
strong, positive and significant for the period 1966-88, but not 
for any of the sub-periods. This strong and positive coefficient 
for the period 1966-88, implies that the long-run change in 
industry nominal wages, observed from 1966 to 1988, reflects to a 
wide extent, vibrant changes to industry-specific productivity, 
and thus, a lot of the observed flexibility should be attributed 
to industry-specific changes in productivity.
The estimated coefficients for the variables representing long- 
run changes in industry employment are found insignificant for 
all the tested periods. Furthermore, the regression 
specifications without the employment variable are relatively 
more significant and with slightly higher coefficients of 
determination than the specifications which include the industry 
employment variables. This result implies that long-run changes 
in industry employment have not influenced changes in industry 
nominal wages and is consistent with the competitive model.
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The coefficients for the initial wage level variable are found 
negative and significant for the period 1966-88. This result 
reflects the long-run tendency, over the full period 1966-88, 
towards a more compressed manufacturing wage structure as well as 
the dominance of governmental incomes policy in industry wage 
determination processes. Negative signs characterise the 
original wage level variable in the sub-period regressions for
1967-74 and 1982-88, but the estimated coefficients are not 
significant. Nevertheless, the estimated coefficient in the 
specification for 1975-81 is found significant and positive. This 
result implies a intermittent tendency towards a widening inter­
industry wage structure. This is consistent with the norm-based 
policy in force during that period and with the major 
disturbances observed during that period in the manufacturing 
industrial relations caused by the high frequency of 
decentralised strike activity and the widespread collective 
bargaining at the plant level.
Finally, the control variable for female employment in each 
industry's employment is found negative and significant in the 
1977-88 period regression, that is the period for which data on 
the female participation in industry employment are available. 
The negative sign simply reflects the fact that, as female 
workers are, on average, paid less than men workers, the increase 
of their share in an industry' s employment affects negatively 
average changes in wages of both sexes.
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5.5.3. Short-run Industry-specific Flexibility.
The estimates of industry-specific determinants of short-run 
changes in nominal wages across manufacturing industries in 
Greece, are reported in Table 5.5.2. We find no positiye and 
significant coefficients for the productiyity yariable. Howeyer, 
the estimated coefficients for changes in productiyity are found 
negatiye and significant for the full period 1966-88 as well as 
for the sub-period 1967-74.
This negatiye association between short-run, namely annual, 
changes in nominal wages and changes in industry productiyity 
implies that the dominant pattern oyer the period under 
consideration has not been for annual changes in wages to be 
following changes in industry productiyity. This, in turn, may 
haye happened because annual rates of change in industry wages 
either haye been falling behind productiyity increases, or wages 
haye been increasing more that allowed by productiyity 
performance. Such deyelopments haye been probably caused by the 
yarying incomes policy in force as well as by the major changes 
in the manufacturing bargaining structure and processes, 
especially in 1975-81. Both of them insulated wages from ayerage 
and industry productiyity deyelopments. From this point of yiew, 
we can infer that productiyity changes were not a source of 
short-run industry-specific flexibility in relatiye wages.
The inyerse results on the influence of industry-specific 
productiyity upon industry wages, as it is found strongly
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positive in the long-run and negative in the short-run, do not 
contradict one other. While at the end of the period under 
examination the overall change in industry wages reflect the 
long-run change in industry productivity, it appears that their 
course through the annual rounds of wage determination over the 
period 1966-88 has not been smooth and linear because of the 
alterations in incomes policy and equally major changes in 
bargaining structures and processes.
The estimated coefficients for the employment variable indicate 
that annual changes in employment have not been associated with 
wage flexibility. They are found negative and significant for the 
period 1966-88 and insignificant for the sub-periods. This 
finding is consistent with our conclusions drawn from the 
bivariate correlation analysis of changes in wages and change sin 
employment over the same period. This result implies a negative 
relationship between increases in nominal wages and employment 
growth. As in the cross-section analysis we control for 
productivity changes, the negative relationship between increases 
changes in nominal wages and industry employment growth indicates 
that over the period under consideration the year to year course 
of industrial pay may has contributed to relative loss of 
potential jobs by causing reduced demand for labour.
While neither short-run changes in industry productivity nor 
short-run changes in industry employment are found influential 
determinants of industry-specific wage flexibility, the estimated 
coefficients for the strike activity variable indicate that over 
the period 1966-88 the rate of industry strike activity has
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caused a certain degree of short-run industry-specific wage 
flexibility. The estimated coefficients for the strike activity 
variable are positive and significant for the full period 1966- 
88, as well as the sub-periods 1967-74 and 1982-88, except the 
period 1975-81 for which the regression results are generally 
poor as the estimated equation itself is insignificant. The 
strong positive coefficient for 1967-74 refers to the effects of 
strike activity undertaken during the first fourth months, namely 
from January to April, of 1967 as only for that period strike 
activity was lawful. In our data set from 1968 till 1974 the 
industry strike activity variable has zero values. But, overall 
the regression results indicate that strike activity has been a 
source of short-run industry-specific wage flexibility.
The estimated coefficient for the initial wage level variable is 
found negative and significant for the indexation period 1982-88 
and positive and significant for 1967-74. The coefficient for the 
indexation period is consistent with the type of incomes policy 
in force, as partial indexation was aimed to compress the wage 
structure. But the coefficient for the sub-period 1967-74, during 
which no formal incomes policy was in force, collective 
bargaining was typical and strike activity banned, due to the 
political regime of the period, indicates that the forces working 
for a wider wage structure dominated the year-to-year changes in 
the manufacturing wage structure.
Finally, the estimated coefficient of the control variable for 
female employment is found, as expected, negative and
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significant, indicating that the increase of the female share in 
industry employment affects negatively the rate of change in 
average nominal wages of both sexes the females wage is, on 
average, nearly 70 per cent of the males wage.
5.5.4. Emolovment Consequences of the Asymmetric Response of 
Wages to Productivitv.
Given the results suggesting the presence of industry-specific 
wage flexibility associated with changes in productivity in the 
long-run, we also test for the employment consequences of the 
productivity-related wage flexibility. The results from testing 
the hypothesis of asymmetric response of wages to productivity 
are given in Tables 5.5.3 and 5.5.4. Table 5.5.3 presents the 
results from testing the asymmetric response hypothesis in the 
long-run, that is on the basis of base-year to end-year changes. 
Table 5.5.4 presents the results from testing it in the short- 
run, that is on the basis of year-to-year changes.
The results concerning long-run wage flexibility provide no 
support in favour of the asymmetric response hypothesis. The 
estimated coefficients are found insignificant in all regressions 
specified for the period 1966-88 and its sub-periods. The results 
of the regression analysis relating changes in relative wages 
and above- and below-average changes in relative productivity, 
in the short-run, provide no support of the asymmetric response 
either. However, the estimated coefficients are found significant 
in the case of the 1982-88 period, but the variable for changes
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in productivity below-average is negatively signed, while the 
variable for changes in productivity above-average is found with 
positive sign. This result implies that in 1982-88, that is over 
the period of indexation policy, wages in the sector of below- 
average productivity changes were not responsive to this relative 
productivity performance and were rising without being connected 
to productivity developments. At the same time wages in the 
sector of above-average changes in productivity were responsive 
to their better relative productivity performance.
Thus, the test on asymmetric response suggests that the observed 
productivity-related flexibility was employment hindering. This 
is caused by the fact that wages in industrial branches with 
above-average changes in productivity by being more responsive to 
productivity changes led to relative job losses, while wages in 
industrial branches with below-average changes in productivity by 
being de-connected from their relative productivity performance 
saved less jobs than would have saved by following the relative 
productivity developments.
This de-connection of industry wages from industry productivity 
performance seems to be mainly caused by the indexation policy, 
as indexation by applying automatically across the board 
insulated year-to-year wage developments from differentials in 
productivity change. However, results similar to those regarding 
the sub-period 1982-88 are found for the sub-period 1977-88 too. 
As indexation policy was introduced in 1982, it seems that, in 
1977-81, either the norm-based policies insulated wages from 
relative productivity performance or collective bargaining
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developments had a similar effect.
As far as incomes policy is concerned over the period 1977-88, 
its common characteristic, despite the differences in type 
between norm and indexation, was their aim to narrow the wage 
structure by favouring the low-paid segments of the labour force. 
As far as collective bargaining developments are concerned, the 
positive and significant coefficient found for strike activity 
for period 1966-88 suggests that informal collective bargaining 
at the plant level contributed to the de-connection of changes in 
industry wages from changes in industry productivity changes.
To summarise, our analysis on industry-specific determinants of 
flexibility over the period 1966-88, suggests that in the long- 
run industry wages were associated with industry-specific 
productivity changes, while in the short-run strike activity was 
the main source of industry-specific wage flexibility. 
Furthermore, it appears that over the period 1977-88 asymmetries 
in the association between relative changes in productivity and 
wages at the industry level were employment hindering rather 
than employment enhancing as wages in industries of relatively 
poor productivity changes were insulated from this productivity 
performance. Incomes policy aimed to compress the wage structure 
seems to be the major cause of this employment hindering 
asymmetry.
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5.6. CONCLUSIONS.
In theory flexibility in relative wages can be either competitive 
or non-competitive. Competitive is considered the flexibility 
associated with the use of relative wages for balancing labour 
demand and supply at the industry level, when, for instance, 
increased wages are used for retaining and attracting labour in 
expanding sectors. Non-competitive is considered the flexibility 
associated with industry-specific factors such as changes in 
productivity or bargaining power.
In Greek manufacturing over the period 1966-88, although 
flexibility in manufacturing relative wages was not an 
overwhelming characteristic, in conditions of extensive 
regulation of the labour market, that is in conditions which do 
not resemble very much to the ideal competitive labour market, 
non-competitive factors played a more important role than the 
competitive ones. The observed flexibility is mainly of the non­
competitive type as it is caused by industry-specific factors 
such as productivity changes and industry-specific rates of 
strike activity.
The lack of competitive flexibility as well as the 
characteristics of non-competitive flexibility are mainly due 
to successive incomes policies implemented in the context of 
permanent employment regulation and to the militancy of trade- 
unions at the plant level which transformed the manufacturing
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bargaining structure. These developments implied that for a 
number of years the Greek manufacturing sector was characterised 
by wage rises that were directly associated with industry- 
specific productivity changes.
The productivity-related flexibility suggests that workers in 
certain sectors shared industry-specific productivity gains. The 
strike activity-related flexibility suggests that workers, 
militancy and informal collective bargaining related to industry- 
specific characteristics resulted too in higher relative wages. 
It seems that the overall regulation disfavours competitive 
flexibility and sets the scene for non-competitive flexibility 
caused by institutional forces.
While overall, there was not much scope for competitive 
flexibility, in 1967-74 both the bivariate correlation analysis 
and the background information suggest that that period can be 
considered as an episode of competitive flexibility in the Greek 
manufacturing sector. The sub-periods characterised by different 
types of wage policy are different as far as flexibility is 
concerned either. Apart from the episode of competitive 
flexibility in 1967-74, non-competitive flexibility dominated the 
relative wages scene, but only for the sub-periods 1982-88 and 
1977-88 the rates of industry strike activity are associated with 
non-competitive flexibility. The results for the sub-period 1975- 
81 are poor and this may be due to the wide disturbances caused 
in the system of industrial relations in Greek manufacturing.
As far as the employment consequences of asymmetric responses of
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relative wages to industry-specific changes in productivity are 
concerned, they were found employment hindering for the period 
1977-88, that is the period of egalitarian incomes policies of 
both types, norm-based and indexation. Overall, the extensive 
and varying policies of wage and employment regulation as well as 
their repercussions in the area of industrial relations are 
behind the observed non-competitive flexibility in relative wages 
and the asymmetries in the wage-productivity-employment nexus.
But the observed variability in relative wages should not be 
attributed only to these industry-specific factors. Incomes 
policies themselves may account to a certain extent for changes 
in relative wages as they treated them in varied ways.
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Table 5.4.1
BIVARIATE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS RELATING CHANGES IN 
NOMINAL WAGES AND CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT OF WAGE EARNERS 
(Time periods: 1966-88, 1967-74, 1975-81, 1982-88).
Full Period: 1966-1988. Period: 1967-1974.
Changes
of
1 year 65/66-87/88 -.09** 66/67-73/74 .16**
n=460 n=160
2 years 65/67-86/88 -.09** 65/67-72/74 .11
n=440 n=160
3 years 65/68-85/88 -.16*** 65/68-71/74 .04
n=420 n=140
5 years 65/70-83/88 -.32***
n=380
10 years 65/75-78/88 -.43***
n—2 8 0
23 years 66/88 -.15
n=20
Period 1975-1981. Period 1982-1988.
Changes
of
1 year 74/75-80/81 .002 81/82-87/88 -.01
n=140 n=140
2 years 73/75-79/81 .12 80/82-86/88 .16*
n=140 n=140
3 years 72/75-78/81 .03 79/82-85/88 .13
n=140 n=l40
5 years 70/75-76/81 -.26*** 78/82-83/88 -.04
n=140 n=140
10 years 65/75-71/81 -.27*** 72/82-78/88 .21***
n=140 n=140
Note: Levels of Significance: * = 0.10, ** = 0.05, *** = 0.01
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Table 5.4.2
BIVARIATE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS RELATING CHANGES IN NOMINAL WAGES 
AND CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT OF WAGE EARNERS.
(Short-run and Long-run changes over the period 1966-88)
Period of Change:
1 year 2 years 3 years 5 years 10 years 23 years
Year
/66 .45**
/67 .20 .23
/68 -.12 .12 13
/69 .28 —. 02 —.07
/70 — .08 —.08 —.29 —. 16
/71 .24 .21 20 -.17
/72 .36 .37 13 -.07
/73 -.01 .07 17 .35
/74 -.13 -.37 32 .02
/75 —. 12 —.02 —.41 -.19 — .21
/76 -.24 -.09 16 -.28 -.35
/77 .28 .48 34 .11 -.04
/78 -'16 17 .01 -.01
/79 -.51 42 -.07 —. 12
/80 .12 "17. 03 .30 -.09
/81 .21 .40
:49**
.02 — .22
/82 .43 .28 .35 -.15
/83 -"33 .01 .01 .0002 .11
/84 .48
':«*• -
.10
.14 .11 .09
/85
/86
.001
-.13
.17
.21
.15 
—. 16
/87 .10 .01 .08 -.07 .09
/88 .08 .16 .10 .35 .15 -.15
Notes; N = 20 
Levels
(Two-digit industrial branches of manufacturing). 
of Significance: * = 0.10, ** = 0.05, *** = 0.01.
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Table 5.4.3
BIVARIATE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS RELATING ANNUAL CHANGES 
IN NOMINAL WAGES AND ANNUAL CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT OF WAGE EARNERS
(comparison between coefficients for all branches 
and coefficients for expanding branches)
Year
Period
CHWEi
of Change: 1 year 
CHWEi>0
/66 .45** .25
/67 .20 .18
/68 -.12 -.28
/69 .28 .39
/70 —. 08 —. 05
/71 .24 .26
/72 .36 .30
/73 -.01 .006
/74 -.13 -.13
/75 —. 12 -.01
/76 -.24 — .22
/77 .28 .16
/78
/79
/80 .12 -.22
/81 .21 .18
/82 .43 .27
/83 --33** -.37*
/84 .48 .41
/85 .00 .03
/86 -.13 —. 04
/87 .10 .08
/88 .08 -.07
Notes;
N = 20 (Two-digit industrial branches of manufacturing). 
Levels of Significance: * = 0.10, ** = 0.05, *** = 0.01.
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Table 5.5.1
ESTIMATES OF THE INDUSTRY SPECIFIC DETERMINANTS OF NOMINAL WAGE 
CHANGES ACROSS MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES IN GREECE. 
(base-year to end-year changes)
Dependent Variable 
Period CT
: CHWi 
CHWEi CHPRi WLi CHFEi r 2/r 2 F-value
1966 4, 688.68 .07 2.29** -82.89** .45 4.36**
/88 (11.89) (.07) (2.11) (-2.67) .35
n=20 4, 691.77 2.27** -82.84** .45 6.95**
(12.36) (2.27) (-2.75) .39
1967 126.43 .03 .16 -1.20 .08 .45
/74 (4.45) (.22) (1.06) (-.53) -.10
n=20 125.49 .14 -1.01 .08 .69
(4.59) (1.12) (-.50) -.03
1975 212.09 .38 .14 1.84** .29 2.22
/81 (7.27) (1.15) (.94) (2.35) .16
n=20 212.85 .06 1.81** .24 2.62**
(7.23) (.42) (2.28) .15
1982 192.08 -.07 -.005 -.17 -.37 .22 1.03
/88 (10.20) (-.49) (-.03) (-1.66) (-.52) .01
n=20 191.07 .03 -. 16 —.41 .20 1.36
(10.46) (.23) (-1.67) (-.59) .01
1977 885.81 -.03 -.30 -2.73** -4.64* .61 5.77**
/88 (15.82) (-.06) (-.83) (-2.82) (-2.00) .50
n=20 885.61 -.29 -2.72*** -4.63*.61 8.20***
(16.36) (-.89) (-2.93) (-2.07).53
Notes :CHWi = Change in Nominal Hourly Wage Paid in Branch i.
CT = Constant Term.
CHWEi= Change in Employment of Wage Earners in Branch i. 
CHPRi= Change in Productivity in Branch i.
WLi = Initial Level of Wage in Branch i.
CHFEi= Change in the Share of Female Employment in Branch i
Levels of Significance: * = 0.10, ** = 0.05, *** = 0.01.
t-statistics in parentheses.
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Table 5.5.2
ESTIMATES OF THE INDUSTRY SPECIFIC DETERMINANTS OF NOMINAL WAGE 
CHANGES ACROSS MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES IN GREECE.
(year to year changes)
Dependent Variable: CHWi
Period CT CHWEi CHPRi Sli WLi CHFEi r 2 F-value
1966
-88
n=460
17.74
(29.80)
-.13*** -.12*** 
(-2.88) (-3.02)
.20 -.0001 
(5.38) (-.05)
.09 11.55***
1967
-74
n=160
-4.34
(-2.58)
-.09
(-1.55)
-.14***
(-2.94)
10.45*** .89*** 
(2.37)(10.15)
.44 30.62***
1975
-81
n=140
23.53
(23.55)
.03
(0.59)
.02
(.58)
-.005 .02 
(-.20) (1.43)
.02 .55
1982
-88
n=140
35.51
(20.68)
-.05
(-.96)
.06
(1.16)
.18*** -.05*** -.15**.53 
(3.73)(-10.84) (-2.38)
29.93***
1977
-88
n=240
27.71 
(35.51)(
— .06 
-1.34)
-.05 .05* -.03*** -.18***.35 
(-1.12) (1.74)(-10.50) (-3.21)
24.88***
Notes:CHWi = Change in Nominal Hourly Wage Paid in Branch i.
CT = Constant Term.
CHWEi= Change in Employment of Wage Earners in Branch i. 
CHPRi= Change in Productivity in Branch i.
Sli = Index of Strike Activity in Branch i.
WLi = Initial Level of Wage in Branch i.
CHFEi= Change in the Share of Female Employment in Branch i
Levels of Significance: * = 0.10, ** = 0.05, *** = 0.01.
t-statistics in parentheses.
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Table 5.5.3
ESTIMATES OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELATIVE NOMINAL WAGE CHANGES
AND RELATIVE PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE 
(base-year to end-year change)
Dependent Variable: CHRWi
Period CT CHPRAi CHPRBi WLi CHFEi r 2 F-value
1966/88
n=20
1,119.39** 1.35 
(2.19) (0.53)
3.14
(1.28)
-89.38**
(-2.54)
.45 4.45**
1967/74
n=20
24.27 -.27 
(0.81) (-.49)
.40
(1.57)
-1.41
(-0.69)
.15 .92
1975/81
n=20
-63.26** .12 
(2.10) (.49)
-.04
(-.11)
1.81**
(2.23)
.24 1.69
1982/88
n=20
34.43 .05 
(1.61) (.16)
.02
(.08)
—. 16 —. 
(1.58) (-.
41
55)
. 20 .96
1977/88
n=20
185.10***-.84 
(3.33)(-1.91)
—. 60 
(-1.01)
-2.99***-3. 
(-3.37 )(-1.
63
66)
.67 7.72***
NotesiCHRWi = Change in Relative Wage Paid in Branch i.
CT = Constant Term.
CHPRAi= Change in Productivity in Branches with Above 
Average Increase in Productivity.
CHPRBi= Change in Productivity in Branches with Below 
Average Increase in Productivity.
WLi = Initial Level of Wage in Branch i.
CHFEi= Change in the Share of Female Employment in Branch i
Levels of Significance: * = 0.10, ** = 0.05, *** = 0.01.
t-statistics in parentheses.
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Table 5.5.4
ESTIMATES OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELATIVE NOMINAL WAGE CHANGES
AND RELATIVE PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE 
( year to year change)
Dependent Variable: CHRWi
Period CT CHPRAi CHPRBi WLi CHFEi r 2 F-value
1966-88
n=460
-.17
(-.49)
.018 
(0.52) (
-.020 
-. 06)
.0004
(.33)
.0001 .17
1967-74
n=160
-.83
(-.60)
—. 049 
(-.59)
.060
(.85)
.046
(.70)
.009 .47
1975-81
n=140
.84
(.88)
-.023
(-.40)
.059
(.99)
-.005
(-.57)
.009 .39
1982-88
n=140
.11
(.09)
.12** 
(2.22) (-
-.15***
2.41)
-.003
(-.96)
-.11 .099 
(-2.61)
3.70***
1977-88
n=240
-.12
(-.22)
.09** 
(2.09) (-
-.11**
2.31)
-.002 -.11*** .059 
(-1.04 )(-2.95)
3.67***
Notes:CHRWi = Change in Relative Wage Paid in Branch i.
CT = Constant Term.
CHPRAi= Change in Productivity in Branches with Above
Average Increase in Productivity.
CHPRBi= Change in Productivity in Branches with Below
Average Increase in Productivity.
WLi = Initial Level of Wage in Branch i.
CHFEi = Change in the Share of Female Employment in Branch i.
Levels of Significance: * = 0.10, ** = 0.05, *** = 0.01.
t-statistics in parentheses.
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CHAPTER 6.INCOMES POLICY AND RELATIVE WAGES IN GREEK MANUFACTURING
6.1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.
Since 1975 there has been no period without formal incomes policy 
in force. The policies undertaken since then fall into two 
categories. First, were the norm-based policies of the 1975-81 
period. Second, policies based on systems of indexation were in 
operation throughout the period 1982-88. These policies were 
undertaken in the context of changing bargaining structures and 
processes in manufacturing. As argued in Chapter 5 these 
developments are associated with non-competitive flexibility in 
relative wages.
Given the high frequency of strikes and the rise of informal 
collective bargaining at the plant-level, this chapter examines 
the level and the direction of influence exerted by the norm- 
based and the indexation-based incomes policy upon the inter­
industry wage structure in the Greek manufacturing sector 
over the period 1975-88. The period 1967-74, during which no 
explicit incomes policy was enforced, is adopted as benchmark for 
the comparison and the evaluation of the formal incomes policies' 
effects upon the inter-industry wage structure. It also examines 
the level and the direction of economy-wide influences, namely 
those by inflation and unemployment.
The inter-industry wage structure in Greek manufacturing is 
described by the coefficient of variation of average hourly 
pay of male workers across twenty two-digit branches. In
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other words, the coefficient of variation and its variability 
over time are used as summary indicators representing the 
relative position of the average male worker in each of the 
twenty industrial branches with respect to hourly wage 
receipts.
Section 6.2 deals with the theoretical issue of how incomes 
policies may, if successful, narrow the wage structure. And, 
then, discusses the set of factors, apart from incomes policy, 
which may also account for both formation and change over time 
of the manufacturing wage structure. Section 6.3 elaborates and 
clarifies the hypotheses concerning changes in relative wages 
which are to be tested in this chapter. In Section 6.4 the 
equations* specification for testing on the leverage of 
incomes policies upon the inter-industry wage structure is 
presented and the relevant regression results are discussed. 
Finally, Section 6.5 draws the conclusions of the analysis.
Our analysis suggests the norm-based and the indexation policies 
are both associated with the widening of the manufacturing wage 
structure compared to the benchmark period 1967-74. However, the 
indexation policy widened the wage structure half as the norm- 
based policy. Furthermore, changes in inflation and unemployment 
are associated with variation in the wage structure in a rather 
unconventional way. Higher inflation and lower unemployment lead 
to increased inter-industry wage differentials. Strike activity 
is found to vary inversely to the coefficient of variation in 
manufacturing wages. Therefore it cannot be considered as an
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indicator of bargaining power. The common cause lying behind 
these results is the rise and the workings of the informal system 
of collective bargaining at the plant level and the behaviour of 
the high-wage and high-bargaining power industrial branches 
which benefited the most from the decentralisation and the 
fragmentation of collective bargaining in manufacturing.
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6.2. WAGE STRUCTURE. INCOMES POLICY AND BUSINESS CYCLE.
6.2.1. Incomes Policy Rationales.
The use of incomes policy as a tool of macroeconomic management 
for controlling wage inflation, is of interest to both economic 
and industrial relations' analysis. Artis (1981) drawing on an 
analytical as well as historical perspective summarised the main 
rationales underlying the incomes policies which were adopted 
during the post-war period. Flanagan, Soskice and Ulman (1983) 
provided an extensive review of international experiences with 
incomes policy over the same period. These analyses made clear 
two points.
First, rationales of incomes policy are influenced by political 
calculus. Incomes policy design, implementation and effectiveness 
are, usually, a matter of economic as well as political debate. 
Under conditions of wage determination through collective 
bargaining, incomes policy aiming to control wages can be viewed 
as attempt to control collective bargaining either. The political 
dimension of incomes policy in conditions of collective 
bargaining was stressed by the keynesian school and its founder 
himself. The wage-raising power of unions was perceived as "a 
political rather than economic problem".
As Brawn (1975) pointed out, incomes policies in the post-war 
period, when they were not part of corporatist settlements and 
social contracts, were considered as direct offensive to trade-
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unions and free collective bargaining and from this point of view 
incomes policies have been strongly criticised as unable to cope 
with wage inflation in an environment of collective bargaining 
and as causing more problems in the system of industrial 
relations than they resolve.
According to Clarke (1987:45), in the 1970s incomes policies 
"even with positive support from trade-union centres frequently 
had no more than a short term moderating effect, which might be 
followed by a surge of wage increases when the policy was 
relaxed". Tarling and Wilkinson (1982), drawing on the U.K. 
experience with incomes policies in the 1970s, concluded that 
those policies created anomalies in the general process of 
earnings changes which in turn led to significant instabilities 
and disturbances once policies ended.
Second, the views of both policy-makers and economists about the 
rationales of, and the roles for, incomes policy are closely 
related to the evolution of theorising about wage determination 
and wage inflation. Varying theories on wage inflation imply 
different rationales for the role of incomes policy in 
macroeconomic management. In an extreme case, the monetarist 
account of inflation implies no room for incomes policy as a tool 
for controlling wage inflation. By contrast, in the set of cost- 
push theories of inflation, incomes policy should be adopted in 
order to control wage costs and, thus, minimise inflationary 
factors at their origin. In this framework, the issue of 
relative wages is crucial for controlling wage inflation.
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Theories on wage determination in a market environment, as 
summarised by Artis (1981), fall into four categories; the wage 
theorem view, the Phillips curve, the augmented Phillips curve 
and the real wage resistance model. The issue of relative wages 
is not in the centre of interest in theories dealing with wage 
determination at the aggregate level. Nevertheless, it is an 
important issue for theories based upon the wage theorem view. 
According to the wage theorem view, in its hey-day, "the 
maintenance of full employment removes the restraint upon trade- 
unions to press for higher wages ... and inter-union rivalry 
makes it impossible for the lesson that higher wages mean higher 
prices to be learnt; rather it encourages an inflationary spiral. 
Individual (group) money wage rates depend heavily on 
relativities, with the result that the absolute (average) level 
of money wages (and prices) is essentially indeterminate" 
(Artis,1981:7) .
6.2.2. Incomes Policv and Wage Structure.
The analysis of wage determination at the disaggregated level 
leads to the question whether or not there are any leaders and 
followers, that is groups of wage earners who set the pace in 
wage bargaining processes which is then followed by other groups. 
According to Blackaby (1971:44) leaders in wage bargaining may 
include: highly capital intensive industries where productivity 
rises rapidly; highly unionised and militant industries with 
strong trade-unions; industries employing workers with skills in
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scarcity; workers with great importance to export industries; and 
workers in industries which tend to get left behind in the medium 
term. As Blackaby notes "it is important to distinguish between 
the influence of high pay and the influence of the high pay 
bargain struck on a particular occasion". What mainly matters 
with regard to wage inflation and its association with 
developments in the wage structure, is the influence of high pay.
From this point of view, incomes policy should be focusing upon 
wage determination in industries leading the wage inflation 
process. These industries, in the absence of such a policy, would 
achieve higher wage increases. In turn, these increases, could 
create, through pay comparability and partial spillover effects, 
accelerating wage inflation. Earlier attempts, as by Sargan 
(1971), to test for the existence of such relationships 
confronted problems since wage statistics on which the analysis 
had to be based did not match with negotiating groups. The use of 
the coefficient of variation as a proxy of variations in the wage 
structure helps to overcome the problem of matching bargaining 
groups and wages behaviour.
In testing for the incomes policy's effects upon relative wages 
and the resulting wage structure the assumption is made that the 
labour market is divided in sectors with specific characteristics 
as far as wage determination and the sectors position in the wage 
structure are concerned. Wachter (1974) distinguishes between the 
competitive and the non-competitive sector, the latter being the 
large oligopolistic unionised industries. These unionised 
industries are considered as the home of cost-push inflation.
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Metcalf (1977), in the same line of argument, distinguishes 
between sectors covered and uncovered by collective bargaining. 
In this case the covered sector behaves as the non-competitive 
sector in Wachter*s definition. The origins of these divisions 
can be traced in earlier attempts to analyse the wage inflation 
at a disaggregated level. Bowen (1960:74-81), for instance, 
divided the industries into two groups. First, a market power 
sector consisting of industries that are both highly concentrated 
and highly unionised. Second, a competitive sector in which the 
industries have the reverse characteristics.
On the basis of the distinction between competitive or non­
covered sector and non-competitive or covered sectors, given the 
positive correlation between non-competitive or covered 
industries from the one side, and wages from the other side, both 
Wachter and Metcalf assume that, in the case of cost-push 
inflation, a successful incomes policy should stabilise or 
reduce the width of the wage structure. Certainly, the assumption 
that a successful incomes policy narrows the wage structure by 
setting restrictions on the rate of wage increases in the high- 
wage non-competitive sector holds true when the pressure upon 
wages comes mainly from the high-wage highly unionised and 
covered by collective agreements industries.
But a different, although temporary, effect upon the wage 
structure may be caused when the pressure comes from the low- 
wage industries. In such a case, low wage industries may 
contribute in narrowing, temporarily, the wage structure.
275
Nevertheless, if pay comparability is a principle upon which wage 
claims are formed, any improvement in the relative pay of the 
low-wage industries may cause the high-wage industries to react 
in order to re-establish their relative position in the wage 
structure. But, typically, wage inflation is not created by low- 
wage pushers which oblige high-wage industries to react. This 
might be only a temporary case which has rather to do with the 
second side of the distinction made by Blackaby, that is the 
influence of the high pay bargain struck in a particular 
occasion. In any case, a successful incomes policy should be able 
to control wage inflation caused by wage spirals initiated by 
either the high-wage or the low-wage industries and, at least, 
not allow the wage structure to become wider.
6.2.3. Business Cvcle and Wage Structure.
Incomes policy is not the only determinant of variation in the 
wage structure. Whatever the specific rationale of an incomes 
policy is with respect to the wage structure, the latter is also 
influenced by structural and cyclical changes in the economy. 
Factors which may account for the inter-industry wage 
differentials include product market conditions, conditions 
related to capital and technology, and human capital 
characteristics of the industry's labour force. Moreover, include 
labour market conditions and industrial relations
characteristics such as unionisation, militancy and bargaining 
power.
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Wachter (1970) provided a view on factors determining cyclical 
variation in relative wages. According to his approach, cyclical 
variation in relative wages can be analysed in terms of 
shifts in industry labour supply curves. These shifts in 
industry labour supply are caused by changes in aggregate 
unemployment. In his model, the labour market is divided into two 
sectors, the high-wage non-competitive sector and the low-wage 
competitive sector. Each sector is assigned a sector-specific 
labour supply curve. If the labour market tightens, low-wage 
industries have to improve their pay in order to maintain a 
certain level of labour supply. If unemployment rises, low- 
wage industries may adjust downwards their relative wage.
High-wage industries, in turn, adopt wage policies that permit 
them to maintain their relative position in the wage structure 
and they may, according to Wachter, allow their relative wages 
vary inversely with the business cycle. This inverse variation is 
due to the trade-unions* interest in wage developments within 
high-wage groups rather than outside them. It is also due to 
their interest for a smoother variation in wages than in line 
with the business cycle variation. It can be also explained by 
the smoothing effect that the periodic collective bargaining of 
contracts has upon cyclical variations. This rationale led 
Wachter to the, then corroborated, hypothesis that the size of 
the wage differentials is a positive function of the level of 
unemployment, with the variable of unemployment representing 
excess demand conditions in the labour market.
Moreover, Wachter found that a cost of living variable may also
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affect variations in the wage structure, as industries differ 
in the speed with which they adjust wages to changes in 
consumer prices. In the context of the U.S. wage formation 
processes, with three-year long contracts, wage rounds and 
institutional lags in wage determination, high-wage industries 
responded more rapidly during slow inflation and less 
rapidly during rapid inflation, than low-wage industries.
According to the model proposed and tested by Wachter, it 
appears that there is a negative association between inflation 
and the wage structure and a positive association between 
unemployment and the wage structure, so that a decrease in 
unemployment and an increase in inflation may both act to narrow 
the wage structure over the business cycle. Metcalf (1977) 
arrived to similar results with respect to the influence of 
unemployment and inflation upon variation in the U.K. wage 
structure.
Apart from the incomes policy influence, three other sets of 
factors may account for formation and evolution of the 
manufacturing wage structure over time. The first set refers to 
differences in the competitive structure in the product markets, 
which determine differences in capital and productivity. The 
second refers to human capital characteristics which also imply 
differences in labour productivity. The third set refers to the 
business cycle influence upon the manufacturing wage structure. 
To summarise, on the business cycle influence upon variations in 
the wage structure, there is evidence concerning the variation in
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the U.S. and the U.K. wage structures that unemployment is 
positively and inflation is negatively associated with it.
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6.3. HYPOTHESES TO TEST AND THEIR RATIONALES.
6.3.1. High-wage and Low-wage Sectors.
Despite the long-lasting characteristics of undeveloped formal 
institutions and processes of collective bargaining, in the 
context of strike activity at the plant level and informal 
collective bargaining, the model of high-wage highly concentrated 
highly unionised and low-wage less concentrated less unionised 
industries is substantiated and becomes relevant to developments 
in the Greek manufacturing sector.
As far as relative wages in the twenty two-digit industrial 
branches are concerned the coefficient of concordance in the 
ranking of the manufacturing wage structure for male workers in 
the period 1965-1988, presented in Table 4.3.4, is 0.82. This 
value means that male employees of certain high-wage industrial 
branches in Greek manufacturing maintained, throughout this 
period, their higher position in the wage structure. The 
composition of the top five high-wage industrial branches is very 
stable and the club of the bottom-five low-wage industrial 
branches has also stable composition and permanent members.
This stability of the wage structure hierarchy over the period 
1965-88 and the central role of the size variable in the 
determination of the manufacturing wage structure, indicated in 
Table 4.3.5, implies that the model proposed and tested by 
Wachter and Metcalf may capture the essential workings of the
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Figure 6.3.1 INDUSTRIES IN WAGE &  STRIKE STRUCTURE
AVERAGE RANKING. 1975-1988
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Greek labour market with respect to wage determination in the 
manufacturing sector. However, while the high-wage and low-wage 
sectors are clearly distinguishable, the evidence on the ranking 
of industrial branches according to their strike-proneness may 
not reduce the validity of the model. In the case of the high- 
wage and low-wage industrial branches in Greek manufacturing the 
combination of ranking of the twenty industrial branches 
according to wages and strike activity, as presented in Figure 
6.3.1 indicates that some high-wage industrial branches hold also 
high ranks in the strike activity hierarchy while other high-wage 
branches hold relatively low ranks with respect to strike 
activity. The same mixed picture is also observed in the case of 
the low-wage industrial branches. Some of them are rather passive 
while others hold high ranks in the strike activity hierarchy.
Given the theoretical and empirical considerations discussed in 
Section 6.2 and in earlier chapters respectively, it seems 
reasonable to assume that country- and period- specific 
characteristics are crucial for the analysis of variation in the 
Greek manufacturing wage structure. They may bring about 
alterations in the explanation of rationales with regard to 
determination of relative wages. These country and period 
specific characteristics are taken into account in formulating 
the testable hypotheses of this chapter. These hypotheses refer 
to three sets of influence exerted upon the Greek manufacturing 
wage structure over the years 1967-88, that is the influence of 
incomes policy, business cycle and strike activity respectively.
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6.3.2. The Influence of Incomes Policy.
Our hypotheses concerning the influence of incomes policies are 
slightly modified when compared with those in earlier work by 
Wachter and Metcalf. This modification is due to the fact that in 
the U.S. and the U.K. case there were both incomes policy-on and 
incomes policy-off periods in conditions of wage determination 
under collective bargaining. In the Greek case, there have been 
incomes policy-on periods with collective bargaining emerging in 
parallel. Thus, in this chapter different periods of incomes 
policy are compared with a period during which neither incomes 
policy nor essential collective bargaining were at work.
During the period 1967-74, with essential collective bargaining 
suspended, strike activity banned and statutory regulation of 
wages by the government, the ability of high-wage high-bargaining 
power industries to maintain and to increase their wage premium 
was taken away. This may have created relatively better 
conditions for the low-wage less powerful industries which faced 
no severe change with respect to wage determination conditions.
In the period 1975-81, with the re-establishment of the right of 
collective bargaining and the adoption of norm-based incomes 
policies the wage structure is expected to become wider than 
that of the period 1967-74, for the following reasons. First, the 
norm-based incomes policy may have failed to provide a low level 
of uncertainty with respect to inflationary erosion of wages. The 
policy's pattern was to award a substantial increase in the 
beginning of the year and a less important increase in its second
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semester regardless of any accelerating rises in consumer prices. 
Thus, high-wage high-bargaining power industries may have been 
pre-active and aimed at higher increases to avoid erosion of
their real wage. In the same time, low-wage low-bargaining power 
industries may have been reactive and failed to keep up with 
rising inflation.
Second, the rise of the informal system of collective bargaining 
at the plant level in the Greek manufacturing industries may have 
enabled the high-wage highly-unionised industries to recover, re­
establish and increase their wage premium, by initiating a
bargaining behaviour which considered the norm as the floor for 
additional increases in nominal wages. In the same time, low-wage 
low-bargaining power industries may have had no alternative but 
to follow the norm. The evidence on the wide dispersion of the 
strike activity across the manufacturing sector given in Tables 
3.4.7-3.4.10, along with the existence of a clearly identified 
group of high-wage highly active, in terms of strike activity 
behaviour, industries, as denoted by Figure 6.3.1, suggest that a 
wage premium may have been extracted by the high-wage high-
bargaining power industries via the informal system of collective 
bargaining.
In the period 1982-88, the indexation policy is expected to
cause the wage structure to narrow, in comparison to that of the
norm-based policy period, for three reasons. First, the system of
indexation was securing an automatic adjustment of wages to
consumer prices increases, and thus minimised the level of
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uncertainty with respect to wage determination in conditions of 
double-digit inflation. In other words, this policy permitted, 
by design, to both high-wage and low-wage industries to adjust 
regularly and with the same speed their wage rates. Thus, the 
automatic adjustment of wages would stabilise the wage structure. 
Second, the system of partial indexation was clearly in favour of 
the low-wage industries and it seems reasonable to assume that, 
throughout the period 1982-88, the system of partial indexation 
was compressing the relative position of the high-wage 
industries.
Third, this period was also a period of high unemployment and job 
insecurity for a large number of ailing manufacturing industries 
employing nearly 10 per cent of manufacturing employees. These 
developments may have affected negatively the bargaining power 
of the unionised labour force. Presumably, the high-wage high- 
bargaining power industries, which were exerting their power to 
extract and maintain a wage premium, saw it being eroded. In 
conditions of higher unemployment, the low-wage and less powerful 
industries, perhaps, found themselves in a relatively better 
position as the level of unemployment did not erode their 
bargaining power which they never dispossessed and which never 
was a main determinant of their relative position. In addition, 
it may have been the case that the system of indexation was 
offering to the low-wage low-bargaining power industries more 
than they could get by any means of collective action or by the 
competitive workings of the loose labour market. Thus, with the 
low-wage industries in the greenhouse and the high-wage
285
industries exposed to market and governmental pressures, the wage 
structure is expected to narrow.
However, the indexation policy is expected to experience a wage 
structure wider than that of the benchmark period. During the 
period of indexation the means for collective action and 
collective bargaining were available. And if used, as the 
recorded strike activity partly indicates, they may have affected 
positively the variation in the wage structure. In the benchmark 
period, collective bargaining was suspended and any means for 
collective action were taken away from the high-wage high- 
bargaining power industries. From this point of view, during the 
indexation policy, at least during the sub-periods when it was 
not made compulsory by law, the high-wage high-bargaining power 
industries dispossessed collective bargaining as a means for 
extracting a, more or less curtailed, wage premium.
To summarise, the hypotheses with respect to incomes policy are 
that both the norm-based and the indexation policies will both 
widen the variation in the wage structure, with the norm-based 
policy exerting a relatively stronger influence than the 
indexation policy.
6.3.3. The Influence of Business Cvcle.
Can the assumptions made by Wachter and its model be 
applied in the case of the Greek labour market with respect to 
wage formation and the evolution of the manufacturing wage 
structure throughout the period 1967-88? Does the fluctuation
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of the coefficient of variation of average hourly pay for male 
workers across twenty two-digit industrial branches, reflect 
influences exerted by unemployment and inflation? Is their 
leverage expected to be positive or negative?
Our hypotheses concerning the influence of the business cycle are 
also affected by the way the system of wage determination has 
evolved in the Greek manufacturing sector during the last two 
decades. Contrary to the evidence provided by Wachter and 
Metcalf, in the context of the informal system of collective 
bargaining in Greece we contend that business cycle factors work 
in an unconventional way as pay of the high-wage and high- 
bargaining power branches reflect more inflation and unemployment 
influences than pay of the low-wage low-bargaining power 
branches.
In the context of the dual system of wage determination, which 
includes both formal and informal collective bargaining, it 
seems reasonable to hypothesise, contrary to Wachter*s and 
Metcalf's evidence, that rising consumer prices are positively 
associated with variation in the wage structure. This means that 
an increase in inflation causes the wage structure to become 
wider. This may have happened if employees in the less powerful 
industrial branches, failed to compensate themselves for 
inflation, when employees in industrial branches with bargaining 
power were able to keep up with inflation, to get higher 
increases in nominal wages and, thus, secure a higher wage 
premium.
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Obviously, this case is quite different from that of the U.S. 
and the U.K. where the existence of formal annual or two to three 
year collective contracts causes a certain stickiness in wage 
changes of the high-wage and highly unionised industrial 
branches. In the case of the Greek manufacturing sector, if the 
informal and erratic mechanism for wage determination was in 
operation, the outcome may have been that rising inflation caused 
the wage structure to widen rather than to narrow. It is 
likely that rising inflation led high-wage and high-bargaining 
power to widen the wage structure via the workings of the 
informal system of collective bargaining.
In the same context, contrary to Wachter*s and Metcalf's 
conclusions, unemployment may have been negatively associated 
with variations in the manufacturing wage structure. In other 
words, an increase in aggregate unemployment causes the wage 
structure to narrow, while a decrease causes a wider wage 
structure. This may have been the case when, in the context of 
informal collective bargaining, rising unemployment mainly 
affects adversely the employees in the high-wage high-bargaining 
power industrial branches, rather than the low-wage low- 
bargaining power branches. Likewise, a tighter labour market 
reinforces more the bargaining power of the high-wage high- 
bargaining power than that of the low-wage low-bargaining power 
industrial branches.
In both cases, a negative association between unemployment and 
the wage structure may be observed, as with rising unemployment
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the low-wage and less powerful industrial branches become in a 
relatively worse bargaining position, while with tightening
labour markets the high-wage high-bargaining power industrial
branches become in a relatively better bargaining position. If 
unemployment affects in such a way the relative bargaining power 
of high-wage and low-wage industrial branches, then a negative 
association between the level of unemployment and the wage 
structure may be observed.
Contrary to this hypothesis, it was argued by Wachter that
rising unemployment permits low-wage industrial branches to
adjust downwards their relative wages, while high-wage industrial 
branches become under less pressure for rising their
relative wages. But, even if rising unemployment undermines to a 
certain extent unions' bargaining power, high-wage industrial 
branches cannot dispense with institutional pressure from the 
trade-unions side, which aim to preserve their relative position 
in the wage structure. In this case, according to the rationale 
proposed by Wachter and corroborated by himself and Metcalf, 
rising unemployment may cause the wage structure to become
wider. The difference in the rationale of our hypothesis is
caused by our postulation concerning the system of industrial
relations and wage determination.
In the U.S. and the U.K. case, rising unemployment is considered 
as undermining the relative position of employees in the low-wage 
industries, while institutionalised collective bargaining in 
high-wage industries causes a stickiness in cyclical variation of 
wages. In the Greek case, we assume that rising unemployment
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undermines the relative position of employees in high-wage 
industries, because of the lack of institutionalised collective 
bargaining at the plant level. Thus, rising unemployment makes 
the informal system of collective bargaining weaker and less 
effective. In other words, rising unemployment, while in the U.S. 
and the U.K. does not undermine formal collective bargaining 
arrangements, in Greece may have undermined the very existence of 
the system of collective bargaining at the plant level, that is 
the informal one.
Finally, another matter for investigation with regard to the 
business cycle influence upon the wage structure, is whether or 
not this influence is exerted by the actual or the past values of 
inflation and unemployment, that is with or without a time-lag. 
For instance, in the context of institutionalised bargaining with 
contracts lasting for two to three years, as in the U.S. 
inflation may exert its influence with a relevant lag. In the 
context of informal and erratic bargaining procedures, the 
influence of inflation may be caused by its actual rates. In the 
same context the analogy can be drawn concerning the actual or 
lagged influence of unemployment.
To summarise, the hypotheses with regard to the business cycle 
influence upon the wage structure are that prices inflation 
causes the wage structure to become wider, while unemployment 
affects it negatively.
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6.3.4. The Influence of Strike Activity.
Our hypothesis about the influence of strike activity upon 
variation in the wage structure is rather ambiguous. Prima facie, 
strike activity may be considered as being positively associated 
with changes in the wage structure. However, it is equally 
reasonable to assume that it may be, also, negatively associated 
with variations in the wage structure. It all depends on how the 
role of strike activity is perceived with respect to collective 
bargaining and wage determination.
If strike activity is considered as indicator of bargaining 
power, then, it is quite reasonable to expect a positive 
relationship between strike activity and the wage structure. But 
it is not definite that strike activity denotes bargaining power. 
Industrial branches with high bargaining power, which is 
established and recognised in a certain system of industrial 
relations, do not need to recourse to industrial action for 
achieving their aims. Inversely, industrial branches with low 
bargaining power can be more strike-prone than high-bargaining 
power branches, although less effective. In other words, strike 
activity is only a part of the bargaining process and not an 
indicator of the balance of power within it.
In the context of the system of industrial relations in the Greek 
manufacturing sector as developed since 1975, strike activity at 
the plant level indicates that an informal system of collective 
bargaining was initiated. Indeed, strike activity may have 
offered the only way via which employees were able to initiate
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this informal system. To build an informal bargaining structure, 
the establishment of a new bargaining relationship is required. 
Strike activity, by demonstrating a certain level of bargaining 
power, offers the means through which such a new collective 
bargaining relationship can be set up. Furthermore, employees may 
have to recourse to strike activity periodically in order to 
preserve this new relationship, if the latter is not formal and 
institutionalised. Perhaps, industrial branches of low bargaining 
power, in their effort to initiate and preserve bargaining 
relationships of this kind, may have had to recourse to 
industrial action more often than high- bargaining power 
branches.
In the Greek manufacturing sector over the years 1975-88, as 
discussed in section 6.3.1 and described in Figure 6.3.1, the 
coexistence of all four combinations of industrial branches 
ranked according to their high/low wages and their high/low 
strike activity records, underlines the question which lies 
behind this ambiguity about the influence that strike activity 
exerts upon the wage structure. This is the question of the 
character and the role of the strike activity in Greece, and 
especially in the manufacturing sector. The same question is also 
raised by statistics which indicate that during the hey-days of 
strike activity, in the period 1976-81, only 6 per cent of 
strikers where reported as being fully or partially successful 
(loannou, 1989:102).
After all, does strike activity play a central role in wage
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determination processes across the board, or reflects only, or 
mainly, discontent and adversarial industrial relations? In such 
a case the possibility of a negative association of the strike 
activity with variation in the wage structure should not be 
discarded. If variation in strike activity indicates variation 
in collective bargaining power a positive association should be 
expected. But as bargaining power, usually does not vary to the 
extent that strike activity does, the rationale on the strike 
activity as indicating occasionally either discontent and low 
bargaining power or high bargaining power may capture better 
the role of strike activity in the Greek manufacturing sector. By 
testing on the relationship between the variation in the wage 
structure and strike activity, this question is to be addressed 
to a certain extent.
To summarise, the hypothesis concerning the influence of strike 
activity remains open. There are good reasons for not to consider 
strike activity as a good proxy for collective bargaining power. 
This is due to the ambiguity on the character and the role of 
strike activity in the system of wage determination in the Greek 
manufacturing sector.
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6.4. EQUATIONS SPECIFICATION AND REGRESSION RESULTS.
On the basis of the analysis developed in earlier Sections, 
variation in the wage structure is considered as a function of 
five sets of factors, which include i) incomes policy, ii) the 
business cycle, iii) product market characteristics, iv) human 
capital characteristics and v) developments in industrial 
relations.
From these sets of factors, we have not elaborated the influence 
of both product market and human capital characteristics. 
Unavailability of the relevant data do not allow to test for 
their influence on variation in the wage structure. Thus, with 
respect to product market conditions the assumption is made that 
over the period under examination any differences among the 
manufacturing industrial branches in the competitive structure 
of their product markets remained constant. In other words, we 
assume that there was no variation in the degree of their 
monopolistic power in the product market. Furthermore, with 
regard to the human capital composition of the male labour force 
in manufacturing, the assumption is made that there was no 
variation over time in the skills mix within each industry.
Consequently, to test for the incomes policies' influence upon 
the wage structure, an equation is specified which includes as 
dependent variable the annual coefficient of variation of average 
hourly wage receipts of male workers across the twenty two-digit
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industrial branches of the Greek manufacturing sector. The 
coefficient of variation is used to represent the relative 
variability of the average hourly pay of male workers across 
manufacturing industry. Five independent variables are included; 
two to control for the business cycle influence, one for the 
influence of strike activity and two for the types of incomes 
policy under examination.
The norm-based and the indexation incomes policy variables are 
represented by two dummy variables taking the value of 1 for the 
years they were used. Both incomes policy variables take the 
value of 0 for the benchmark period 1967-74. According to our 
hypotheses, it is expected a positive association of the norm- 
based incomes policy variable with the coefficient of variation 
in wages. Similarly, it is expected the positive association of 
the indexation policy variable with the coefficient of variation 
in the wage structure, but in this case the estimated parameter 
should be indicating the indexation's lower positive influence 
upon the wage structure.
The business cycle variables are one for inflation and one for 
the labour market conditions. As far as the business cycle 
influence is concerned, slightly modified specifications are 
tested with inflation and labour market conditions variables 
regressed with and without one-year lag. Of course, the lagged 
specifications imply no change in the way the explanatory 
variables are expected to be associated with the coefficient of 
variation in manufacturing wages.
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The variable for inflation is the annual rate of inflation. 
According to our hypothesis, the inflation variable is expected 
to be positively associated with the coefficient of variation in 
manufacturing wages.
Conditions in the labour market are represented alternatively by 
four relevant variables. First, the average annual level of 
unemployment is expected to be negatively associated with 
variation in the wage structure. Second, the reciprocal of the 
annual level of unemployment, as its inverse is expected to be 
negatively associated with the coefficient of variation in wages, 
should be positively associated with the dependent variable. 
Third, the year to year change in the annual index for the 
registered unemployment is also used as a proxy for labour market 
conditions and, according to our hypothesis, it is expected to 
behave in the same way as the variable for the level of 
unemployment does, that is to be negatively associated with 
variation in relative wages. Four, the year to year change in 
the total employment of employees in the manufacturing sector is 
used as independent variable for labour market conditions. It 
is expected to be positively associated with the coefficient of 
variation in wages.
Not each one of these slightly different variables for conditions 
in the labour market are considered as being of the same 
explanatory value. They do represent alternative proxies of 
labour market conditions. Statistics on registered unemployment 
underestimate the total level of unemployment in the Greek labour 
market. This level of unemployment is better captured by the
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annual labour force survey from which the variable for the 
average annual level of unemployment is drawn. However, 
statistics on registered unemployment are more reliable for 
labour market conditions faced by those unemployed with long 
experience in the labour market and more stable participation in 
the labour force. Normally, registration as unemployed is made 
for claiming benefits which are only paid to those with a 
certain minimum period in work. Thus, statistics on registered 
unemployment underestimate the number of unemployed by excluding 
new job seekers, casual labour, women dropping in and out of the 
labour force etc.
Moreover, both the level of unemployment and the level of 
registered unemployment may provide a biased view with respect to 
the labour market conditions prevailing in the manufacturing 
sector and, in particular, in industries employing more than 10 
employees from which the sample for manufacturing wages is drawn. 
These industries employ less than three quarters of the total 
number of employees in employment, while employees in employment 
account, throughout the post-war period, for less than 50 per 
cent of the total labour force. This is why the variable 
representing the annual change in the average annual employment 
of employees in the manufacturing sector may be a better proxy 
for the labour market conditions prevailing in the Greek 
manufacturing sector.
Finally, the strike activity variable is the annual coefficient 
of variation in days lost in strike activity per 1000 employees.
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It takes the value of 0 in the period 1967-74, during which no 
strike activity was recorded. According to our hypothesis, as 
variation in strike activity is not considered as a good proxy of 
bargaining power, there is no strong view on its positive or 
negative association with variation in the wage structure.
In testing for the incomes policy influence upon the 
manufacturing wage structure 22 annual observations, covering the 
period 1967-88, are used. Regression results of three sets of 
equations are given in Tables 6.4.1, 6.4.2, 6.4.3 and 6.4.4.
Table 6.4.1 presents results for the equation in which the 
business cycle variables are incorporated in their actual annual 
values. Table 6.4.2 provides the results for the specification in 
which the business cycle variables are regressed with one-year 
lagged values. Table 6.4.3 presents the results of the regression 
in which the labour market conditions variable is incorporated 
with one-year lag while the inflation variable is incorporated in 
its actual annual values. Table 6.4.4 examines various 
specifications of the strike activity variable. In Tables 6.4.1- 
6.4.3 four equations are reported, as four variables for labour 
market conditions are used alternatively. In Table 6.4.4 four 
equations are reported as four varying specifications of the 
strike activity variable are tested.
In general, all the hypotheses with regard to the influence 
exerted upon variation in the wage structure by the incomes 
policy and the business cycle variables are supported by the 
regression results. It appears that incomes policy dominates the 
evolution of the manufacturing wage structure, while the business
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cycle variables play a second but noticeable role.
All equations suggest that the norm-based incomes policy is 
associated with the widening of the wage structure. As far as 
indexation policy is concerned, the hypothesis that it caused the 
wage structure to become wider in comparison with the benchmark 
period, but relatively narrower than caused by the norm-based 
policy is also corroborated. The incomes policy coefficients for 
the norm-based policy are strongly significant across all sets of 
equations. The estimated coefficients of the indexation policy 
variable are less significant in some equations due to 
collinearity with the variable of inflation. But, overall, they 
suggest that indexation policy is associated with the widening of 
the wage structure as much as half as the norm-based policy did. 
This result fits with our hypotheses regarding the influence of 
incomes policy upon the manufacturing wage structure over the 
period under examination.
How much does the categorisation of incomes policy make 
difference in widening or narrowing the wage structure? This 
question can be answered by considering the standardised 
regression coefficients. The standardised regression coefficients 
for equation 4, which provides better results than any other 
equation in the set examined, are the following:
CVW = 0.32CPI + 0.22CHME - 0.40CVSTR + 1.13NIP + 0.42IIP
These results imply that the influence of the norm-based incomes 
policy in widening the manufacturing wage structure is three
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times the influence of the indexation policy.
As hypothesised the independent variable for inflation, when 
regressed without time-lag, gives significant estimates with 
positive sign. But its estimates in the lagged specification are 
neither stable nor significant. A relatively better performance 
of the lagged specification would have been consistent with the 
predominance of formal and institutionalised annual wage 
bargaining. But the better performance of the actual rate of 
inflation is more consistent with the erratic wage rounds 
evolving within the informal system of collective bargaining.
The positive correlation indicates that the higher the rate of 
inflation the wider the wage structure becomes as high-bargaining 
power branches adjust their wages to past and expected inflation, 
while low-bargaining power branches fail to keep up with. In this 
context, the influence of inflation upon the wage structure is 
not minimal as the standardised estimated coefficient compares to 
that of the indexation policy variable.
Labour market conditions influence the wage structure in a quite 
stable way. Variation in the wage structure is a negative 
function of the level of unemployment. This negative association 
is corroborated by all three alternative variables representing 
the state of unemployment. Stability in signs as well as 
consistency are remarkable. In all sets, the variable 
representing the annual change in manufacturing employment, 
provides estimates which are consistent with the negative sign 
in the parameters for unemployment. The two variables for
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registered unemployment and change in manufacturing employment 
perform better than the variable for the level of unemployment 
and its reciprocal.
Indeed, equations which include changes in manufacturing 
employment as a proxy for labour market conditions, provide the 
overall best fit. When it turns to how much influence the labour 
market variables exert upon the wage structure it appears that it 
is not very important in quantitative terms, as the standardised 
estimated coefficient for change in manufacturing employment is 
nearly half of that for the indexation policy variable.
The negative association between unemployment and variation in 
the wage structure implies that an increase in unemployment leads 
to a narrower wage structure. This indicates that industrial 
branches leading the widening of wage differentials are 
vulnerable to higher unemployment. This is consistent with the 
erratic character of the informal collective bargaining 
procedures which are not protected by the law and are not a 
central element of the official trade-unionism in Greek 
manufacturing.
Another interesting finding in all sets of regressions is the 
negative coefficient of the strike activity parameter which 
appears stable both in sign and in magnitude. The negative sign 
indicates that variation in the wage structure develops inversely 
to variation in strike activity. This inverse relationship 
indicates that strike activity it is not an indicator of 
bargaining power. The question which way works the causal link
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between variation in the wage structure and variation in strike 
activity is addressed in Table 6.4.4 where two alternative 
variables on strike activity are tested with and without a one 
year lag. The estimated coefficient for the strike activity 
variable in the equation with the lagged specification is found 
insignificant. However, is found significant and negative in the 
specification without lag. This result indicates that strike 
activity varies inversely to the variation in the wage structure 
and suggests that variation in strike activity does not 
determine variation in the wage structure. Therefore the 
conclusion can be drawn that strike activity is not always an 
indicator of bargaining power, especially in the context of the 
informal system of collective bargaining.
To summarise, regression results suggest that, in comparison with 
the benchmark period 1967-74, formal incomes policies do widen 
the wage structure, with the norm-based policy exerting the 
stronger positive effect while indexation policy exerts a lower 
positive influence. Incomes policies dominate the making of the 
manufacturing wage structure over the period 1975-1988 with the 
business cycle variables exerting a rather secondary but 
noticeable influence. Inflation is positively associated with 
variation in the wage structure, while unemployment is negatively 
associated. Variation in strike activity is found negatively 
associated with variation in the wage structure. The regression 
results support the original hypotheses. They confirm that 
country-and period-specific characteristics with respect to the 
system of industrial relations, as analysed in earlier Chapters,
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account for this unconventional association between variation in 
the wage structure and business cycle.
303
6.5. CONCLUSIONS.
In the Greek manufacturing sector, after a long tradition of 
permanent intervention in wage determination, the adoption of 
formal incomes policy since 1975 for controlling rising 
inflation, coincided with the rise of an informal system of 
collective bargaining at the plant level. In this context, the 
comparison of two types of formal incomes policy, with the period 
1967-74 used as benchmark, leads to the conclusion that both 
types of policy, namely the norm-based and the indexation, are 
positively associated with variation in the wage structure. 
Indeed, while both policies were aiming at a narrow wage 
structure, although not with equal emphasis, the norm-based 
policy failed and, in fact, did widen the wage structure. 
Indexation policy was relatively more successful in compressing 
the manufacturing wage structure.
This difference in performance may be attributed to the workings 
of the informal system of collective bargaining in the 
manufacturing sector, via which high-wage high-bargaining power 
industrial branches were extracting their wage premium in the 
1975-81 period. The indexation policy did cause a relatively 
narrower wage structure by protecting institutionally the 
relative wage of the low-wage low-bargaining power industrial 
branches. From this point of view, if the dispersion of the wage 
structure is used as criterion for the incomes policy evaluation, 
indexation can be considered as more successful. It appears that 
the indexation policy succeeded in narrowing relatively the wage
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structure via two ways. First, by improving the relative position 
of the low-wage industrial branches. Second, by controlling the 
high-wage industrial branches. Thus, it is not a paradox that 
trade-unions while being strongly in favour of the indexation 
system, cast their criticism upon the scale used for partial 
indexation which causes the decline in inter-industry wage 
differentials.
Behind the issue of the incomes policy effectiveness and failure 
lies the issue of the institutional framework of wage 
determination in the manufacturing sector. Industrial relations 
developments such as the lack of a formal system for collective 
bargaining at the plant level and the rise of informal collective 
bargaining, cause the wage structure to become wider when the 
incomes policy is rather voluntary and allows room for informal 
collective bargaining.
Indeed, in this context, the business cycle causes contradictory 
influences upon the wage structure. Inflation undermines the 
relative wage of the low-wage less powerful industrial branches. 
Unemployment controls the high-wage high-bargaining power 
industrial branches in extracting a wage premium. In other 
words, because of incomes policies and the institutional 
developments in the manufacturing bargaining structure it appears 
that changes in the wage structure not only became less 
responsive to business cycle conditions but, indeed, their 
responsiveness is the inverse than that observed in 
industrialised market economies such as the U.S. and the U.K.
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where collective bargaining evolves through relatively stable 
structures and processes.
With regard to industrial relations developments, given that 
strike activity was the main weapon for initiating new bargaining 
relationships and setting up the informal system of collective 
bargaining at the plant level, the inverse variation in strike 
activity suggests that the inter-industry efficiency of strike 
activity was not a function of the hours lost in industrial 
conflict. The evidence on the expansion of strike activity, along 
with its inverse variation compared to variation in the wage 
structure suggest that in many cases the low-wage low-bargaining 
power industrial branches have been locked in a vicious cycle of 
low relative wages and adversarial industrial relations.
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Tahle 6.4.1
REGRESSION EQUATIONS
TO EXPLAIN INTER-BRANCH VARIANCE IN WAGES. 1967-1988.
Variable SD M ES 1
Equation 
2 3 4
CVW 2.03 15.09
CT 13.94
(15.40)
12.73
(17.91)
12.80
(29.03)
12.48
(25.53)
CPI 8.33 14.05 + 0.06*
(1.68)
0.06**
(1.93)
0.09**** 0.08**** 
(2.62) (2.61)
U 2.43 
RECU 0.17 
CHRU 20.13 
CHME 2.52
4.46
0.31
4.42
1.91
+
+
-0.20
(-1.04)
1.22
(0.61)
-0.02*
(-1.36)
0.18**
(1.90)
CVSTR 85.51 98.47 ? -0.01**
(-1.85)
0.01**
(-1.80)
-0.01**
(-1.74)
-0.01**
(-1.84)
NIP + 4.85***** 4.88***** 4.93***** 4.84***** 
(4.20) (4.07) (4.42) (4.53)
IIP + 2.29**
(1.75)
1.66*
(1.50)
1.40*
(1.42)
1.78**
(1.85)
R -adjusted 
Durbin-Watson 
Method of Estimation
.797
1.75
OLS
.788
1.71
OLS
.805
1.87
OLS
.823
1.73
OLS
Notes:
SD = Standard Deviation.
M = Mean.
ES = Expected Sign.
CVW = Coefficient of variation in hourly wage of male worker:
across twenty two-digit manufacturing branches.
CPI = Annual rate of inflation.
U = Level of unemployment.
RECU = Reciprocal of unemployment level.
CHRU = Change in registered unemployment.
CHME = Change in manufacturing employment.
CVSTR = Coefficient of Variation in hours lost per 1000 employees 
in strike activity across twenty two-digit industrial branches.
NIP = Norm-based incomes policy.
IIP = Indexation incomes policy, 
t-statistics in parentheses.
Levels of Significance *=.1, ***=.025, ★****=.005, **=.05, ****=.01
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Table 6.4.2
REGRESSION EQUATIONS
TO EXPLAIN INTER-BRANCH VARIANCE IN WAGES. 1967-1988.
Equation
Variable SD M ES 5 6 7 8
CVW 2.03 15.09
CT 15.15 12.38 13.05 12.75
(13.40) (15.78) (30.18) (25.29)
CPIt_i 8.55 13.66 + -0.02 0.003 0.05 0.01
(-0.26) (0.05) (1.02) (0.27)
Ut_i 2.32 4.34 - -0.37*
(-1.67)
RECU^_]^ 0.17 0.31 + 4.15*
(1.54)
-0.3***
(-2.10)
CHRU^_^ 20.04 
CHME^_2 2.53
4.70
2.00 + 0.23**
(2.10)
CVSTR 85.51 98.47 ? -0.01 -0.01* -0.01** -0.01*
(-1.19) (-1.37) (-2.02) (-1.50)
NIP + . _.***** . ***** ***** **** 4.94 4.74 6.04 5.58
(3.89) (3.47) (5.60) (5.13)
IIP + 3.30**** 2.66** 2.50*** 2.76**
(2.64) (2.42) (2.48) (2.66)
R^-adjusted .770 .765 .789 .788
Durbin-Watson 1.88 1.72 2.41 2.06
Method of Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS
Notes:
SD = Standard Deviation.
M = Mean.
ES = Expected Sign.
CVW = Coefficient of variation in hourly wage of male workers 
across twenty two-digit manufacturing branches.
CPI = Annual rate of inflation.
U = Level of unemployment.
RECU = Reciprocal of unemployment level.
CHRU = Change in registered unemployment.
CHME = Change in manufacturing employment.
CVSTR = Coefficient of Variation in hours lost per 1000 employees 
in strike activity across twenty two-digit industrial branches.
NIP = Norm-based incomes policy.
IIP = Indexation incomes policy, 
t-statistics in parentheses.
Levels of Significance *=.1, ***=.025, *****==.oo5, **=.05, ****=.01
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Tzü)le 6.4.3
REGRESSION EQUATIONS
TO EXPLAIN INTER-BRANCH VARIANCE IN WAGES. 1967-1988.
Equation
Variable SD M ES 9 10 11 12
CVW 2.03 15.09
CT 13.98 12.66 12.82 12.56
(13.32) (16.41) (33.86) (27.14)
CPI 8.33 14.05 + 0.05* 0.05* 0.07*** 0.05**
(1.38) (1.33) (2.33) (1.77)
Ut_i 2.32 4.34 - -0.19
(-0.93)
RECU^_]^ 0.17 0.31 + 1.89
(0.65)
CHRU^_2 20.04 
CHME^_2 2.53
4.70
2.00 +
-0.03
(-2.17)
0.19**
(1.88)
CVSTR 85.51 98.47 ? -0.01* -0.01* -0.008* -0.008*
(-1.73) (-1.71) (-1.64) (-1.59)
NIP + 4.72***** 4.70***** 5.24***** 4.94****
(3.92) (3.65) (5.06) (4.64)
IIP + 2.06* 1.76* 1.87** 1.99**
(1.68) (1.53) (1.98) (2.00)
R^-adjusted .794 .788 .832 .822
Durbin-Watson 1.76 1.69 2.27 1.96
Method of Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS
Notes :
SD = Standard Deviation.
M = Mean.
ES = Expected Sign.
CVW = Coefficient of variation in hourly wage of male workers 
across twenty two-digit manufacturing branches.
CPI = Annual rate of inflation.
U = Level of unemployment.
RECU = Reciprocal of unemployment level.
CHRU = Change in registered unemployment.
CHME = Change in manufacturing employment.
CVSTR = Coefficient of Variation in hours lost per 1000 employees 
in strike activity across twenty two-digit industrial branches.
NIP = Norm-based incomes policy.
IIP = Indexation incomes policy, 
t-statistics in parentheses.
Levels of Significance *=.1, ***=.025, *****=.005, **=.05, ****=.01
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Table 6.4.4
REGRESSION EQUATIONS
TO EXPLAIN INTER-BRANCH VARIANCE IN WAGES. 1967-1988.
Equation
Variable SD M ES 4 13 14 15
CVW 2.03 15.09
CT 12.48 12.40 12.47 12.42
(25.53) (20.23) (19.09) (19.49)
* * * * **** * * *
CPI 8.33 14.05 + 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09
(2.61) (2.88) (2.60) (2.61)
4r 4r 4r 4> 4( ifcCHME 2.52 1.91 + 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.22
(1.90) (1.76) (2.08) (2.31)
CVSTR
85.51 98.47 ? -0.01**
CVSTRt_i (-1.84)
85.12 97.72 ? 0.003
RSTR (1.12)
355 277 ? 0.0003
RSTRt_i (0.34) *
355 278 ? 0.001
(1.38)
NIP
^  .t «L .t .Ê. .L .1. .L .k ^  .1. .1.
+ 4.84 2.43 2.62 2.35
(4.53) (3.47) (3.71) (3.45)
IIP
+ 1.78** -0.33 0.10 -0.11
(1.85) (-0.38) (0.12) (-0.15)
R^-adjusted .823 .821 .808 .829
Durbin-Watson 1.73 1.82 1.84 1.81
Method of Estimation OLS EIIM AR(1) EIIM AR(1) EIIM AR(1
Notes:
SD = Standard Deviation.
M - Mean.
ES = Expected Sign.
CVW = Coefficient of variation in hourly wage of male workers 
across twenty two-digit manufacturing branches.
CPI = Annual rate of inflation.
CHME = Change in manufacturing employment.
CVSTR = Coefficient of Variation in hours lost per 1000 employees 
in strike activity across twenty two-digit industrial branches.
RSTR = Rate of strike activity i.e.
NIP = Norm-based incomes policy.
IIP = Indexation incomes policy, 
t-statistics in parentheses.
Levels of Significance *=.1, ***=.025, *****=.005, **=.05, ****=.01
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In a nutshell the conclusion of the thesis is that in the Greek 
manufacturing sector, despite the extensive and continuous 
regulation of wage determination procedures, changes in 
industrial relations which occurred after 1975 and were marked by 
decentralised and fragmented collective bargaining, were 
accompanied by flexibility in relative wages. The causes of this 
flexibility, which is largely non-competitive, are related to 
the rise of decentralised, fragmented and informal collective 
bargaining at the company and plant level.
This conclusion has been reached through an approach developed in 
three stages. First, we examined the main characteristics of the 
national system of industrial relations, that is the formal 
bargaining structure, the machinery of compulsory arbitration and 
the behaviour of salary and wage earners as expressed in strike 
activity. Second, we analysed the wage and employment policies 
undertaken over the period 1966-88 along with the basic 
developments as far as wages and employment in manufacturing are 
concerned. Third, based upon the inferences drawn regarding 
incomes policies and developments in industrial relations, we 
tested first for the existence of flexibility in relative wages 
and second for the influence exerted upon the wage structure by 
incomes policies, inflation, unemployment and strike activity.
Our approach was based on the assumption that industrial 
relations, through which labour markets operate, influence labour
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market outcomes. More specifically, to analyse the national 
system of collective bargaining in Greece, we adopted as 
framework the twofold distinction first between centralised and 
decentralised bargaining, and second between coherent and 
fragmented bargaining structures. The aim of this approach has 
not been just to classify the Greek bargaining structure in a 
certain category, but to trace its continuity and its change over 
the period 1966-88, and when necessary beyond that.
Since 1955, when the basic legislation on collective bargaining 
was introduced, two have been the central elements of the 
national system of collective bargaining; first, the formalised 
and regulated by the law bargaining levels and units and second, 
the extensively used machinery of compulsory arbitration. The 
legislation, namely and mainly Law 3239, defined the levels and 
units at which bargaining can take place by permitting company 
and plant level collective bargaining only for exceptional cases 
and by excluding manufacturing industries. Therefore, the formal 
bargaining structure favoured by the existing legislation is 
rather centralised. Indeed, it has been supposed to be coherent 
as well, because the legislation by defining bargaining levels 
and units aimed to avoid overlapping among different levels of 
negotiation.
Arbitration, in turn, was made compulsory in the sense that one 
party can unilaterally refer a dispute to the arbitration court 
the award of which is binding for the parties involved in the 
dispute. The aim of compulsory arbitration when it was adopted
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was to control industrial conflicts and minimise the occurrence 
of strikes as well as to promote tripartite collaboration.
After examining the aims and the provisions upon which the 
national system of collective bargaining has been based, we 
conclude that since 1975, as far as bargaining procedures and 
structures are concerned, there has been a gap between aims and 
outcomes, exemplified by the creation, especially in 
manufacturing, of a dual structure of collective bargaining. 
First, strong tendencies towards decentralised and fragmented 
bargaining have been observed which resulted in the creation of 
an informal system of collective bargaining at the company and 
plant level. Second, despite the central role played by 
arbitration, as a major proportion of dispute cases in the Greek 
labour market have been going to arbitration, its extensive and 
increasing use has been positively associated with the rise of 
strike activity. The evidence on the characteristics of strike 
activity suggests that the use of arbitration led to higher rates 
of strike activity rather than the other way round.
The increase after 1975 in the number and density of bargaining 
units acting inside and outside the formal bargaining structure 
has been impressive. This increase, indicating decentralisation 
and fragmentation of collective bargaining, can be explained by 
four factors referring to political, structural, economic and 
industrial relations developments. First, the political 
developments refer to the fall of the military regime and its 
succession by a parliamentary democracy, which led to a more 
liberal climate in industrial relations and trade unions. More
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specifically, the freeze of trade-union activities during the 
period of the military regime, along with the appointment of pro- 
governmental leaderships in the official structure of trade- 
unionism, resulted, after the fall of the military regime, in a 
political and organisational vacuum in Greek trade-unionism.
Second, the period 1967-74 was characterised by the most rapid 
expansion of manufacturing employment ever observed in Greece. 
This expansion was largely associated with the creation of new 
establishments in which new workers, lacking experience and 
tradition with regard to trade-union activities, had to organise 
from the very beginning their bargaining institutions and 
processes. Third, since 1975 the rate of inflation, which over 
the 1960s remained on average at levels lower than 2 per cent, 
soared at double-digit levels, and generated the need for wage 
and salary earners to keep up, at least, with inflation rates to 
preserve their real incomes.
Fourth, the formal bargaining structure, more specifically the 
formal levels and units for collective bargaining determined and 
certified by the law, were not compatible with the changing 
structure of the expanding manufacturing employment as company 
and plant level bargaining units were excluded. Furthermore, 
within the formal system of collective bargaining the control of 
compulsory arbitration by the Ministry of Labour, and its use as 
a machinery for implementing the governmental incomes policy, 
did not encourage salary and wage earners to seek wage 
settlements through the formal system.
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strike activity, the rate of which increased impressively after 
1975 and since then remained at high levels, has been the vehicle 
by which salary and wage earners, representing new bargaining 
units, attempted to establish new bargaining relationships at the 
company and plant level. However, it is noteworthy that strike 
activity and informal collective bargaining were not equally 
developed across the board. Some industrial branches were more 
strike-prone while others where less active.
There are two reasons for considering that strike activity 
reflects efforts to initiate procedures and institutions 
alternative to the formal system of collective bargaining. 
First, it is the positive association between direct and indirect 
regulation of collective bargaining by the Ministry of Labour and 
strike activity. Second, it is the fact that strike activity was 
largely evolving at the company and plant level. Even if some of 
those strikes were protest-strikes, the collective action 
undertaken by salary and wage earners can be considered as 
indicator of new bargaining units at their early stages. In other 
words, it seems that while regulation and compulsory arbitration 
had a "freezing effect" upon the formal collective bargaining, at 
the same time they had a "de-freezing effect" upon collective 
bargaining evolving out of the formal bargaining structure.
After all, in Greek manufacturing the number and the density of 
bargaining units within the formal system as well as the number 
and the density of conflicts occurring at the company and plant 
level indicate the decentralisation and fragmentation of
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the bargaining structure. Therefore, the developments over the 
period 1975-88 suggest that the Greek system of collective 
bargaining while typically, that is its formal part, is rather 
centralised, in reality, that is after taking into account its 
informal part, is decentralised and fragmented too. It falls 
somewhere between the two extremes, with fragmented collective 
bargaining being a dominant feature.
These developments in industrial relations over the period 1975- 
88, not surprisingly, were not very favourable for the successful 
implementation of formal incomes policies introduced since 1975. 
This is because, normally, incomes policies in order to effective 
require centralised collective bargaining. The two types of 
policy adopted over the period 1975-88 had the common 
characteristic that both favoured, more or less, the low paid and 
aimed at the compression of the wage structure. In conditions of 
rising inflation, incomes policies based largely on flat-rate 
and scale elements, (the system of automatic and partial 
indexation is typical of this case) normally result in a decline 
in wage differentials. This has been the case as far as wages of 
individuals are concerned. But it appears that in 1975-81, 
despite the egalitarian incomes policy, inter-industry 
wage differentials in manufacturing increased. Indeed, the 
variability in relative wages observed over the whole period 
1966-88 indicates the existence of some flexibility.
Given the developments in the bargaining structure and the 
rationales and mechanics of incomes policies adopted since 1975, 
we examined the extent to which the variability in relative wages
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reflects competitive or industry-specific non-competitive 
flexibility. The main issue examined with regard to competitive 
flexibility has been whether or not increases in relative wages 
were associated with the use of wages for retaining and 
attracting labour in expanding sectors. The main issue examined 
with regard to non-competitive flexibility has been whether or 
not the increases in relative wages reflected industry-specific 
productivity gains shared by the workforce or reflected industry- 
specific bargaining power and militancy.
The results suggest that the observed variability over the period 
1966-88 mainly reflects non-competitive flexibility associated 
with long-run industry-specific productivity gains while in the 
short-run reflects industry-specific bargaining power and 
militancy. It appears that the decentralised and fragmented 
collective bargaining via the informal system created conditions 
conducive to non-competitive flexibility in relative wages. 
Indeed, the overall context of wage and employment regulation by 
governmental policies disfavoured competitive flexibility and 
provided some room for non-competitive flexibility.
However, some sub-period characteristics are noteworthy. First, 
in 1967-74, when no formal incomes policy was in force and strike 
activity was banned, competitive forces were given a chance and 
were at work. Low unemployment, rapid expansion in manufacturing 
employment creating strong demand for labour. The wage fixing in 
line with the average productivity growth allowed expanding 
industries to use relative wages for retaining and attracting
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labour. Second, in 1977-88, that is over the period of 
egalitarian incomes policies, the asymmetries in wage changes 
and in productivity changes at the industry level were found 
employment hindering because wages in industrial branches with 
below-average productivity growth were less responsive to that 
relatively poor productivity performance than wages in industrial 
branches with above-average changes in productivity. The causes 
of this asymmetry can be traced first, to the egalitarian incomes 
policies themselves and second, to the workings of the informal 
system of collective bargaining at the plant level.
The effects of the decentralised and fragmented collective 
bargaining upon relative wages were also expressed in the way 
that incomes policies, inflation and unemployment were 
associated, over the period 1967-88, with the evolution of the 
inter-industry wage structure. The predominant role of factors 
such as the establishment size, the skill and the sex composition 
of the labour force as determinants of the manufacturing wage 
structure and the stable hierarchy at the top and at the bottom 
of the manufacturing wage structure indicate that a two-sectors 
model of high-wage, concentrated and high-bargaining power 
industries on the one hand, and low-wage, less concentrated and 
low-bargaining power industries on the other, is substantiated.
In the context of decentralised, fragmented and informal 
collective bargaining it has been found that the norm-based 
incomes policy was associated with the widening of the wage 
structure twice as much as the indexation policy. Our explanation 
for this is that under the norm-based policy the high-wage high-
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bargaining power branches, by considering the norm as the floor 
for additional increases in nominal wages, were able to extract a 
wage premium via the informal system of collective bargaining, 
while the low-wage industries had to struggle for getting wage 
settlements near the governmental norm.
The relatively narrower wage structure associated with the 
indexation policy is consistent with the fact that automatic 
indexation along with the scales for partial indexation protected 
and increased the relative wage of low-wage low-bargaining power 
branches, while at the same time, by being made statutory in 1983 
and 1985-87 controlled, to a certain extent, wage rises in high- 
wage high-bargaining power industrial branches.
The effects of the decentralised, fragmented and informal 
bargaining are also prominent in the way that economy-wide 
factors such as inflation and unemployment influenced the inter­
industry wage structure over the period 1967-88. Relative wages 
not only became less responsive to inflation and unemployment but 
their responsiveness was inverse than that observed in the U.S. 
and the U.K. manufacturing sector.
In the U.S. and the U.K., for instance, the existence of formal 
collective agreements lasting one, two or three years causes a 
certain stickiness in wage changes of the high-wage industries. 
But in Greece high-wage industries keep up with rising 
inflation via the informal system of collective bargaining, 
while low-wage industries fail to do so. Thus, as indicated by 
the positive correlation between inflation and variation in the
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wage structure, rising inflation leads to wider inter-industry 
wage differentials.
A similar inverse association has been observed with regard to 
unemployment and variation in the wage structure. It appears that 
unemployment affects more the high-wage high-bargaining power 
industries, probably because rising unemployment undermines the 
workings of the informal system of collective bargaining. This 
negative association between unemployment and variation in the 
wage structure was not observed in the U.S. and the U.K. where 
formal collective bargaining in high-wage and high-bargaining 
power industries is not affected by changes in the level of 
unemployment.
With regard to the annual inter-industry variation in strike 
activity the results indicate the existence of a negative 
association with variation in the wage structure. In other words, 
the wider variation of the rate of strike activity from year to 
year did not cause an analogous variation in the wage structure. 
This could be explained on the basis that strike activity does 
not always indicate bargaining power. It may well operate as a 
way of expressing collective discontent and protest.
Incomes policy in Greece can be evaluated from two standpoints. 
First, according to its, more or less, stated rationales and 
objectives. Second, according to its overall contribution in 
macroeconomic and industrial relations developments. Normally 
these two standpoints are identical. But it appears that in the 
case of incomes policy in Greece these standpoints differed. This
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has been due to the conflict between economic and political 
calculations of successive governments when designing and 
implementing incomes policy over the period 1975-88.
When, the annual change in nominal wages or the annual change in 
unit labour costs are adopted as criteria, as they are from a 
macroeconomic point of view rather important with respect to 
cost-push inflation, the distinction between success and failure 
of the norm-based and the indexation policy becomes less clear as 
both are related to good and bad performances and both, under the 
pressure of deteriorating current accounts, had to change their 
stance from nominal to real incomes policy. It appears that real 
incomes policy implemented via the indexation scheme has been far 
more effective in controlling real wages and unit labour costs 
than such policies implemented via the norm-based scheme.
As far as the inter-industry wage structure is concerned the 
experience suggests that it may become wider or narrower because 
of quite different influences such as the pressure exerted by the 
high-wage high-bargaining power industries or the indexation- 
based incomes policies securing relatively high relative wages 
for the low-wage low-bargaining industries. However, both cases 
signal the problems in the functioning of the Greek labour 
market. These problems are first related to governmental incomes 
policy itself, and second, refer to bargaining structures and 
procedures.
On incomes policy the main question is whether or not the system 
of indexation should be abandoned altogether. Such an option
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would have to answer the questions how to control high-wage 
high-bargaining power industrial branches and how to offer 
protection for minimum wages to low-wage low-bargaining power 
industrial branches. Because it seems unlikely that changes in 
formal indexation provisions could lead to a reduction of the 
willingness of employees and trade-unions to preserve real wages 
and their share in income distribution. It is not the indexation 
system which makes them to behave in the bargaining process 
without having any money illusion.
Moreover, it is an open question as to whether the wide 
dispersion in manufacturing wages observed over the period 1976- 
81 set long-term standards which were suppressed by the 
indexation policy but were not disposed of by the narrower 
standards imposed in the period 1982-88. Indeed, a related 
question is whether or not the abandon of incomes policies would 
be followed by major disturbances to the wage structure.
On bargaining structures and procedures the main problem refers 
to the harmonisation of the formal bargaining structure with the 
real bargaining structure as well as to the creation of really 
independent machinery able to provide conciliation and 
arbitration services without being overridden by the governmental 
policies. The harmonisation of the dual bargaining structure, in 
turn, is related to the recognition of the right to bargain and 
contract collective agreements at the company and plant level. 
The institution of independent arbitration services depends 
largely on the initiatives of the Ministry of Labour which has
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been addicted to direct and indirect regulation of wage 
determination, dependent it comes the question of obtaining more 
coherence in the bargaining structure.
The recognition of the right to bargain at the plant level may 
initiate changes in the bargaining structure towards more 
coherence, as many not really representative formal bargaining 
units would be made redundant. But as the existing structure has 
been built over a quite long period, decrees and rational 
normative approaches and decisions at the top of the trade-unions 
structure do not seem, in the short-run, able to generate any 
impressive reform.
Finally, in the context of decentralised and fragmented 
collective bargaining it is not easy to achieve corporatist-like 
arrangements based upon a quid pro quo for greater flexibility in 
relative wages and moderation in wage determination on the one 
hand, and continued policies for employment protection on the 
other. The prevailing conditions may well continue working in 
favour of non-competitive flexibility which is not a solution but 
part of the problem.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1: SYSTEMS OF ARBITRATION IN THE U.S. THE U.K. AND
AUSTRALIA
These three systems of arbitration developed in a common 
cultural tradition but in different contexts of industrial 
relations. Blain, Goodman and Loewenberg (1987) compared 
mediation, conciliation and arbitration frameworks in these 
countries and concluded that the British and the American 
industrial relations systems can be essentially characterised as 
collective bargaining systems with conciliation mediation and 
arbitration occupying an ancillary position, while the Australian 
system involves the greatest degree of compulsion. They drew the 
line by using as main criterion the degree of compulsion in the 
existing legislation and machinery.
From our point of view these distinct models of arbitration which 
are associated with different systems of industrial relations 
provide the basis to discuss the conditions under which 
arbitration may be compatible with collective bargaining first 
with regard to the key issue who is who performs the role of 
arbitrator, considers the parties offers and external information 
to arrive to the final award, be it compulsory or not, and 
second with regard to the degree of governmental intervention, as 
the state is at the same time responsible for setting the legal 
framework, for protecting the national economic interest and 
often for serving as industrial peacemaker. For instance, incomes
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policies have been more often at work in the U.K. and in 
Australia than in the U.S.
First, let us consider the system of arbitration provided by 
independent professionals which is used in the U.S. Similar 
system of arbitration is used in Canada. According to Cordova 
(1987:331), in Jamaica, Malaysia, Panama, the Philippines and 
Zambia systems of private arbitration like the north-american 
are practised too.
In the U.S. the collective bargaining structure is highly 
decentralised. Collective bargaining takes place mainly at the 
company and the plant level. Collective agreements are very 
detailed and the great majority of them content arbitration 
clauses. (Wheeler and Hoyt, 1987). Conventional and final-offer 
or binding arbitration are common forms of interest arbitration 
in use. Binding arbitration is mainly used in the public sector. 
Many state laws provide for such arbitration of unresolved 
disputes. Arbitrators are selected among lawyers and academics. 
Their decisions are usually considered as final, binding and 
unappealable. Overall, as Bloom and Cavanagh (1987:354) 
concluded, the American system of industrial relations exhibits 
a strong normative preference for resolving disputes without the 
aid of third parties.
Second, the system of voluntary arbitration provided in the U.K. 
by the ACAS an autonomous institution. In the U.K. arbitration is 
voluntary and therefore an unwilling party cannot be compelled to 
go to arbitration. Moreover, arbitration awards are not legally
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binding but arrangements for arbitration are made on the basis 
that the award will be honoured by the parties. In this context 
of voluntary arbitration even the terms of reference are usually 
agreed by the parties. Arbitrators are not members of the staff 
of the ACAS but are appointed by ACAS from lists of industrial 
relations specialists.
There are three types of arbitral bodies. In the first type, the 
arbitration procedure is performed by a single arbitrator. In the 
second type it is performed by specially appointed boards of 
arbitration consisted of a chairman and one a side members. In 
the third type arbitrator is the Central Arbitration Committee 
which is a more permanent tripartite body the members of which 
are appointed by the Secretary of State for Employment from lists 
proposed by the interested parties.
However, as Brown (1987:113) argued, the predominant position of 
collective bargaining in conflict resolution in Britain and the 
fact that the government has largely and for a long period 
avoided involvement in dispute resolution, has meant that there 
has been little scope for third party institutions. Moreover, the 
main bulk of disputes referred to ACAS is concerned with 
conciliating over industrial grievances and only a small 
proportion of disputes procedures involve an ACAS arbitrator at 
the final stage. Overall, in the U.K. arbitration has not been a 
central element in conflict resolution and in industrial 
relations in general.
Third, the Australian system of compulsory arbitration provided
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by the ACAC. an autonomous institution. Similar systems of 
compulsory arbitration are used in New Zealand and Israel. 
According to Blanpain (1987:7) the Australian system of
compulsory arbitration has been adopted by a great number of 
developing countries like Singapore, Kenya, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Zambia, Sierra Leone and Malaysia. Perhaps this wide adoption of
the Australian model of compulsory arbitration is related to the
fact that in the 1960s compulsory arbitration was considered and 
proposed as the best choice, with regard to equity in
distribution and political stability, for developing and less 
developed countries. (Turner, 1965 and Braun, 1975:212-213).
In Australia the system of arbitration has been under continuous 
and systematic scrutiny . (Committee of Review into Australian 
Industrial Relations Law and Systems, 1985). It includes both 
federal and state arbitral bodies. Either party to the bargaining 
process can refer a dispute to the arbitral body. The main 
arbitral body is the Australian Commission of Conciliation and 
Arbitration which has a long history going back to the beginning 
of the century. All members of the Commission are appointed by 
the Governor General on advice of the government in office. 
However, the ACAC is independent from the government. The 
government is only responsible for the legislation governing the 
system and cannot intervene directly in the wage and industrial 
relations regulation. The Commission itself is empowered to 
intervene in disputes extending to more than one state. 
Arbitration is compulsory in two ways. First, both parties to the 
bargaining process are required to submit to a compulsory
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procedure for representing their arguments. Second, awards are 
binding on the parties. Awards specify minimum standards of pay 
and conditions. Federal awards tend to set the pattern for all 
other tribunals.
Under the legislation on arbitration all federal unions are 
required to register with the arbitration authorities. Only 
registered organisations are entitled to institute proceedings 
before the Commission and obtain or enforce awards. Conciliation 
procedures are the first step undertaken by the commission. If 
parties are able to reconcile their differences through 
conciliation may present a memorandum of agreement to the 
Commission for certification or request that an award be made. A 
certified agreement has the value of an award. If conciliation is 
unsuccessful totally or partially the commission is obliged to 
resolve the dispute by arbitration.
The Commission consists of a President, Deputy Presidents, a 
Senior Commissioner and Commissioners. They are permanent members 
of the Commission. The President is required to have a legal 
background but the rest should be persons with experience at 
"high level" in industrial relations or have a relevant 
university degree. All members have a tenure until age 65. 
Presidential members appointed before 1972 have tenure until 70. 
The Commission works in a panel system. Panels are responsible 
for a number of sectors or industries.
Thus, in Australia traditional tasks of collective bargaining 
have largely been shouldered by the statutory conciliation and
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arbitration machinery. Therefore the scale and the significance 
of collective bargaining vary considerably when compared with 
other industrialised market economies. Collective bargaining 
appears to have been in a secondary position as a mode for 
wage and job regulation. This is why Windmuller (1987:92) in his 
comparative study of systems of industrial relations considers 
that collective bargaining is not one of the central features of 
the Australian system. The centrality of conciliation and 
arbitration makes it fundamentally different from other systems 
in industrialised market economies. A rather similar system of 
arbitration has been used also in New Zealand which has also a 
long history going back in the beginning of the century.
The Australian system of compulsory arbitration has been the 
subject of extensive research comparing its labour market 
outcomes with those of systems of collective bargaining. Overall, 
as the Committee of Review into Australian Industrial Relations 
Law and Systems (1985: 169) reported, the evidence as to how the 
the system of compulsory arbitration has affected Australia* s 
experience in respect of inflation and unemployment is less 
decisive and "certainly does not support confident assertions 
about ill-effects due to the Commission's presence".
Mulvey (1986) reviewed the literature on the effects that 
compulsory arbitration might have had upon the wage structure and 
concluded that the evidence is ambiguous. Many studies such as 
those by Brawn et all (1980) and Norris (1980) who compared the 
wage structure in Australia with that in the U.K. and the U.S. to
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test whether compulsory arbitration brings about a more 
egalitarian wage structure than would obtain under free 
collective bargaining show less dispersion in the inter- 
occupational and inter-personal distribution of earnings in 
Australia as compared with the U.K. and the U.S. Only the low- 
paid workers were found better off in Australia and this can be 
attributed to arbitration. But the differences are of modest
proportion and they cannot be interpreted as indicating that 
compulsory arbitration induces severe distortions of the wage 
structure.
Withers et al (1983) examined how well the Australian system of 
wage determination facilitates disaggregated labour market 
adjustment by comparing it with the major alternatives in the 
U.S. the U.K. and Sweden and found not important differences 
between the Australian system of compulsory arbitration and its 
alternatives. Therefore, we can draw the conclusion that, while 
arbitration may affect the wage structure in an egalitarian way 
through comparability, not important differences between labour 
outcomes under collective bargaining and under arbitration are 
observed at the level of national systems of industrial 
relations.
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APPENDIX 2; EMPLOYMENT OF SALARY AND WAGE EARNERS IN GREEK
MANUFACTURING.
In Section 4.4 we discussed the characteristics and the evolution 
of the employment of wage earners in manufacturing over the 
period 1965-1988. This appendix provides the Tables which present 
the characteristics, the distribution and the evolution of the 
employment of both salary and wage-earners in the Greek 
manufacturing sector. Tables with A prefix correspond to those 
included in Section 4.4.
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Table A4.4.8.
CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT OF SALARY AND WAGE EARNERS IN MANUFACTURING
BY BRANCH
Selected Periods
Period
Branch
1967/74 1975/81 1982/88 1965/88 
change per cent
20 39.91 -10.05 49.94 99.20
21 54.52 -10.26 39.22 155.73
22 -29.00 16.63 -10.59 -44.42
23 29.84 1.11 8.37 41.99
24 126.85 9.15 34.54 298.91
25 62.30 -10.48 6.92 40.55
26 55.94 -12.48 1.26 27.22
27 9.83 -1.45 45.80 68.99
28 19.18 -5.09 — 0.06 12.10
29 1.35 -5.17 34.54 11.43
30 49.64 27.69 -17.01 107.80
31 49.18 11.54 19.24 102.81
32 160.84 41.71 8.75 334.83
33 28.01 -8.25 36.96 50.28
34 92.06 —14.65 33.86 214.02
35 55.47 10.22 -2.10 55.16
36 40.11 -5.18 -16.01 12.05
37 92.00 -7.75 11.97 86.99
38 116.26 68.97 -26.23 157.35
39 82.76 -29.08 55.22 115.29
All 48.24 5.95 12.37 78.64
Number of 
Branches with 
Expanding 
Employment 19 8 14 19
Sources: 1967-1975, NSSG Annual Industrial Survey, Table 6.
1976-1988, NSSG Labour Force Statistics, Table 3.
332
Table A4.4.9.
DISTRIBUTION OF SALARY AND WAGE EARNERS ACROSS MANUFACTURING INDUSTRI
1965-1988
Year
Branch
1965 1970 1975 
per cent
1980 1985 1988
20 13.09 14.31 13.01 11.03 13.54 14.60
21 2.01 2.68 2.67 2.35 3.03 2.88
22 6.72 3.94 2.40 2.66 2.17 2.09
23 20.26 17.48 17.76 17.77 16.13 16.10
24 5.37 6.32 9.40 9.58 11.95 11.98
25 2.50 2.73 2.57 2.26 2.09 1.96
26 2.04 2.16 2.05 1.71 1.50 1.45
27 2.77 2.64 2.18 2.09 2.46 2.62
28 3.35 3.17 2.63 2.53 2.22 2.10
29 1.81 1.42 1.09 0.99 1.33 1.13
30 3.00 3.27 3.64 4.15 3.75 3.49
31 5.66 5.73 5.62 5.78 6.45 6.43
32 0.61 0.84 1.09 1.46 1.29 1.48
33 7.88 7.41 6.52 5.85 6.82 6.63
34 1.50 2.65 2.82 2.41 3.05 2.63
35 6.66 6.47 6.54 6.54 5.83 5.79
36 3.36 3.41 3.15 2.89 2.30 2.11
37 4.42 5.56 5.27 4.66 4.80 4.63
38 6.23 6.79 8.52 12.43 8.42 8.97
39 0.78 1.03 1.07 0.86 0.87 0.93
All 100 100 100 100 100 100
(20, 23,
24, 38) 44.95 44.90 48.69 50.81 50.04 51.65
Total 218938 248892 335853 360284 391840 391119
Sources: 1965-1975, NSSG Annual Industrial Survey, Table 6.
1976-1988, NSSG Labour Force Statistics, Table 3.
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Table A4.4.10.
AVERAGE EMPLOYMENT OF SALARY AND WAGE EARNERS IN MANUFACTURING INDU
Selected Periods
Average
1967-74
Branch
Share
%
Average
1975-81
Share
%
Average
1982-88
Share
%
Average
1966-88
Share
%
20 35632 13.62 40097 11.24 49743 13.04 41069 12.62
21 7016 2.68 8438 2.37 10765 2.82 8514 2.62
22 9722 3.72 9471 2.66 8305 2.18 9400 2.89
23 46653 17.83 61961 17.38 62196 16.30 55987 17.20
24 17651 6.75 34068 9.55 45939 12.04 31020 9.53
25 7203 2.75 8013 2.25 7960 2.09 7614 2.34
26 5399 2.06 6873 1.93 6165 1.62 6045 1.86
27 6692 2.56 7579 2.13 9488 2.49 7807 2.40
28 8083 3.09 9120 2.56 8696 2.28 8573 2.63
29 3495 1.34 3686 1.03 4522 1.19 3877 1.19
30 9010 3.44 14238 3.99 15105 3.96 12375 3.80
31 15108 5.77 20331 5.70 25074 6.57 19634 6.03
32 2211 0.84 5064 1.42 5371 1.41 4005 1.23
33 18926 7.23 21536 6.04 24954 6.54 21508 6.61
34 6767 2.59 8541 2.40 10458 2.74 8332 2.56
35 16816 6.43 23223 6.51 23026 6.03 20566 6.32
36 8808 3.37 11548 3.24 8547 2.24 9512 2.92
37 14852 5.68 17453 4.89 17622 4.62 16253 4.99
38 18980 7.25 41918 11.76 34434 9.02 30443 9.35
39 2594 0.99 3425 0.96 3172 0.83 2989 0.92
All 261617 100 356584 100 381542 100 325522 100
(20 23
24 38) 45. 45 41.93 50.40 48.70
Sources; 1967-1975, NSSG Annual Industrial Survey, Table 6 
1976-1988, NSSG Labour Force Statistics, Table 3.
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Table A4.4.11.
ANNUAL CHANGES
MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT OF SALARY
1965-1988
AND WAGE EARNERS BY BRANCH
Year 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
ranch
20 2.05 6.92 0.13 -1.04 3.79 12.98
21 10.13 19.56 12.39 -8.00 -0.17 22.93
22 7.62 —4.94 -13.63 -8.31 -12.47 1.28
23 0.98 2.31 -3.85 -6.44 -2.39 9.17
24 5.06 3.90 5.34 0.65 0.62 20.74
25 13.75 3.73 2.38 -2.05 4.94 13.82
26 3.16 2.17 0.07 0.63 -3.28 20.90
27 16.07 8.26 -0.02 1.01 -5.65 5.20
28 0.73 6.38 -3.83 -2.96 3.32 4.92
29 -1.22 -5.22 0.77 -5.67 -1.51 0.68
30 4.72 8.88 3.33 4.20 15.81 -8.76
31 19.28 3.91 -1.60 2.13 4.98 4.95
32 21.64 3.45 2.47 11.54 -5.02 39.57
33 14.05 3.50 -2.18 -2.70 -0.96 9.57
34 23.82 37.13 2.42 7.18 18.10 12.91
35 3.07 1.09 -5.65 1.82 1.96 11.43
36 5.89 4.04 1.61 -3.13 7.69 4.80
37 3.77 -1.95 9.29 1.01 8.87 21.29
38 6.88 1.87 -5.91 -1.96 11.39 18.38
39 16.14 7.42 1.15 6.94 1.67 27.87
All 5.93 3.77 -1.45 -1.96 2.10 11.06
Year 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
ranch
20 4.82 0.65 3.96 9.92 1.80 -8.95
21 10.56 6.51 5.17 10.49 -1.91 -8.99
22 -3.13 -9.62 -1.77 1.56 -6.10 18.83
23 6.45 6.35 8.15 6.38 5.31 2.53
24 8.92 10.98 12.45 36.47 8.28 -4.12
25 6.11 10.52 10.12 7.42 -8.28 -8.09
26 1.32 4.55 3.79 20.53 -3.62 14.12
27 2.34 0.91 0.90 5.13 1.57 5.78
28 5.80 0.54 4.23 2.19 -1.20 6.46
29 — 0.54 -12.96 1.04 23.87 -4.87 1.17
30 8.68 9.83 6.42 7.01 10.55 7.97
31 2.27 10.60 10.39 6.17 -0.07 12.23
32 -3.54 15.24 33.39 18.96 -0.65 44.68
33 4.81 1.00 5.12 8.94 -2.09 0.54
34 7.50 7.01 14.52 1.99 7.03 -10.53
35 4.05 8.26 6.93 11.58 1.47 -0.52
36 3.32 1.93 11.15 9.48 -2.76 14.50
37 14.74 10.58 10.43 2.73 -11.10 8.13
38 20.47 8.33 9.34 17.22 1.22 40.75
39 5.96 7.65 14.29 0.84 6.79 6.44
All 6.56 5.21 7.64 10.50 1.19 5.09
(continued)
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Table A4.4.11(continued)
ANNUAL CHANGES
IN MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT OF SALARY AND WAGE EARNERS BY BRANCH
1965-1988
Year 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Branch
20 -0.37 1.14 -4.25 3.54 -1.10 -3.14
21 0.67 4.17 1.19 -2.20 -4.99 0.51
22 4.62 -1.81 0.25 -2.54 -2.20 -2.63
23 2.90 -0.38 0.35 1.78 -5.81 -3.66
24 9.84 7.69 7.67 -10.52 -0.10 1.04
25 0.91 -3.11 0.85 4.09 -5.10 -7.12
26 -4.67 -4.93 -6.27 -7.72 -2.17 -6.57
27 0.22 0.73 -1.18 -2.25 —4 .45 -2.60
28 —0.94 -0.16 1.58 -3.48 —8.06 -1.90
29 2.44 2.89 -3.85 -4.87 -2.80 -5.15
30 3.51 6.74 5.98 -3.33 4.48 5.37
31 -3.86 -2.46 1.08 3.63 1.19 0.05
32 2.32 -3.13 2.95 -2.88 -1.16 2.72
33 0.80 -0.63 -2.50 -1.90 -4.75 -5.76
34 -1.67 -0.57 2.38 2.19 -6.74 -4.80
35 6.76 1.96 0.65 -1.55 2.73 -4.43
36 5.61 0.08 -5.89 —13.66 -3.58 -2.32
37 -7.67 -0.52 -3.73 -0.76 -2.79 -1.03
38 9.44 -1.27 0.73 2.20 7.93 -1.60
39 0.09 -6.99 -1.89 -11.89 -17.20 -7.78
All 2.58 0.57 0.22 -1.28 -1.24 -2.18
Year 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Branch
20 17.92 6.76 10.71 -0.05 1.92 5.59
21 26.60 3.96 11.66 -0.89 -2.55 -1.91
22 -10.49 -7.31 11.90 8.52 -20.17 11.19
23 3.80 0.52 4.24 3.60 -1.28 -2.58
24 44.51 0.17 -7.12 -1.31 -0.27 1.67
25 19.86 -6.18 1.55 -0.32 -5.02 -1.11
26 34.85 -6.85 -16.85 -4.57 2.81 -1.18
27 32.33 1.30 2.50 4.17 7.44 -5.19
28 14.53 -2.85 -4.88 -1.11 -1.12 -3.41
29 24.94 10.85 14.86 2.25 -11.69 -6.33
30 0.36 -1.69 -9.56 -1.81 -4.07 -1.25
31 30.69 -5.62 -2.85 -0.09 0.16 -0.56
32 —3 . 06 -0.49 -1.72 8.69 2.74 2.73
33 32.79 1.54 4.71 -0.23 -3.09 0.34
34 32.79 5.38 11.11 -1.95 -10.20 -2.23
35 -0.08 -0.19 -0.94 2.46 -1.76 -1.55
36 -16.09 -2.27 12.05 -5.34 -6.49 3.26
37 6.17 -2.17 11.95 —0.88 -4.88 2.14
38 -34.06 -4.01 9.61 -5.47 4.81 7.31
39 24.97 0.05 15.35 1.37 0.54 5.59
All 9.27 -0.07 3.10 0.10 -1.30 1.03
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APPENDIX 3; RELATIVE WAGE FLEXIBILITY IN GREEK MANUFACTURING, 
CORRELATION AND REGRESSION RESULTS AFTER INCLUDING IN 
THE EMPLOYMENT VARIABLE BOTH SALARY AND WAGE EARNERS 
INSTEAD OF WAGE EARNERS ALONE.
A methodological issue concerning the variable for employment has 
to be addressed before proceeding in testing for the existence of 
relative wage flexibility in Greek manufacturing. Which variable 
for employment should we use? Employment of salary and wage 
earners or employment of wage earners alone? Theory, of course, 
does not specify which changes in employment should be looked at 
primarily. For instance, when we discuss the expanding 
employment, and we consider it as indicator of excess demand for 
labour in the short-run, under inelastic supply of labour, should 
we refer to both salary and wage earners or only to wage earners?
This is a matter which, at first sight, should be resolved on the 
basis of data homogeneity. From this point of view, as the 
variable for wages is the annual average hourly pay of male and 
female wage earners, the variable for employment of wage earners 
was preferred. But in the correlation analysis as well as in the 
cross-section analysis, to allow for any important difference 
caused by, or causing, substitution effects, we used both 
variables for employment, that is employment of salary and wage 
earners and employment of wage earners alone.
Changes in nominal wages refer to average hourly wage of workers
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of both sexes, while changes in employment are represented by two 
alternative variables, one for salary and wage earners and a 
second for wage earners alone. Correlation coefficients for 
salary and wage earners and for wage earners alone, were, 
sometimes, found slightly different but not important differences 
are observed with regard to either their sign or their level of 
significance. In fact, as shown by correlation analysis results 
not reported here, correlation between changes in these two 
alternative variables for manufacturing employment was found very 
high, sometimes approaching the value of unity.
Moreover, an interesting issue is the relatively higher, compared 
to changes in employment of wage earners alone correlation 
coefficient found for changes in employment of both salary and 
wage earners. It seems that higher wage increases were offered 
when the employment of salary and wage earners was expanding 
rather than when the employment of wage earners alone was 
expanding. Does this indicate that increases in employment of 
salary and wage earners give the signal of higher demand for wage 
earners? This can be explained by an internal labour market 
situation in which filling and hiring from within the firm is 
observed.
In the test for industry-specific influence upon changes in 
industry nominal wages we used these two alternative variables 
for manufacturing employment as well. One including both salary 
and wage earners and one including only wage earners. Not 
important differences were observed. This appendix contains the 
correlation and regression results of the specifications where
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both salary and wage earners were included in the employment 
variable. The following Tables with A prefix correspond to those 
included in Sections 5.4 and 5.5.
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Table A5.4.1.
BIVARIATE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS RELATING 
CHANGES IN NOMINAL VAGES AND CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT.
(Time periods: 1966-88, 1967-74, 1975-81, 1982-88).
Full Period: 1966-1988. Period: 1967-1974.
Changes 
of 
1 year 65/66-87/88 -.08* 66/67-73/74 .21***
2 years
n=460
65/67-86/88 -.08*
n=l60 
65/67-72/74 .16
3 years
n=440
65/68-85/88 -.16***
n=160 
65/68-71/74 .09
5 years
n=420
65/70-83/88 -.31***
n=140
10 years
n=380
65/75-78/88 -.38***
2 3 years
n=280
66/88 -.20
n=20
Period 1975-1981. Period 1982-1988.
of
1 year 74/75-80/81 .007 81/82-87/88 .02
n=140 n=140
.19**2 years 73/75-79/81
n=140
.09 80/82-86/88
n=l40
3 years 72/75-78/81 -.03 79/82-85/88 .13
n=140
-.26***
n=140
5 years 70/75-76/81 78/82-83/88 -.07
n=140
-.19**
n=140
.19**10 years 65/75-71/81 
n=14 0
72/82-78/88
n=140
Notes: Levels of Significance: * = 0.10, ** = 0.05, *** = 0.01
340
Table A5.4.2.
BIVARIATE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS RELATING CHANGES IN NOMINAL WAGES 
AND CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT OF SALARY AND WAGE EARNERS,
(Short-run and Long-run changes over the period 1966-88)
Period of Change:
1 year 2 years 3 years 5 years 10 years 23 years
Year
/66 .10
/67 .27 -.02
/68 -.24 .03 -.30
/69 .28 -.04 -.08
/70 — .06 -.003 — .23 -.19
/71 .31 .22 .21 -.15
/72 .27 .37 .15 -.11
/73 .20 .19 .30 .29
/74 -.03 -.28 -.22 .05
/75 — .26 -.01 -.31 —. 06 -.28
/76 -.27 -.18 -.23 -.10 — .21
/II .16 .29 .11 -.18 .07
/78 — .16 -.10 .10 -.13 .17
/79 -.57 -.55*** -.36 -.24 .07
/80 .28
'.50**
— .06 .33 .19
/81 .17 .24 .19 .05
/82 .04 .11 .40 .13 .04
/83 -.05 .18 .07 .02 .10
/84 .29 .16.. .24 .08 .07
/85 . 17 .49
;°6***
.11 .11
/86 .15 .28 .22 -.10
/87 .06 .13 .17 .003 — .06
/88 -.13 .09 -.10 .15 —.02 —.20
Notes : N = 20 (Two-digit industrial branches of manufacturing).
Levels of Significance: * —  O.lOf * * — 0.05f * * * — 0.01.
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Table A5.4.3.
BIVARIATE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS RELATING ANNUAL CHANGES 
IN NOMINAL WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT OF SALARY AND WAGE EARNERS 
(comparison between coefficients for all branches 
and coefficients for expanding branches)
Year
Period
CHSWEi
of Change:1 year 
CHSWEi>0
/66 .10 .09
/67 .27 .14
/68 -.24 -.41
/69 .28 .36
/70 —. 06 -.04
/71 .31 .32
/72 .27 .17
/73 .20 .21
/74 -.03 -.03
/75 -.26 -.20
/76 -.27 -.24
/77 .16 .04
/78
/79 -'.57***
/80 .28 -.01
/81 .17 .14
/82 .04 .25
/83 —. 05 —. 04
/84 .29 .33
/85 .17 .15
/86 .15 .24
/87 .06 -.14
/88 -.13 -.18
Notes: N = 20 (Two-digit industrial branches of manufacturing).
Levels of Significance: * = 0.10, ** = 0.05, *** = 0.01
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Table A5.5.1.
ESTIMATES OF THE INDUSTRY SPECIFIC DETERMINANTS OF NOMINAL WAGE 
CHANGES ACROSS MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES IN GREECE. 
(base-year to end-year changes)
Dependent Variable: CHWi
Period CT CHSWEi CHPRi WLi CHFEi r 2/r 2F-value
1966
/88
n=20
4,695.76
(12.14)
.51
(.60)
2.37**
(2.29)
-87.21**
(-2.76)
.46
.36
4.58**
4,691.77
(12.36)
2.27**
(2.27)
-82.84**
(-2.75)
.45
.39
6.95**
1967
/74
n=20
124.25
(4.29)
-.02
(-.18)
.13
(.94)
-.82
(-.35) -
.08
.10
.45
125.49
(4.59)
.14
(1.12)
-1.01
(-.50) -
.08
.03
.69
1975
/81
n=20
215.80
(7.46)
.33
(1.31)
.16
(1.05)
1.62**
(2.06)
.31
.18
2.39**
212.85
(7.23)
.06
(.42)
1.81**
(2.28)
.24
.15
2.62**
1982 
/88 
n=2 0
192.34
(10.19)
-.07
(-.05)
.001
(.005)
-.17
(-1.64)
-.40
(-.55)
.22
.01
1.04
191.07
(10.46)
.03
(.23)
—. 16 
(-1.67)
-.41
(-.59)
.20
.01
1.36
1977
/88
n=20
887.61
(15.91)
-.18
(-.42)
-.29
(-.87)
-2.74**
(-2.87)
—4.62* 
(-2.01)
.61
.51
5.88**
885.61
(16.36)
-.29
(-.89)
4c
-2.72 -4.63 
(-2.93) (-2.07)
.61
.53
8.20***
Notes:CHWi = Change in Nominal Hourly Wage Paid in Branch i.
CT = Constant Term.
CHSWEi= Change in Employment of Salary and Wage Earners 
in Branch i.
CHPRi = Change in Productivity in Branch i.
WLi = Initial Level of Wage in Branch i.
CHFEi = Change in the Share of Female Employment in Branch i
Levels of Significance: * = 0.10, ** = 0.05, *** = 0.01.
t-statistics in brackets.
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Table A5.5.2.
ESTIMATES OF THE INDUSTRY SPECIFIC DETERMINANTS OF NOMINAL WAGE 
CHANGES ACROSS MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES IN GREECE,
(year to year changes)
Dependent Variable: CHWi
Period CT CHSWEi CHPRi Sli WLi CHFEi F-value
1966 
-88 
n=4 60
17.83 -.12** 
(28.50)(-2.42)
-.11***
(-2.80)
.20*** .0003 .09 
(5.36) (.093)
10.90***
1967
-74
n=160
-4.29
(-2.54)
—. 05 
(-.73)
-.12***
(-3.02)
10.62*** .87*** .43 
(2.40) (9.80)
29.80***
1975
-81
n=l40
23.47
(22.99)
.04
(.64)
.03
(.63)
-.005 .02 .02 
(-.19) (1.44)
.56
1982
-88
n=140
35.44
(20.57)
.02
(.23)
.10*
(1.69)
.18*** -.05*** -.16**.53 
(3.75)(-10.78) (-2.56)
29.56***
1977
-88
n=240
27.76
(35.38)
— . 04 
(.50)
-.03
(-.78)
.05* -.03*** -.19***.34 
(1.72)(-10.44) (-3.33)
24.43***
Notes :CHWi = 
CT
Change in 
Constant
Nominal
Term.
Hourly Wage Paid in Branch i.
CHSWEi= Change in Employment of Salary and Wage Earners 
in Branch i.
CHPRi = Change in Productivity in Branch i.
Sli = Index of Strike Activity in Branch i.
WLi = Initial Level of Wage in Branch i.
CHFEi = Change in the Share of Female Employment in Branch i
Levels of Significance: * = 0.10, ** = 0.05, *** = 0.01.
t-statistics in brackets.
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